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ABSTRACT
In countries of conflict, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often 
resort to humanitarian relief. A small number of peace and conflict resolution 
organizations (P/CROs) engage more directly, through grassroots mediation, elite 
negotiation and advocacy. This thesis observes the potential for implementing 
such direct conflict interventions in traditional relief and development 
organizations.
To understand current NGO activities, I examine ten case study 
organizations in two countries of conflict, Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia. I analyze 
organizations' rhetorical presentation, their society-level engagement, strategies 
for intervention, and responses to persistent challenges, such as security, 
impartiality, collaboration and evaluation. Based on conflict study literature, I 
make tentative recommendations for NGOs in Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia 
specifically. I also propose a more general system for classifying NGO peace 
work: five generations of conflict intervention, each more integrated, direct, and 
political. Rhetorical, structural and operational changes will help organizations 
move toward higher generation work. 
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PREFACE
SHATTERING CONTEMPORARY HEROES
Over the past half-century, transnational non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) have become a powerful force in global civil society. The number of such 
formalized groups of global change-makers has exploded, from fewer than 1,000 
following World War II to as many as 63,000 today (Karns and Mingst 2004; 
“Yearbook of International Organizations” 2011). They are addressing social 
injustice in almost every country in the world, touching on almost every 
sociopolitical issue, including poverty, disease, education, contemporary slavery, 
minority rights, and environmental destruction.
Some optimistic observers see this era as a coming-of-age of global civil 
society; “public opinion has become the second superpower” (Barnes 2005, p. 
13). Where revolutionary spirit was once insulated, contemporary communication 
technology facilitates transnational networks of like-minded radicals. Progressive, 
people-centered activism has increasingly demanded structural change, and 
slowly, institutions are beginning to listen. NGOs have acquired an increasingly 
prominent role, both 'at the table' and 'on the ground', in service-delivery, 
advocacy, and information sharing. Through intergovernmental organizations, like 
the United Nations, thousands of NGOs have consultative status, attend 
conferences and advise on treaties (Reinalda and Verbeck 2001). Certain 
movements have been particularly successful, capturing international imagination 
and changing global policy. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines was a 
game changer through the 1990s, resulting in an international treaty to ban land 
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mines, and a 1997 Nobel Peace Prize recognizing the feat of global organizing. 
NGOs saw similar success in campaigns for a UN Climate Convention, the 
International Criminal Court, HIV / AIDS awareness, and debt reduction in 
developing countries (Barnes 2005). 
While the growth of non-governmental organizations is certainly a 
positive trend, it is distressingly romantic to believe that their arrival signals the 
end of global injustice or the pre-eminence of grassroots democracy. As with 
anything formalized and commodified, the passion of spontaneous activism, once 
packaged in a globally competitive institution, loses much of its authenticity. The 
profound pluralism suggested by the sheer number of transnational NGOs 
crumples before the reality that the eight largest U.S.-based NGOs, including 
household names like CARE and World Vision, make up 80% of all U.S. aid to 
Africa (Anheier 1990). Far from a idealized democracy, NGOs grapple with an 
oligarchy of major players, external pressures from donors, governments and 
intergovernmental actors, as well as internal hierarchies and power struggles. 
NGO critic William DeMars (2005) explains, “The tendency by scholars to credit 
utopian premises based on mundane practices reflects the self-understanding of 
NGOs themselves” (p. 4). As the only significant private actors in international 
good-deed doing, it comes easily for NGOs to uncritically assume their work is 
ground-breaking and laudable. 
DeMars take on NGOs mirrors my own. Though he has written numerous 
articles and at least two books lambasting the organizations, he also describes 
himself as an ardent supporter of their work, in humble gratitude to their service. 
x
It is precisely because these organizations have so much social and political 
potential that is it necessary to understand and rethink the challenges and traps 
they face. 
Many NGOs retell touching origin stories to evoke the initial energy that 
inspired their work. One goliath, CARE International, has perhaps the best 
known, most quintessentially American account. U.S. Army surplus food parcels 
were shipped to starving families in Europe, in a show of solidarity with Allied 
victims of war. As John F. Kennedy remarked, “Every CARE Package is a 
personal contribution to the world peace our nation seeks. It expresses America's 
concern and friendship in a language all people understand.” (qtd. in care.org) 
Like child sponsorships or slave redemptions, CARE packages are heart-warming 
but hollow, an easy way to engage donors without making any serious impact on 
either world peace or social justice (see Anderson 1996; Smith 2004; Bales 2005).
Fortunately, NGOs have matured since the 1950s. As other international 
actors recognize NGOs' presence as more than flash phenomenon, “growing 
concern for the effectiveness and accountability of NGOs raises questions among 
donors and NGOs themselves as to whether NGOs are really working to solve 
underlying problems, or are serving as 'Band-Aids'” (Lindenberg and Bryant 
2001, p. 176). In response, organizational managers have begun strategizing for 
the long-term, scrutinizing broader implications of their work. Of course, there are 
still organizations that deliver food aid, rely on child sponsorships for millions of 
dollars, and fund slaves' redemption. But for the most part, NGOs have declared 
their resignation from humdrum service as “ladles in the global soup kitchen” 
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(ibid). 
Instead, most globalized development organizations have committed to 
ending global poverty, a goal perhaps popularized by the UN Millennium 
Development Goals which carry enormous sway among NGO funders. A brief 
survey reveals widespread commitment. CARE self-identifies as “dedicated to 
ending poverty”. ActionAid is “ending poverty together”, while Lutheran World 
Relief works for “structures and policies that will address the root causes of 
poverty”. Oxfam joins the chorus: “We believe we can end poverty and injustice, 
as part of a global movement for change”. 
These organizations have been in the field for several decades now. They 
have seen injustice and experienced the frustration of failed programs. Staff have 
witnessed reoccurring need, stagnant health, wilting economies, and persistent 
illiteracy, even in the face of seemingly effective service delivery. In many ways, 
through rhetoric, programming and internal research, NGOs are pursuing methods 
to uproot social inequalities, stopping them not just for one child, today, but for all 
children, forever. The poverty-alleviation rhetoric is too lofty to be believable 
(with 1.7 billion people in absolute poverty, the problem won't disappear 
tomorrow), but at least attention to long-term outcomes helps staff and donors 
focus on methods to achieve structural – rather than piecemeal – changes. 
Nonetheless, this shift toward long-term poverty reduction has largely 
failed to reach the one area where structural changes are, arguably, most needed: 
conflict. Research is clear about the connection between poverty and violent 
conflict. Poverty – particularly relative poverty, or material and income inequality 
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between groups of people – contributes to the presence of violence (Crocker, 
Hampson and Aall 2009). According to “Relative deprivation” theory, when 
people cannot meet their most basic needs, and neither government nor civil 
society provide an adequate peaceful outlet for expressing these needs, people 
become frustrated and often violent (Gurr 1968). 
Similarly, violent conflict reinforces poverty. This takes no stretch of the 
imagination. During war, agricultural losses, disrupted markets, and human flight 
cause famine, dehydration and disease – indirect factors often more deadly than 
the violence itself (Steward 1998). Social and political structures crumble, 
infrastructure, such as roads, water systems and hospitals, are destroyed, 
unemployment rates skyrocket, and education falls by the wayside while people 
prioritize immediate survival. As development theorist Paul Collier (2007) quips, 
violent conflict is “development in reverse”, decades of aid, derailed in moments. 
Thus, when NGOs resoundingly commit themselves to ending poverty, it 
only makes sense that ending conflict would appear high on their formidable to-
do lists. Yet, basic humanitarian relief remains the dominant strategy of NGOs 
operating in countries of conflict (Stein 2001; Stewart 1998). This includes 
“airlifting food, clean water, and sanitation equipment to distressed populations, 
establishing shelter for homeless victims, providing repairs for salvageable 
structures, and the prevention, containment, and treatment of life-threatening 
diseases” (Aall 2009, p. 5). Organizations perform community-level triage, 
responding like fire fighters, focused on keeping the daily death toll as low as 
possible. 
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Far from ending violence, emergency relief exacerbates local conditions, 
often extending the trajectory of conflict (Abley 1997; Anderson 1996; Stewart 
1998). As researchers in India and Pakistan discovered, “no matter how much 
[NGOs] tell themselves that their intervention is 'humanitarian', there is no 
escaping the politics of the current situation” (Butalia 2004, p. 114). Emergency 
aid often causes violence to spread across geographic space and social strata (see 
chapter 4). At the very best, relief organizations function like doctors in a boxing 
ring, stitching up society just enough to enable continued violence and reverse 
development. 
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CHAPTER 1: NEW CONFLICTS, NEW ACTORS
Learning from the Experts
In popular dialogue about NGOs in countries of conflict, relief is typically 
seen as the nobler of two options: provide aid or get out. Whether an organization 
remains at the scene or evacuates, it typically continues to educate global civil 
society about the situation, makes pleas for financial support, and urges 
(inter)governmental actors to 'do something'. To the average donor, distanced 
from the violence, unaware of the complexity of local politics, this level of action 
can seem brilliant, brave, even hopeful. Aall (2009) explains, often NGOs in 
conflict are not examined critically because if they are at least meeting some basic 
need, they are doing more than we could have expected, helping a population so 
vulnerable at so great a risk. In theory, it seems reasonable to ask, “shouldn't the 
rest of the world simply appreciate the effort?” (ibid, p. 24). 
A small, but growing number of organizations advocate a much broader 
range of activities. These groups, termed “peace and/or conflict resolution 
organizations” (P/CROs), are as self-conscious about ending violent conflict as 
generalized transnational NGOs are about ending poverty (Gidron 2002). 
P/CROs, like the Search for Common Ground, the Carter Center, the Community 
of Sant'Egidio, the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, or the Crisis Management 
Institute, focus almost exclusively on methods of conflict prevention, resolution, 
and transformation.
Often, actors in conflict assume an unstated division of labor: the public 
sector maintains responsibility for violence prevention and peace-making, while 
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the private sector responds to immediate needs such as disease, drought and 
displacement. P/CROs fundamentally challenge this assertion (Gidron 2002; 
Bartoli 2009). These groups raise local consciousness, open dialogue, monitor, 
advocate, mediate, negotiate, and facilitate reconciliation. They function like 
civilian diplomats, pursuing resolution and peace-building, balancing violence 
mitigation with social justice. Aware that ignoring political realities doesn't make 
them disappear, P/CROs abandon lip service to 'neutrality', and forge headlong 
into sociopolitical conflict. 
Such organizations are in the minority, but lessons learned from their 
activities can be applied elsewhere. Conflicts are complex and multilayered. No 
magic bullet will end violence; only holistic peacebuilding, occurring at multiple 
dimensions at all levels of society, will produce lasting peace. As a result, there is 
no shortage of work to be done in the field of peace and conflict resolution and 
the few P/CROs cannot do it alone. Since generalized development NGOs have 
committed to long-term solutions for structural social change, strategic conflict 
transformation fits naturally among their objectives. These transnational giants 
bring enormous capacity to the work. In addition to trillions of dollars, they have 
sociopolitical resources aplenty: connections with local civil society, approval of 
the local government, relevant cultural and historical knowledge, established 
country offices and staff, well-worn systems of delivery, and vast international 
access to donors and advocates. To squander these resources on emergency aid is 
an enormous loss for the promise of world peace. 
As traditional development NGOs begin to include peace work in their 
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repertoire of responses to conflict, they can learn from the pitfalls and success of 
P/CROs. This thesis will draw on such lessons, explored in a growing literature, 
to suggest new roles for NGOs in conflict. In the following chapters, I consider 
what NGOs are doing now – to what extent they are already involved in conflict 
transformation – and how they can expand and improve their efforts. In particular, 
I examine practical challenges, such as legitimacy, accountability and security, 
struggles experienced by all NGOs, but particularly salient for organizations 
'doing' conflict resolution. These research questions will soon be elaborated in 
greater detail; first I define parameters and motivators underlying this research. 
Globalization and the Post-Cold War Era
Many of the same factors responsible for the explosive growth of NGOs 
have also contributed to new forms of conflict and injustice (Karns and Mingst 
2004). Globalization seemed at first promising to many. Economic integration 
would produce social and political cooperation, rendering antagonistic political 
allegiances irrelevant (Renner 1999). These hopes have not come to fruition. 
Instead, globalization has created multilayered inequalities between political elites 
in the global North and South, and within countries across economic classes. 
Because globalization “entails severe dislocation and social pain, and because it is 
experienced as a challenge to local control and democratic accountability, 
economic globalization tears at the very fabric of many societies”, a tragic 
phenomenon cast lightly in the witticism, “Jihad vs. McWorld” (ibid, p. 46). 
In recent decades, the state has become both more and less relevant 
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(Weenink 2001). On one hand, it has lost coercive and material power on the 
international stage, giving way to new global actors like intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational 
corporations (MNCs). On the other hand, the state has more referent, symbolic 
power through “localization” – nationalism and xenophobia (Renner 1999). As 
communication and transportation technologies improve, and economic, political 
and environmental crises force global migrations, diverse cultures are interacting 
more than ever. Even while free-trade agreements permit unrestrained commerce 
across borders, protecting multinational corporations and the world's largest 
economies, heightened border security prevents border-crossing by migrants and 
refugees. Such policies, coupled with exploitative economic practices, like 
substandard wages and natural resources extraction, have worsened both relative 
and absolute poverty in developing countries. 
During the Cold War, stand-off between the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
polarized allies; conflicts were characterized by inter-state competition and non-
direct engagement (Bariyo 2007). The end of the Cold War initiated what is, by all 
accounts, a new era of civil strife (Mawlawi 1993; Kriesberg 2009; Roucounas 
2000; Gleditsch 2009). Inter-state violence, with clear enemies and explicit 
objectives, has been replaced by intra-state chaos. Even this distinction is 
muddled: when sovereignty is contested and lies at the heart of a dispute, 'inter-' 
and 'intra-' become highly contested terms (Bartoli 2009). Moreover, dynamics in 
each country affect neighboring countries, via trade and migration. As a result, 
civil conflicts quickly become regional conflicts, mired in local, national and 
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transnational politics. Suffice it to say that conflict has gotten more complicated. 
While the daily death toll hasn't necessarily increased, conflicts have become 
more intractable, habitually ingrained in civilians' way of life (Mack 2008). 
According to Bariyo (2007), “these intra-state conflicts do not only retard 
development in a country, but are the biggest root causes of human suffering in 
Africa” (p. 28). 
According to UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, conflict in Africa, with 
the highest density of conflicts in the world today, can be traced to political and 
cultural legacies of colonialism, contemporary intervention by global 
superpowers, “winner-take-all” political victories, abusive governance in weak 
states, widespread violations of human rights, high rates of unemployment, 
competition for land, and the international arms trade (Annan 2004). Bariyo 
(2007) describes a useful framework for categorizing causes of conflict. 
Economic factors, the first and most prominent of the four causal categories, 
includes large numbers of unemployed youth available to fight, frustration with 
inadequate government, environmental degradation, and profiteering from war, 
through the sale of weapons, the extraction of unguarded natural resources, or the 
distribution of food at exorbitant prices. These economic factors are most 
conducive to grassroots-level violence prevention, strategic development and 
(inter)national advocacy, and best addressed pre-emptively. Social factors are 
similarly amenable to grassroots-level resolution, but require mediation, dialogue 
and awareness-raising. These issues include ethnic marginalization, religious 
differences, and xenophobia, and can be addressed in conflict prevention if actors 
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are attentive to micro-conflicts, or disputes at the community level. Both political 
and external factors will require much higher level mediation and negotiation, at 
national and international scales. Political factors include repression, lack of 
transparency, or wasteful governance; external factors can be regional, such as 
border crossing of refugees and small arms, or fully international, such as 
exploitation by multinational corporations. In most modern conflicts, all four 
factors are at play, with varied importance depending on the level of society and 
the stage of the conflict. 
While Annan and Bariyo present potential explanations for individual 
conflicts, Renner (1999) explains why intractable civil conflicts have increased 
globally. Worldwide, at least 150 million people are unemployed and another 900 
million underemployed, which foments protest, instability and criminality. 
Growing disparities in income, employment, job security, health, and education 
lead to institutionalized marginalization and oppression; modern communication 
technologies permit heightened awareness and resentment of global disparities. 
These processes are further reinforced by flagrant rights violations, such as 
migrant detention, sex slavery, and torture, which capitalize on economic and 
political vulnerabilities. While environmental factors, such as poor land 
management and resource scarcity, have always incited conflict, environmental 
degradation is now much more globalized through climate change and its 
subsequent impacts, including natural disasters, drought, floods, famine, and 
disease. Local economies that depend on natural resource extraction, farming, and 
land ownership are generally most affected by environmental deterioration; 
6
because the effects are disjointed from their root causes, environmentally-inspired 
conflict is most likely to operate locally.
Understanding the complexity of these causal factors is essential in order 
to appropriately respond. We are no longer faced with a 'clash of civilizations', as 
in World War II or the Cold War, in which ideologies divided enemies and states 
called all the shots. Today's peace-making means more than strategic conversation 
with national diplomats. The complexity of today's social dynamics requires 
conscious peacebuilding at all levels, along all dimensions. In the oft-quoted 
words of John Paul Lederach, “there is need to build peace from the bottom up, 
the top down, and the middle out” (qtd. in Fischer 2006, p. 20).
The sundry causes of conflict – their complexity, interrelation, and 
derivation from dominant forces in contemporary society – make conflict 
resolution seem next to impossible. States, intergovernmental organizations and 
multinational corporations wield enormous fiscal, military and legal power. It is 
easy to ask, how could NGOs, puny by comparison, without comparable legal 
stature or protections, possibly contribute to structural changes at this level? The 
question is equally valid in the negative: how could they not? Renner (1999) 
presents NGOs with a challenge: “At the threshold of the twenty-first century, we 
thus face a choice: will we be overwhelmed by an endless string of internal wars 
capable of devastating entire countries and perhaps even reigniting interstate 
confrontations, or will we build the foundations for lasting peace?” (p. 8). 
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The Rise of Global Civil Society
The same trends of globalization and localization responsible for 
magnified human suffering have also contributed to a burgeoning civil society. 
Formalized structures governing human behavior are complemented by a “web of 
social relations that exist in the space between the state, the market (activities with 
the aim of extracting profit), and the private life of families and individuals” 
(Barnes 2005, p. 7). Although NGOs are one major component of global civil 
society, the concept also includes loosely defined social movements, media 
outlets, private foundations and philanthropy, professional associations, trade 
unions, educational and research institutes, political parties, chambers of 
commerce, religious institutions, and cultural associations (Barnes 2005; Karns 
and Mingst 2004). 
These groups emerge as a response to failures of the state and market to 
secure human well-being (Anheier 1990). Even while asymmetries in corporate 
capitalist markets exclude and exploit the global majority, states increasingly 
protect and default to market interests. Institutional inertia of both social 
structures has led many people to lose faith in their ability to provide justice. One 
strain of analysis suggests that citizens have reached a tipping point beyond which 
the magnitude of global inequalities are no longer acceptable byproducts of 
contemporary society. As awareness spreads about global injustice, people begin 
to feel “solidarity in the face of common threats” (Barnes 2005, p. 13). Through 
social movements, transnational advocacy networks, and civil society 
organizations, citizens are demanding an audience on the international stage. 
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This trend has positive implications for peacebuilding at both local and 
global scales. Private associational life supports a robust democratic process 
(Gidron 2002). Through discourse, political debates are removed from the domain 
of ideology, granted nuance and rational analysis. Civil society organizations 
prevent the outbreak of violence between a government and its peoples, serving 
“as a go-between for citizens and the political system by articulating preferences 
and by contributing to the implementation of policies” (Reinalda and Verbeek 
2001, p. 152). Multiple, overlapping associations also smooth tensions between 
social groups delineated by traits such as race, ethnicity, tribe, or religion. 
Norms that arise from social discourse motivate and contextualize human 
behavior, creating what Edwards (2004) describes as the “good society”, 
governed by principles such as “love and forgiveness, truth and beauty, courage 
and compassion” (p. 37). Civil society organizations reinforce values of service 
and solidarity, altruistic behavior toward one's neighbors, and goodwill among 
humans as a collective, confronted with universal perils of birth, death and 
oppression. Advocacy, person-to-person organizing, and professional dialogue 
have advanced theories for explaining and improving social reality. The construct 
of human rights, for example, has gained currency among state and interstate 
organizations because a collection of NGOs, activists, lawyers, and academics, 
among others, promoted the concept. Today, labeling a policy or practice a 
'violation of human rights' carries strong moral and judicial implications. 
Similarly, norms about non-violence, trust and cooperation inspire, and are further 
reinforced by, civil peace efforts:
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All throughout human history, one finds lofty rhetoric about peace, realism 
about the terrible impact of warfare, and skepticism about war's merits. 
What is different in our age is that civil society – peace movements and 
other citizens' groups – appears to be playing a far more important role 
than in the past, trying to subject security policy to greater public scrutiny 
and to wrest it from the narrow control of military bureaucracies and 
defense intellectuals. (Renner 1999, p. 29). 
Even in light of these positive moral outcomes, Edwards (2004) cautions 
against uncritical optimism about civil society. Criminal gangs and terrorist 
organizations are the most obvious proof that civil society does not necessarily 
promote virtuous citizenship. These marginal organizations mirror less extreme 
but equally self-interested groups in the mainstream. Though many associations in 
civil society arise in response to social inequalities, they also reproduce the same 
circumstances they seek to uproot. Unequal access to income and education, for 
example, impacts who can participate, to what extent, and with what degree of 
power. Discriminatory beliefs and practices, based on race, ethnicity, sex, religion, 
or sexual orientation, are reproduced in social interaction as powerfully as they 
are in political and economic exchange. Even in theoretical ideal, egalitarian civil 
society can lead to decreased political participation and eventually, a collapse of 
the state, “exactly the correlation that has been observed for contemporary 
America, where associational life is in danger of becoming a substitute for 
politics” (ibid, p. 43).
Ultimately, the only truism is pluralism. For every issue, there will be 
voices of favor and dissent: pro-choice organizations and pro-lifers; LGBTQ 
rights' groups and religious conservatives; pro-immigrant groups and border 
security proponents; 'free'- and 'fair'- trade organizations; capitalists and socialists; 
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doves and hawks. This third space between the state and the market should be 
populated, but not romanticized. It is essential that individuals have outlets 
through which to associate, organize and self-express; this value of civil society 
cannot be denied. However, because civil society organizations are as likely to do 
harm as good, analysis about these organizations should be as critical and 
discerning as studies of the other two sectors. 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) Defined
The rapid proliferation of NGOs has been a dominant factor in the 
emergence of civil society. According to the Union of International Associations, 
there are at least 63,000 international NGOs in 300 countries, “in every field of 
human endeavor” (2011). The number of national NGOs – organizations 
operating within only one country – is easily in the billions. Nepal has an 
estimated 15,000 NGOs; Russia, 277,000; India, 3.3 million; and in Kenya, at 
least 250 new organizations are created every year (Hudock 2009; Lee 2010). 
These organizations have immense resources and capacity. The 
international NGO sector rakes in over $1 trillion annually, and “employs over 19 
million people, not to mention countless volunteers” (Hall-Jones 2006). 
Approximately 3,200 NGOs have consultative status with the U.N., meaning they 
can report to and advise various commissions and conferences of the IGO. While 
local and national NGOs exist everywhere, most international NGOs headquarter 
in the global North and receive funding from governments, corporations, 
philanthropic foundations and individuals. They form around a vast range of issue 
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areas, including “major social cleavages such as class, religion, region, language 
or ethnicity, or... progressive goals such as the environment, human rights and 
development, or... conservative goals such as opposition to abortion, family 
planning and immigration” (Karns and Mingst 2004; p. 219). Table 1.1 displays 
the number of NGOs by issue area in 2002 and 2003. After 'defense', 'law, policy 
and advocacy' is the fastest growing area of NGO activity, and reflects 
organizations' aforementioned commitment to ending poverty at its root.
Table 1.1: Overall Growth Rate of NGOs by Purpose: 2002-2003
Purpose 2002 2003 % change 2002 – 2003
Culture and Recreation 3,531 3,666 3.8
Education 3,077 3,212 4.4
Research 12,161 12,387 1.9
Health 2,869 2,925 2.0
Social Development 6,303 6,434 2.1
Environment 1,740 1,781 2.4
Economic Development, 
Infrastructure 14,880 15,221 2.3
Law, Policy and Advocacy 6,713 7,090 5.6
Religion 2,945 3,082 4.7
Defense 394 425 7.9
Politics 2,983 2,780 -6.8
Totals 57,596 59,003 2.4
Source: Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2005. 
Many studies have attempted to answer the question, Who are these 
actors? Larger organizations are generally well-known, for example: the 
International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), Greenpeace International, 
Doctors without Borders (MSF), Oxfam, Save the Children, World Vision, or 
Catholic Relief Services. However, defining the boundaries of the 'NGO' label is 
12
infinitely more challenging. 
Technically, the label 'non-governmental organization' includes anything 
beyond the immediate control of governments. In most definitions of 'NGO', 
freedom from state control is the first and most rigorously explored characteristic. 
However, as discussed in the previous section, 'civil society' and 'NGO' are far 
from synonymous. There are innumerable billions of civil society organizations. 
Imagine trying to count all the colleges, research institutes, trade unions, 
churches, synagogues, mosques, political parties, music groups, book clubs, and 
knitting circles in the world! Civil society is a vast concept that encompasses a 
wide range of social activities, none of which are connected to the government. 
Broader definitions of global civil society have even included 
multinational corporations (Karns and Mingst 2004; Reinalda, Arts and 
Noortmann 2001; Scherer, Palazzo and Baumann 2006). Clearly, these groups do 
not operation with the same principles and objectives as NGOs. Thus, 'NGO' must 
exclude both governmental agencies as well as profit-oriented businesses (Seibel 
and Anheier 1990). In literature on non-profit organizations in the U.S., the notion 
of a 'third sector' has become a popular descriptor for a category of fiscal 
activities distinct from private enterprise and government. Gulati (2001) describes 
the fundamental difference between these three sectors. Governments rely on 
public action to produce public goods, while private enterprise uses private 
actions to produce goods enjoyed privately. The nonprofit sector – in idealized 
theory – combines private action with public benefit. 
Ropers (2002) adds that NGOs, by definition, must be voluntarily 
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associated. Membership or employment with an NGO may not be the result of de 
facto inclusion, as in a state or union, but must be the choice of free individuals. 
NGOs may not: “contribute to the professional or leisure interests of its members 
or target groups”, have political ties to any one party or candidate, or 
“discriminate against anyone on the grounds of his or her ethnicity, religion, 
gender, etc.” (ibid, p. 98). 
All of these definitions fall apart upon closer examination. As discussed 
previously, civil society can work to reduce its discriminatory practices, but 
cannot completely escape the reproduction of discrimination and inequality so 
long as these factors are present in society. Similarly, to claim that NGOs lack 
political affiliation is like saying an object lacks color; politics are inescapable 
qualifiers. NGOs function to achieve sociopolitical modifications to the structure, 
function or condition of society. This necessarily means NGOs are political – 
politically motivated, affiliated and influenced (Petras 1990). Strategic NGOs 
pursue desired political outcomes; ineffective NGOs ignore or deny their political 
implications. 
Defining NGOs by the exclusion of groups that serve interests of its 
members seems laughable in light of current trends in development work. The 
“weekly per-diem expenses” of international consultants, “never mind their fees, 
often amount to more than average annual per capita incomes” in the local 
community (Cooke 2004, p. 50). The “trappings” of the contemporary 
development worker include expensive hotels, “four-wheel drive, kits of sterile 
hypodermics... education, healthcare and status” (ibid). As the third sector is 
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mainstreamed, international development work becomes increasingly lucrative, in 
material and reputational terms. It is hardly possible to argue that these 
organizations do not exist, at least in part, to serve the interests of its employees. 
Even the basic definition of an NGO – anything that is neither government 
nor profit-oriented business – disintegrates before classifications such as BINGO 
(business-friendly international NGO), BONGO (business-oriented NGO), 
CONGO (commercial NGO), QUANGO (quasi-governmental NGO), and 
GONGO (governmentally-organized NGO) (Lewis 2001; DeMars 2005). Trends 
in non-profit activity, such as social enterprise, the generation of revenue through 
traditional market-based competition, or contracted service, the delivery of social 
goods funded and directed by the government, further erode the illusion of an 
isolated 'third sector'. In practice, Seibel and Anheier (1990) explain, “third sector 
organizations are different in relative, not in absolute terms: they may be less 
means-rational and less formal, and they may put more emphasis on solidarity and 
direct exchanges than do other actors”, but they are still driven by universal 
motivators such as power and money (p. 12). 
Criticism of NGOs has become a common subject of academic and 
popular literature. In 2001, during academics' early sobering from idealistic hope 
for NGOs, Reinalda and Verbeek wrote: “we reject the common idea in the 
literature on non-governmental organizations that NGOs are progressive, critical 
groups of activists who refuse to take part in common rules of the game, and who 
aim to fundamentally change policies in a certain field” (p. 148). Since then, 
criticism of NGO hypocrisy, corruption and co-optation  have come from 
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numerous sources (Anderson 1996; Krisberg 2009; Renner 1999). Reimann 
(2005) identifies five common themes of critique: NGOs' “performance and 
actual effectiveness; accountability issues; issues of autonomy; 
commercialization; and ideological and / or political interpretations of their rising 
influence” (p. 37). While NGOs are not inherently flawed, they face many 
external and internal pressures that promote hasty pursuit of warm fuzzies over 
measured steps toward lasting justice. Because of their tendencies and limitations, 
Reimann advocates for a “tempered” role of NGOs in the international sphere, in 
which they are neither excluded nor exclusive players in development work and 
conflict resolution. I agree that NGOs are problematic as currently constructed, 
and should never replace existing actors, but I maintain optimism that, if managed 
the right way, these organizations could transform social relations, leading the 
way to a peaceful future. 
Research Questions and Design
Questions and Hypotheses
This introductory chapter describes an opportunity for NGO innovation. 
Over the last fifty years of growth, NGOs have reached a certain level of maturity. 
Many have moved beyond band-aids and soup kitchens to more aggressive 
strategies for poverty alleviation, social justice, and peace. Partly in response to 
evidence that humanitarian relief exacerbates violence, a growing body of 
literature has grappled with new roles for NGOs in conflict. The post-Cold War 
era of complex, intractable violence may be just the moment for increased NGO 
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involvement in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. However, since an overview 
of civil society reveals that good intentions are not good enough, it is essential to 
critically examine: How might NGOs contribute to multilateral efforts to end 
violent conflict and generate long-term sustainable peace, while reducing the 
negative impacts of their work? This is the driving question in my research.
Lederach (2001) explains that effective conflict transformation must 
operate at all levels of society. However, the material and social limitations of 
NGOs suggest that states, IGOs and NGOs may need to divide labor in conflict 
response (Bauer 1990). In the absence of other international actors, as is the case 
in various intractable conflicts in Africa, NGOs must determine where they can be 
most productive, to maximize impact given their limitations. I hypothesize that 
the dispersion of power in society dictates the social level at which NGOs will be 
most effective. If power is dispersed – if a country in civil strife lacks a central 
government, has multiple warring factions, and violence spread over a large 
geographic area – I would expect to see NGO activity at the grassroots level. 
However, if power and conflict are centralized, primarily reliant on elite decision-
making, NGO involvement would occur at the level of national elites.
Just as NGOs must choose the level at which they operate, INGOs must 
prioritize which conflicts demand their intervention. Many of the largest, most 
transnational organizations are engaged in multiple countries around the world, 
focused on issue areas rather than particular geographic regions. Some abiding 
principles must determine when and where they choose to intervene. Two factors 
tug at the heart. On the one hand, countries with intractable conflicts are 
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compellingly broken, in great need of external support. Local communities have 
internalized violence through generations of trauma, and frequently, traditional 
actors in the international community have abandoned these regions as 'hopeless'. 
Alternatively, these intractable conflicts also tend to be the most dangerous, least 
stable, and least supportive of civil society; NGOs may wish to avoid these 
enormous security risks. Though both factors are worth considering, they are 
reactionary, born of empathy and fear, rather than strategic planning about the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of NGOs in conflict. 
Rupesinghe (1995) offers another consideration. Through case study 
analysis, he found that NGOs most successfully impact conflict as preventative 
peacemakers, responding thoughtfully to the very earliest stages of conflict. More 
than distributing aid, Rupesinghe argues, NGOs in the critical first moments of 
conflict should focus on “empowerment of people to build the will and 
mechanisms to hold governments and guerrillas accountable” (327). He provides 
examples of NGOs' effective early response in the Phillippines and El Salvador. 
Based on this research, I hypothesize that direct NGO involvement is most 
advantageous in the earliest stages of conflict. Thus, I would expect to see NGOs 
in early stages of conflict working actively to resolve, mediate, negotiate, and 
distill violence. In violent conflicts years old, I anticipate NGOs would be more 
engaged in emergency relief, rather than direct intervention. 
One of the primary advantages of an NGO, at least in theory, is its 
closeness to the grassroots community. Through years of service delivery or 
grassroots-level peace work, NGOs develop expertise about power relations and 
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social conditions (Reinalda and Verbeek 2001). Typically, reports from countries 
of conflict provide broad brush strokes on the human condition, such as the 
number of deaths or the spread of disease in refugee camps. NGOs are uniquely 
positioned to tell more nuanced narratives about the way particular groups in 
society are affected. For example, Butalia (2004) suggests that NGOs can 
illuminate the impact of conflict on women, ensure that women are included in 
discussions of conflict, and build the capacity of local women's groups. This fits 
recent trends in international development focused on women's empowerment 
(Anderson and Larsen 1998). 
NGOs' role in speaking for vulnerable populations in conflict may extend 
to other groups in society as well, including racial, linguistic, religious and sexual 
minorities. I hypothesize that this is the area of conflict response in which NGOs 
are most advantaged compared to state and interstate actors. If this hypothesis is 
correct, NGOs should be constantly atune to the conditions, needs and inclusion 
of vulnerable populations. More than empty talk or meaningless mention of 
minorities, NGOs should have strategic plans to support and advocate for 
minority populations.
Of course, not all organizations will have same priorities and decision-
making strategies. The unique structure, history and social context of an NGO 
influence its behavior choices (Lewis 2001). No matter how carefully academic 
theories analyze and advance roles for NGOs in conflict, organizations will 
grapple with operational realities that render academic theory irrelevant. 
Organizational parameters, such as size, country of origin, mission, funding 
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sources, and external partnerships, all impact the nature of an organization's 
involvement in conflict. As more research investigates the relationship between 
these factors and conflict responses, NGO managers can better craft their 
organizational structure based on the functions they hope to achieve.
The diversity of organizational rhetoric is one clear reminder that NGO 
strategies are only loosely tied to academic theory. For example, though 'conflict 
transformation' has gained currency in academic literature, seen as a turning point 
in peace studies (Lederach 1998; Howard 2001; Lindred et al. 2008), I 
hypothesize that organizations continue to use older terms such as 'conflict 
resolution'. Rhodes (2009) argues that the practical distinction between these 
seemingly disparate theories is insignificant. Given that that organizations are 
even less connected to peace studies literature than intergovernmental 
organizations, I doubt the theoretical debate manifests in NGO activities. 
Organizations use a wide range of terminology to describe local conditions 
(e.g. conflict, violence, crisis, emergency) and organizational response (e.g. 
conflict resolution, conflict prevention, conflict mediation, conflict 
transformation, reconciliation, peace advocacy, peace building). These rhetorical 
choices reflect: the nature of an organization's activities 'on the ground', the 
organization's political and social context, and its expectations about the interests 
of donors and partners. However, rhetorical choices are more than a metric for an 
organization's beliefs. They also double back on an organization, influencing how 
NGO staff conceive of their work, with whom the NGO connects and partners, 
and how future activities are selected and prioritized. In order to understand the 
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cause and effect of NGO rhetoric, I assess the frequency, meaning, context, and 
connotations of these terms, and consider how they might influence an 
organization's choice of activities.
Finally, to extend the analysis of organizational reality, I consider how 
NGOs respond to the challenges of conflict intervention. Although direct NGO 
involvement in conflict resolution is certainly not impossible as realist theorists 
like Kenneth Waltz contend (as described, for example, in Rutherford 2003), 
NGOs do face many limitations. Unlike external state and intergovernmental 
actors, few NGOs have armed forces to ensure security of their staff (Avant 
2007). Incidents, such as the killing of 18 peacekeeping soldiers in Somalia in 
1993 or 6 aid workers in Chechnya in 1996, have heightened anxiety about the 
safety of any perceived partiality in conflict zones. 
Whereas state and interstate organizations have formal (or 'hard') power, 
NGOs' power is 'soft', based in information, expertise, and local legitimacy (Karns 
2004). This means access to elite political figures must be earned, and is not 
immediately accessible. NGOs struggle to generate leverage internally and 
through international organizations in order to facilitate policy changes and 
negotiations (Gidron 2002). In order to amplify their power and rebuke domestic 
control, it is frequently observed that cooperation among NGOs, and with 
government and intergovernmental actors, is essential for effective service 
delivery, advocacy or mediation (Bakker 2001). 
Finally, NGOs, in all issue areas, but particularly in conflict resolution, 
struggle to evaluate their work. Whereas governmental organizations have clear 
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constituencies, and corporations, clear objectives, an NGO must define for itself 
whom it represents and for what purpose. For example, there is often a balance to 
be struck between the value of conflict as a method of achieving social justice, 
and the destructive impact of conflict on individuals and society (Bariyo 2007). 
The complexity of conflicts' causes and actors further exacerbates the struggle to 
define organizational success (Karns 2004). Many peace and conflict resolution 
NGOs, including the Carter Center and the Search for Common Ground, have 
dedicated entire research departments to crafting evaluation strategies. I briefly 
explore the extent to which generalized transnational organizations have taken up 
this challenge. 
Many of the aforementioned questions and hypotheses address the gap 
between NGO reality and potential in peace work. Using lessons extracted from 
the peace and conflict resolution organizations (P/CROs) and a growing body of 
literature on NGOs in conflict, I compare theoretical strategies and observed 
behavior, with suggestions for further engagement in long-term peacebuilding.
To summarize for clarity, my primary research question is: 
How might NGOs contribute to multilateral efforts to end violent conflict 
and generate long-term sustainable peace, while reducing the negative 
impacts of their work?
I am testing three hypotheses: 
1. The dispersion of power in society dictates the social level at which NGOs 
operate.
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2. NGO intervention is most direct during the earliest stages of conflict. 
3. NGOs prioritize the needs of vulnerable populations such as women and 
racial minorities. 
I will explore the following four sub-questions: 
1. How do organizational parameters (such as size, country of origin, 
mission, etc.) impact the nature of an organization's involvement in 
conflict?
2. How do NGOs represent their work to donors and constituents? What 
terms do they use to describe local conditions and their conflict responses? 
How do these linguistic choices shape organizational behavior?
3. How are NGOs addressing continued challenges such as: 
 Dangerous conditions for unarmed aid workers?
 Lack of formal legitimacy as negotiators?
 Collaboration with state and other non-state actors?
 Balance between impartiality and defense of human rights?
 Evaluation of effectiveness given complex systems?
4. What gaps exist between NGO reality and potential in conflict resolution? 
What more can NGOs do to effectively shift from emergency relief toward 
long-term peacebuilding?
Methodology
This study uses a comparative case study analysis to test hypotheses and 
explore research questions. In order to contrast relative extremes pertaining to the 
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first two hypotheses (highly dispersed and centralized power; fresh and intractable 
conflict), I examine conflict in Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire. In order to compare 
NGO behavior across a range of organizational parameters, I have selected six 
organizations from each country with diverse operational realities (see table 1.2). 
These organizations all engage in some measure of direct conflict intervention. 
The rationale behind the selection of the countries and organizations is explained 
in detail in chapters 5 and 6.
Table 1.2: Organizations Examined in this Research
Cote d'Ivoire Somalia
Medecins Sans Frontieres Medecins Sans Frontieres
Care International / Care UK Care International / Care UK
Carter Center Interpeace
Caritas World Vision
International Rescue Committee Mercy Corps
Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammernarbeit (GIZ) Horn Relief
Study Limitations
For information about NGOs' strategies, activities, and operational 
realities, I rely on web publications from the organizations themselves. This is 
advantageous for rhetorical analysis, to understand how organizations publicly 
explain their work. Bartoli (2009) uses similar methods of data collection about 
NGOs; she explains “methodologically, [this research] will draw upon material 
produced by the NGOs themselves as a tribute to self-representation” (p. 394). 
Also, because I have only selected organizations with significant online resources, 
the limitation is less significant than it might have been. However, no organization 
airs its dirty laundry; information about internal politics within staff or decision-
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making blunders are not accessible, as they would be in organizational interviews. 
Further, I often have no knowledge about the extent of a program's impact. With 
the exception of direct service delivery, organizations tend to describe their work 
qualitatively, which means I can only speak to the breadth – and not the depth – of 
activities. 
Both conflicts studied are actively occurring. This is a necessary provision 
for information availability; information about NGO activity in historical conflicts 
would be more difficult to access and would not reflect the cutting-edge in NGO 
program development. However, this stipulation complicates analysis. The 
conflicts are volatile and constantly changing, even over the course of my 
research. Since I obtain information about the conflicts second-hand – I am not 
living in either Somalia or Cote d'Ivoire – it is difficult to draw up-to-date 
conclusions about these conflicts specifically. I cannot say whether one program 
has been more or less meaningful to local communities. Country-specific 
recommendations, at best, exemplify the kind of strategic thinking useful to 
planning NGO interventions. Rather than mapping out an action plan for response 
in each country – a task far better suited to practitioners based locally – I merely 
strive to demonstrate trends in the divergence of NGO activity from their 
theorized potential. 
Finally, case studies are inherently limited in their capacity for 
generalization. Perhaps the worst possible NGO tack would be to assign one-size-
fits-all methodology for conflict response. Roucounas (2000) cautions, “we 
should always bear in mind that each case has its unique aspects and 
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generalization beyond a certain limit may often be partly deceptive” (p. 114). 
An Overview of the Thesis
This introductory chapter provides a context for the discussion of 
nongovernmental organizations in conflict transformation. The chapters that 
follow elaborate on the basic assumption that NGOs, when critically engaged and 
self-aware, can meaningfully contribute to the realization of peace. In chapter 2, I 
briefly summarize trends in peace and conflict studies, including theories about 
conflict transformation, peacebuilding and the balance between peace and justice. 
Chapter 3 examines theoretical justifications for the inclusion of non-state actors 
in conflict resolution, including alternatives to the primal debate between realist 
and liberal international relations theory. In particular, I examine how NGOs 
might fit into theories of multitrack diplomacy. Chapter 4 discusses the history, 
classification and challenges of NGOs in conflict. Major themes emerge, such as 
neutrality, community, and coalition building. Chapter 5 introduces the case study 
comparison between Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia, with explanation about the 
country choices, a history of conflict in each region, and a survey of context-
specific recommended next steps toward peace. Chapter 6 introduces the actors in 
each country, beginning with a survey of NGOs that pulled out of conflict and 
those providing only emergency relief. I describe why each target organization 
was selected, and consider the inclusion of peace and conflict work in their 
overarching objectives. Chapter 7 analyzes the rhetoric NGOs use to describe 
conflict conditions and responses. I explore why rhetoric matters both 
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theoretically and in the context of these organizations. Chapter 8, the heart of the 
case study, examines target organizations' responses to conflict as classified along 
theoretical axes, with comparisons between countries and NGOs. Chapter 9 
reviews target organizations' response to the challenges of conflict intervention, 
including security, impartiality, legitimacy and evaluation. In chapter 10, I make 
tentative recommendations related to Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia specifically, as 
well as general suggestions for NGOs in conflict.
This thesis responds to a contemporary struggle for international peace, 
with new actors and priorities than in decades past. As Renner (1999) asserts, 
many states and IGOs today still “cling to the belief that there can be simple 
military solutions to complex social, economic and environmental challenges. 
Altering these perceptions and assumptions will be a critical task of the twenty-
first century.” (p. 19) In other words, traditional conflict responders still operate 
on the ancient Latin adage, si vis pacem, para bellum ('if you seek peace, prepare 
for war'). The growth of NGO involvement in direct conflict intervention suggests 
enormous potential to challenge business as usual, advancing an alternate 
philosophy: si vis pacem, para pacem. NGOs, a wealth of human and material 
capital, lacking weaponry and official power, are in a prime position to enact non-
violent conflict resolution and contribute to genuine peace-building efforts.
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CHAPTER 2: CONFLICT INTERVENTION: AN OVERVIEW
Hypothetically, NGO intervention in conflict should follow best practices 
in peace theory and praxis. Whether organizational realities match theory will be 
the subject of chapters 6, 7 and 8. Here, I lay the groundwork, presenting an 
overview of trends in peace and conflict studies. I start with a seemingly benign 
question, fundamental to all peace literature, especially pertinent to contemporary 
developments such as conflict transformation: should we work to end conflict?
I then present loose boundaries along which the vast field of conflict 
response has been divided – conflict management, resolution and transformation, 
with overlapping parallels in the 'peace' family – peacekeeping, peacemaking and 
peacebuilding. Although definitions and distinctions vary depending on the 
source, much has been said about the significance of and differences between 
these paradigms. 
To cement these theories in modern circumstance, I examine how conflict 
intervention is affected by intrastate considerations. The interdependence of 
adversaries produces new forms of conflict, demanding new response. Since the 
case studies of Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire correspond to protracted and nascent 
conflicts, respectively, I touch on intractability and conflict prevention, two 
omnipresent themes in the literature.
Finally, the chapter ends with a debate quite similar to the question with 
which it started; in the pursuit of peace and justice, which social objective should 
be prioritized? To what extent are these ideals at odds with one another and how 
might they be reconciled? These questions help to identify how NGOs should 
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intervene, and what theoretical considerations they must weigh in their 
operational decision-making.
Pros and Cons of Conflict
The question of whether to end conflict seems obvious at first blush. Even 
beyond body counts, violence scars society and the individual, with legacies of 
psychological trauma, environmental devastation, and structural collapse. As 
decontextualized concepts, 'peace' and 'conflict resolution' have universal support. 
In context, however, people weigh violence against the alternative, the 
status quo. Conflict is a means to an end: a method to right social wrongs, 
redistribute power and resources, and cease otherwise interminable injustice. As 
Bariyo (2007) explains, conflict “fosters creative solutions”, “facilitates personal 
and social change” and spotlights intolerable conditions (p. 23). Gidron et al.  
2002 explains, 
In some ways, social conflicts are necessary for the stability of a 
democratic society. Oppressed groups create situations of conflict to spark 
social change. Yet social conflict can be dangerous in that when it turns 
violent, there is a chance that a cycle of violence will persist, sometimes 
for generations and even centuries, causing irreparable damage to society. 
(p. 8)
The idea that conflict can “turn violent” points to a critical rhetorical 
distinction: conflict, though used colloquially as synonymous with violence, is not 
equivalent. Note the difference between the terms: 
Conflict: a controversy, disagreement or opposition.
Violence: physical force exerted for the purpose of violating, damaging or 
abusing. (Morris 1969; p. 279, 1431)
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As defined, 'conflict' is neutral, a natural result of desirable pluralism; 
'violence' is strictly negative. The very purpose of violence is to cause injury. In 
war, belligerents attempt to cause enough injury that their opponent assents to 
their understanding of the disagreement. In other words, combatants strive to 
“out-injure” one another (Scarry 1985, p. 89). Though self-evident, this is an easy 
reality to forget, mired in debates over the morality or justness of conflict.
Competitive injury is not the only method to resolve a conflict, of course. 
Conflicts (i.e. disagreements) can be resolved through non-violent methods: 
dialogue, elections, judicial procedures, media, protests, marches, rallies, 
demonstrations, labor strikes, etc. If adequately supported by social infrastructure, 
any of these methods may generate exactly the same social benefits as violent 
conflict: a spotlight on intolerable conditions, the production of social justice, a 
redistribution of resources, and so forth. 
The essence of conflict intervention is to end violence (not conflict), 
promoting methods other than competitive injury to navigate controversy and 
disagreement. Activities such as facilitated negotiation help parties skip the injury 
and jump to resolution. However, if the resolution lacks support – if parties feel 
they could achieve better outcomes through continued violence – peace will not 
be sustainable. Responsible inteveners help parties identify a mutually acceptable 
future such that violence is no longer a desirable alternative to the status quo 
(Rhodes 2009). 
Of course, conflict intervention is not as simple as reaching an acceptable 
compromise. A myriad of factors complicate the matter. For example, warring 
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groups are not homogeneous, power struggles occur within groups as much as 
between, and early causes of disagreement are replaced by other motivators as 
violence persists (Ropers 2004; Lederach 1998; Croker et al. 2009). The 
following sections describe how scholars and practitioners have grappled with 
such concerns over the past 60 years. 
Conflict Management and Peacekeeping
An enormous range of terms have been used to describe conflict 
intervention: conflict management, conflict suppression, conflict settlement, 
conflict resolution, conflict transformation, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, 
peacemaking, peacebuidling, etc. As Kevin Clements explains, these terms “are 
often used very loosely and interchangeably and sometimes refer to exactly the 
same strategies” (qtd. in Rhodes 2009, p. 14). 
Although no definitions encompass all uses of these terms, Rhodes (2009) 
determines that there is a substantive difference. Figure 2.1 depicts the 
relationship between the terms ‘conflict management’, ‘conflict resolution’ and 
‘conflict transformation’. Although there is overlap in the way they are used, each 
term connotes a different set of values and activities. Figure 2.2, produced by 
Assefa 1999, displays these terms along a spectrum, from low participation of 
parties (e.g. force) to high participation (e.g. reconciliation).
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Figure 2.1: Relationship between Conflict Management, Resolution and 
Transformation
Figure 2.2: Spectrum of Conflict Response
Source: Assefa 1999, p. 37
Clearly Assefa prefers conflict transformation, since he considers it both 
more participatory and more proactive. This reflects a general trend in the 
literature since the 1990s toward conflict transformation. 
However, state interveners still overwhelmingly use conflict management 
(Kydd 2010). The strategy is closely tied to the dominant international relations 
theory, Political Realism which sees states as unitary, rational and self-interested 
(see chapter 3). Third party conflict management aims to control (but not 
32
Conflict 
Management: 
containing 
violence
Conflict 
Transformation: 
sustaining peace
Conflict 
Resolution: 
settling 
conflict 
necessarily end) violence in order ensure the national security of the intervening 
country (Jandt and Pederson 1996). 
The most extreme form of conflict management, farthest to the left on the 
spectrum in Figure 2.2, is violence suppression. According to Himes (1980), 
“even though conflict suppression is practiced in all known societies, it is 
nowhere fully supported by the dominant value system” (p. 257). Force is used to 
quell violence; methods include lethal attack, threats, military deterrence, arrest, 
“infiltration and cooptation” of rebel groups, propaganda, and strong-armed 
crowd control (ibid). Insurgents are given no voice, their concerns are not heard, 
and their underlying needs are not met. Research indicates that these methods 
usually fail to reduce the incidence of violence, and have been shown to 
exacerbate or prolong conflicts (Bar-Simon-Tov 1994). 
Less repressive forms of conflict management include adjudication, 
arbitration, negotiation and mediation (Bercovitch and Jackson 2001). In 
adjudication and arbitration, a third party determines the terms of peace. 
Adjudication follows formal judicial procedure in the international court, while 
arbitration requires that parties first select a third party observer to decide the 
terms of their disagreement. In negotiation, parties discuss outcomes of the 
conflict, using tactics to push opponents toward their desired solution. Each 
method aims for conflict settlement, a signed peace agreement that ends conflict 
settlement (Ropers 2004). 
Early conflict management measured success in the short-term (Bercovitch 
and Simpson 2010). Obtaining a settlement meant violence was over and third 
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party intervenors could go home. Scholars and practitioners, particularly 
advocates of conflict transformation, critiqued conflict management for its short-
sightedness. As a result, conflict management evolved to include more long-term, 
multi-dimensional approaches (Lynch 2001). 
Today, conflict management and conflict resolution practices have 
converged in their definition of success: both aim for enduring peace after 
settlement. Bercovitch and Simpson (2010) explain, “a major concern of each of 
the parties involved in a conflict is that there is no guarantee that war will not 
return, except for a faith that their former enemies will hold a preference for peace 
over war” (p. 76). Conflict resolution asserts that a quality peace agreement will 
guarantee the absence of war because both parties will be sufficiently satisfied 
with the outcomes that violence is no longer necessary. Conflict management, on 
the other hand, considers the sustainability of peace a question of security. From 
this perspective, “several factors can improve the durability of negotiated 
settlements, which include international security guarantees, [and] provisions for 
military and political power-sharing” (ibid, p. 70). Third party militaries remain 
post-settlement to ensure order, suppress violence, monitor elections and 
guarantee peace through the use of force. Once society has stabilized, troops can 
leave. Most scholars remain adamant that conflict management strategies “have 
proven less than adequate for dealing with the contemporary localized nature of 
global conflict” (Joyner 2010, p. 41). 
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Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking
Whereas conflict management emphasizes enforcing peace, conflict 
resolution inspires peace through meaningful agreement. The latter strategy has 
been defined as:
non-violent, cooperative intervention processes used by a mutually 
acceptable third party to intentionally understand the sources and 
dynamics of a problem and find a mutually acceptable, peaceful 
solution (Ilana Shapiro, qtd in Rhodes 2009, p. 45)
The emphasis on non-violent cooperation and mutual acceptability differ 
markedly from conflict management strategies that rely on force and coercion to 
convince parties to accept third parties, sign agreements and stop fighting. 
Conflict resolution also promotes values such as fairness and justice to ensure 
stable, equitable relations between parties into the future. 
Kriesberg (2009) describes four historical periods in the evolution of 
conflict resolution. From 1914 to 1945, pacifist sentiment and political cynicism 
grew in response to the two world wars. U.S. and International branches of the 
Fellowship of Recognition (FOR) were established “to foster reconciliation, 
nonviolence, and to empower youth to be peacemakers” (p. 18). First tentative 
steps were made away from Realist philosophy as research on causation began to 
include non-rational factors such as scapegoating, displaced feelings and 
susceptibility to propaganda. From 1946 to 1969, the international system 
expanded rapidly to include a number of powerful intergovernmental 
organizations, like the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, intended to foster 
reconciliation between former WWII enemies. Meanwhile, in the civil sector, 
conflict resolution research centers and academic journals became more common 
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and well-known. 
The period of “institutionalization” from 1970 to 1989 saw the rise of 
social movements in the U.S. for civil and women's rights and against the 
Vietnam War. These movements suggested the potential to resolve social injustice 
through non-violent methods. The 1970s saw landmark interest in conflict 
resolution both in academia and beyond. Colleges, universities, government 
agencies and the corporate and nongovernmental world all began to implement 
conflict resolution values and strategies. Finally, from 1990 to the present, conflict 
resolution methods became more diverse, complex, and well-developed. 
“Growing adherence to norms protecting human rights” and “increasing attention 
to feminist perspectives” pushed conflict resolution practitioners to pay more 
attention to the needs of vulnerable and under-empowered members of warring 
groups (p. 25) 
The primary goal of conflict resolution is to generate a resolution that 
inspires parties to keep the peace (Himes 1980). Edward Azar and John Burton 
explain that a “conflict may be said to be 'resolved' when all parties freely 
accepted a solution that has the following characteristics”: 
 By joint agreement, the solution satisfies the interest and needs underlying 
the conflict.
 The solution does not sacrifice any party's important values.
 The parties will not wish to repudiate the solution even if they are in a 
position to do so.
 The solution meets standards of justice and fairness.
 The solution is sufficiently advantageous to all parties so that it becomes 
self-supporting or self-enforcing (qtd in Rhodes 2009, p. 28).
Reaching a resolution with such characteristics requires intensive 
dialogue. While disputes, “disagreements over competing interests, especially 
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material interests” can be settled with a single decision, as by a court of law or an 
adjudicator, conflicts run much deeper, and must be resolved, not settled, through 
an extensive process (Rhodes 2009, p. 34). Conflictual parties develop trust over 
time through “successive approximations of commitment and reassurance” until 
they feel sufficiently comfortable to express their needs, relinquish prejudices, 
and search for mutually acceptable solutions (Kelman 2005, p. 6). In addition to a 
long dialogue timeline, many conflict resolution scholars describe the various 
social and conflict levels at which mediators must work: global, regional, state / 
society, top leaders, middle-level leaders, embedded parties and the grassroots 
(Ramsbotham et al. 2011, p. 30). 
Because conflict resolution requires adherence to standards of justice, 
traditional notions of impartiality and neutrality are challenged. An 'impartial' 
mediator is not neutral in impact. If mediators do not alter existing power 
relations, the stronger party will necessarily have a bigger role in determining the 
terms of the peace agreement than the weaker party. Adversaries will not be 
equally invested in the outcome, so peace will not last. In the ethos of conflict 
resolution, mediators must ensure that both parties are heard, which often means 
supporting the weaker party (Rhodes 2009). 
Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding
The theory and practice of conflict transformation emerged in the 1990s in 
response to the perceived inadequacy of conflict resolution. Terrell Northrup, a 
leading conflict transformation scholar, identifies and responds to four 
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assumptions of conflict transformation. 
    Conflict Resolution Assumptions:
1. Parties to conflict are rational. 
2. Misinterpretation constitutes a central cause. 
3. Conflict resolution principles apply across social settings (e.g. labor, 
international, interpersonal).
4. High value is placed on resolution. 
     Conflict Transformation Responses: 
1. Rationality depends on cultural context.
2. Misinterpretation is too shallow a concept to represent the deep feelings 
associated with different world views. 
3. Conflict is always in flux and different stages may require different 
approaches.
4. Not all parties may want peace as an outcome, but may want to continue 
fighting.
(Rhodes 2009, p. 48)
Northrup's responses suggest that conflicts are more complicated – 
culturally dependent, deep-rooted, and variable – than conflict resolution accepts. 
No political peace agreement, no matter the quality, will sustain peace on its own. 
Northrup's fourth response alludes to the core belief of conflict transformation: as 
long as societies are unequal, as long as discrimination, oppression, poverty and 
corruption exist, there should be conflict (which, as identified earlier, refers to 
explicit disagreement, controversy, a struggle of values and interests, and does not 
necessarily include violence). These conflicts run so deep in society that 
'resolving' them through a peace agreement only creates repressed frustration, 
which eventually leads to the recurrence of violence. Michelle Gawerc suggests 
“that conflicts are rarely solved completely, that to solve, resolve or end a conflict 
may be at the expense of justice, and that the best way to ensure sustainability of 
an agreement is to allow for higher mutual participation by the conflict groups” 
(Rhodes 2009, p. 53). 
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Conflict transformation and conflict resolution both attempt to channel 
conflict into non-violent dialogue. However, while conflict resolution seeks to 
finish dialogue, draft resolution and move on with peaceful society, conflict 
transformation theorists see dialogue as a constant, on-going process, one that 
occurs not only during violence, but also before (as prevention) and after (as 
peacebuidling). John Paul Lederach, a leading conflict transformation scholar, 
advocates for mediation rooted in a “genuine sense of participation, responsibility 
and ownership” shared by communities at all levels of power, from very 
grassroots interpersonal through elite national levels (1998, p. 242). 
Attention should also be paid to the diverse social, structural, political and 
psychological domains of conflict (Ropers 2004). In a study of 45 communities in 
Latin America, Albert Hirschman found that communities felt “too much 
importance is attributed to large scale political changes as a means for building 
peace at the social level; instead, members of these communities felt that for real 
change in the political sphere, social, cultural and personal relationship must first 
be transformed” (Ricigliano 2003, p. 455). Because warring groups are not 
homogeneous, party leaders may agree with terms of resolutions that cause 
immense harm to the needs of vulnerable groups, such as women, ethnic 
minorities or refugees within the same political group. As long as inequality and 
injustice persist, such agreements do not truly 'resolve' conflict at all.
These approaches, emphasizing vulnerable or under-empowered members 
of society, social and psychological needs, poverty alleviation and social justice 
issues, remain marginalized but growing perspectives in contemporary conflict 
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response. Diana (2004) contextualizes the trend, as she describes: 
...adherents to conflict transformation and the wider value group from 
which they come (culturally liberal, philosophically egalitarian, politically 
democratic, concerned with socioeconomic justice and unhappy about 
war). These values are confined to no particular culture and are universal 
in none, but they constitute a culture in themselves. They are in clear 
opposition to the universally prevalent culture of domination... to sexism, 
racism, and discrimination of all kinds (Francis 2004, p. 12) 
Intrastate Considerations
The following three sections address conflict intervention in particular 
circumstances: intrastate, civil conflict; intractable or protracted conflict and early 
conflict with preventable violence. In these cases, conflict management, 
resolution and transformation principles still apply, but with added considerations. 
The majority of today's conflict can be considered 'intrastate'. As explained 
in chapter one, this terminology is inherently problematic for its deligitimization 
of insurgent groups. Thus, Regan (1996) defines intastrate conflicts based on three 
characteristics: “they take place withing country boundaries; one combatant is a 
state, one a nonstate; and opposition has the ability to offer sustained resistance” 
(p. 338). This points to one of the biggest challenges of mediating intrastate 
conflicts: the quality of parties. Since one party is a nonstate, their legitimacy as 
an official actor is at stake in the conflict. The government struggles to ensure that 
the opposing party is seen as an illegitimate intruder; often the name, status and 
representation of the insurgent group is a point of dispute. Roucounas (2000) 
describes “one occasion, when the revolutionaries were pressing a United Nations 
mediator to clarify their international status, they finally declared they were 
satisfied by his following answer: 'You are what you are'.” (p. 123). 
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Because intrastate conflicts pit neighbors against neighbors, psychological, 
social and cultural components of the conflict are much more intimate and 
complex. During active violence, civil conflict “debilitates the capacity of the 
national government to govern; it disrupts individuals and societal security and 
creates feelings of anarchy; it overwhelms basic human rights and curtails 
procedures in a civil society; and it restricts access to media and communication” 
(Joyner 2010, p. 65). Intrastate conflicts are particularly likely to become 
intractable, and are most likely to require external intervention (Bercovitch and 
Simpson 2010). Peace agreements following intrastate conflicts demand extensive 
decision-making and specification about matters such as cession of territory, 
dissolution or empowerment of rebel forces, procedures for elections, 
reconstruction of the national judiciary, reintegration of refugees, and 
reconstruction of devastated areas. Because the agreement operates with a single 
sovereign entity, a range of political decisions tangential to the dispute at hand can 
be (and often are) addressed in agreements, including land reform, human rights 
protections, poverty, development, and foreign relations (Roucounas 2000). 
Resolution of Intractable Conflicts
Conflict intractability, a common product of civil violence, occurs when 
conflict persists over many years – even decades and centuries. These crises 
become self-perpetuating, reinforced by factors far disassociated with the initial 
cause of the conflict (Crocker et al. 2009). Through the devastation of the 
environment, destruction of infrastructure, displacement of populations, and 
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disruption of trade exacerbates poverty and basic human needs. Government 
functions, such as courts, welfare systems, and hospitals, often weaken or collapse 
altogether. Predatory warlords generate ever-increasing wealth off the political 
economy of violence, resulting in increased power to perpetuate the conflict. 
Neighboring states, affected by refugees, migrating rebel forces, arms 
mobilization and trade relations, are drawn into the violence (this explains why 
today's conflicts are dispersed in geographic clusters; Buhaung and Gleditsch 
2005). As the conflict persists, a new generation grows up during persistent 
violence; youth internalize the ethos of conflict, learn to ground their identity in 
hatred of the enemy and “become wedded to a logic and culture of revenge” 
(Crocker et al. 2005, p. 494). The failure of previous attempts at mediation make 
future efforts seem at least undesirable if not impossible. 
Thus, intractable conflicts present an enormous challenge for third party 
intervenors. Numerous organizations and agencies have emerged to address these 
conflicts and a great deal of academic literature has been written on the subject 
(see Coleman 2000; Pruitt and Olczak 1995; Staub 2006; Kriesberg 1993). 
Crocker et al. 2009 recommends that negotiation of intractable conflicts should be 
reinforced with strong incentives. The cessation of violence will not seem 
inherently lucrative, so mediators must use all the leverage and influence they can 
muster to meet parties' needs and address their “vulnerabilities, insecurities, fears, 
and their sense of 'sunk costs' in the conflict to date” (p. 497). Once parties have 
reached settlement, reconciliation will be unusually difficult to achieve. Bar-Tal 
(2000) suggests that countries should foster and support “psychological 
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infrastructure”, including “devotion to the society and country, high motivation to 
contribute, persistence, readiness for personal sacrifice, unity, solidarity, 
determination, courage and maintenance of the society's objectives” (p. 353). 
Work across the levels of society (grassroots, middle level, national) and domains 
of conflict (political, social, economic, structural) will be more important than 
ever to heal wounds deep and ingrained in the fabric of personal and cultural 
identity. 
 
Conflict Prevention
In some ways, conflict prevention and intractability are flip sides of the 
same coin; as violence in intractable conflicts becomes latent, or “abeyant”, 
preventive strategies can capitalize on the moment of non-violence to create 
lasting peace (Crocker et al. 2009, p. 90). However, conflict prevention, in both 
theory and practice, has taken on a life and culture of its own. Conflict prevention 
has obvious appeal: compared to conflict management, resolution or 
transformation, prevention is infinitely “less costly in social, economic, and 
human terms” (Carment and Schnabel 2003, p. 1). It has particularly attracted 
Realist theorists and state leaders who perceive conflict prevention as a sound 
investment both for national security and the military budget (John 2005). As 
Carment and Schnabel (2003) write, “there is no lack of rhetoric on the necessity 
of conflict prevention, but serious attempts to give organizations the tools, 
procedures and means to put global and regional preventive systems into place are 
modest at best” (p. 2). 
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Since 'preventive diplomacy' has innate appeal from diverse political and 
philosophical perspectives, its advocates and practitioners range greatly in their 
methods and objectives. Prevention may include “confidence-building, fact-
finding missions, early-warning networks, preventive deployment and 
demilitarized zones” (Ackerman 2003, p. 340). The use of force as a preventive 
deterrent has been labeled 'new military humanism', which John (2005) critiques 
as an oxymoron – violence used to stem the tide of violence, he argues, is far from 
humanitarian. 
Preventive activities can be categorized as 'light' or 'deep', 'operational' or 
'structural'. Both light and operational prevention refer to activities only address 
immediate causes of the conflict. Methods include “monitoring missions, 
negotiation, mediation and the creation of channels for dialogue among 
contending groups” (Ackerman 2003, p. 341). Deep, structural prevention, on the 
other hand, has a more long-term approach, similar to the ethos of conflict 
transformation. Social structures, power relations, and human rights are all 
addressed as potential sources of emergent violence. These methods often look 
identical to existing human rights and development work; the only real difference 
is a sensitivity to and prioritization of the potential for violence. 
While deep prevention has inherent value and should be done whether 
conflict is imminent or not, operational prevention, particularly through the use of 
force, is sometimes interpreted as hegemony. An interevenor, especially a third 
party state focused only on international stability with little concern for internal 
dynamics or social conditions, may impose unwanted resolution. Conflict (not 
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violence) is necessary to a healthy society; John (2005) argues, it is not the place 
of an external mediator to suffocate conflict in order to prevent violence. As 
expressed elsewhere, conflict serves the interests of the dominant party; to 
intervene through preventive deterrence necessarily sides with the powerful in the 
status quo. 
Between Peace and Justice
The potential for hegemony in an activity as seemingly benign and 
universally desired as conflict prevention is one example of an uneasy and 
persistent juggling act between peace and justice. Conflict transformation 
perspectives suggest that stable peace first requires justice; conflict management 
contends that justice comes only after peace. In practice, the balance between 
peace and justice is nowhere nearly as simple as a chicken-and-egg debate. Both 
sides have legitimate concerns. “For example, punishing severe justice violations 
may alienate actors who are needed in building peace. Yet peace without justice 
may fail to gain public support and legitimacy and thus fall apart” (Albin 2009, p. 
581). 
To some commentators, the question of post-conflict justice seems as 
black and white as law: the guilty should be punished in order to establish trust, 
fairness and order. However, the Geneva Convention requires that parties, post-
violence, “endeavor to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have 
participated in armed conflict” (Protocol Addition to the Geneva Convention 
1977, Article 6). Furthermore, law throughly fails to address innumerable 
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instances of injustice, as Milner (2002) describes:  
What is it about the rule of law that is supposed to save these people from 
starvation? The government of Senegal demonstrated its notions about the 
rule of law by selling out to the lettuce companies, bringing in the police, 
and no doubt defining the sanctity of private property... Where exactly in 
the international legal order is there an effective forum for dealing with 
the plight of starving people chased off their land while Americans in 
Cleveland get inexpensive salad fixings all year round? This is a problem 
that far transcends the rule of law, and advocating it even as a partial 
solution smacks too much of the historically misplaced faith the West has 
had in bringing order to an unruly world. (p. 626)
In Table 2.1, I propose one tentative method to distinguish between peace-
inhibiting and peace-affirming justice. As Milner's example depicts, international 
law has limited value in complex, globalized conflicts. Likewise, all discernible 
meaning of 'criminal offense' disintegrates before the chaos of intrastate violence. 
Thus, I propose that reconciliation efforts should focus on social, rather than 
criminal, justice. Joyner (2010) distinguishes between retributive justice, the 
standard model in most Western countries, which uses punishment for deterrence 
and revenge, and an alternative, restorative justice, which derives outcomes not on 
the basis of abstract legal principles, but on the needs of the victim and offender. 
In the context of conflict, restorative justice may include “critical self-reflection, 
admission of responsibility, genuine remorse and compensation” (p. 42). 
In the back-and-forth quibble, Albin (2009) identifies some grey area. 
Pursuit of “perfect justice” is likely to make negotiation impossible, but certainly 
negotiators can work with an eye toward “impartial justice”, with values such as 
mutual gain, proportionality, and voluntary consent (582). Both Joyner (2010) and 
Albin (2009) ultimately conclude that the most healthy, sustainable justice 
emphasizes future needs rather than past wrongs. They propose that justice should 
46
be a cooperative, optimistic process, focused on designing a fresh society, with 
strategies to reduce inequality, chip away at poverty, erode discrimination, and 
create structures that support both justice and non-violence. 
Table 2.1: Proposed Model for Balancing Peace and Justice
Peace-inhibiting Justice Peace-affirming Justice
Criminal Social
Retributive, punitive Restorative
Blaming Problem-solving
Focus on wrongs of belligerents Focus on needs of vulnerable populations
Zero-sum, competitive Positive-sum, cooperative
Perfect, absolute Imperfect, a work in progress
Backward-looking Forward-looking
This chapter documents how conflict intervention has evolved, from 
frightening societies into non-violence, to more nuanced responses to the complex 
causation of conflict. Questions of justice play an increasing role in conflict 
theory, and peace practice is slowly catching up: 
We are currently at a critical moment in the development of the 
peacebuidling field. Organizations working to build sustainable peace and 
development must now think and act in more integrative ways that work 
across traditional boundaries – such as official and unofficial actors – and 
across such diverse fields as humanitarian relief, conflict resolution, 
development, human rights, and environmental protection. (p. 445) 
As conflict intervention becomes more dynamic, non-violent, multi-
dimensional, multi-faceted, and long-term, NGOs have a growing role to play. 
However, their participation in conflict intervention is often questioned by more 
traditional actors. Thus, I examine, in the following chapter, theoretical 
justifications for the role of non-state actors in conflict response. 
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CHAPTER 3: NON-STATE ACTORS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A 
THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION
NGOs Sidelined in a Realist Game
Until very recently, up to the last ten to fifteen years, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) were almost universally celebrated as a positive addition to 
the international community. Theorists and practitioners from all ideologies and 
political perspectives expressed satisfaction with this new, amorphous group of 
non-state actors. DeMars (2005) explains:
It is curious that ringing endorsement of the growing influence of NGOs in 
world politics emanate from widely distinct points on the ideological 
spectrum. From the right, neoconservatives praise NGOs for taking over 
many of the functions of shrinking government bureaucracies. From the 
moderate left, political liberals laud NGOs as a democratizing force, 
holding governments accountable by representing societal rights. Farther 
left, some radicals look to NGOs to incubate a counter-hegemonic project 
that could eventually yield revolutionary change. (p. 34) 
This early enthusiasm belies fundamental disagreement about the roles of 
NGOs in international relations. Clearly, NGOs cannot be everything to everyone. 
They cannot simultaneously distribute apolitical aid, deferring to governments for 
direction and purpose, and radically alter hegemonic social structures, including 
the very same states and interstate organizations that purport to control them. As 
NGOs proliferate, international actors have begun to realize vast sociopolitical 
ramifications of their existence. The involvement of NGOs often challenges 
traditional expectations about both the who and the what of international relations. 
Nowhere has this been so true as in the realm of conflict resolution. 
Navigating peace and conflict has always been the singular duty and 
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domain of states, from what Mapendere (2001) describes as “the remote annals of 
humankind” (3). Official diplomats, representing states, stripped of personal 
identity, deliberate under formal conditions, with an eye to deterrence and 
defense. They use carrots and sticks, trust and deception, to out-smart the other in 
a jostling for peace (Montville 1987). 
This preference for state actors in conflict resolution, and even 
international relations more generally, results from the dominance of Political 
Realism. This philosophy, prevailing throughout history, made explicit by Hans J 
Morgentau in the 1900s, asserts that states are the primary actors on the 
international stage (Bariyo 2007). Neorealists even suggest that “non-state actors 
do not matter” (Weenink 2001, p. 80). Even while transnational, non-state actors 
gain resources, power and legitimacy, they remain marginalized by the 
predominance of Realist thought. In a survey of leading introductory textbooks on 
international relations, Gotz (2008) found that NGOs are only mentioned in 
passing, typically under a single chapter about transnational actors, a catch-all for 
the unimportant non-states, ranging from loosely associated activists to 
multinational corporations. Even the term NGO – nongovernmental organization 
– speaks to the ascension of the state. NGOs are linguistically cemented to the 
negation of that which is important – the state (ibid). Though methodologically 
cumbersome (as explained in chapter 1), the term persists because an NGO's 
distance from the government remains an essential feature of its presence in a 
state-centric world.
According to Realist theory, individuals are “power seeking”, moderated 
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only by the rule of law, which protects civility within state boundaries (Karns 
2004, p. 45). Beyond the state, there is only anarchy. Like individuals, states are 
seen to “act in a rational way to protect their own interests” (ibid). They are 
considered unitary actors, a view enshrined in idiomatic speech. When journalists 
say, 'the United States declared war', they really mean 'an individual or group of 
individuals, who claim to represent the interests of a diverse domestic 
constituency, have ordered another group of individuals, namely the military, to 
use violence'. Abstract conceptual entities cannot declare anything (just as they 
cannot ponder, lust, or cry), a truism obscured by the conventional conflation of 
Realist philosophy with irrefutable truth. 
According to Realism, violent conflict is an inevitable human experience, 
a product of biological determinism and international anarchy. States that 
intervene as third-parties to a conflict strive for short-term or regional peace to 
ensure their own national security. These efforts rely on a carefully balanced 
power struggle between states, with an emphasis on “competitive processes of 
conflict resolution: power-based, adversarial, confrontational, zero-sum, win-lose 
approaches” (San dole 1993, p. 4).
The Realist-Liberalist Pact
The rise of intra-state conflict further erodes state-oriented Realism. 
Governments are no longer the only ones declaring war, causing violence, or 
appearing at mediating tables. Uganda and Sudan, for example, can have all the 
talks they want, but without inclusion of the Lord's Resistance Army, a rebel force 
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of violent civilians, there will be no peace settlement. As transnationalism 
connects civilians economically, socially and politically across national borders, 
states become less and less relevant. 
Political Liberalism, the age-old nemesis of Realism, attempts to 
approximate these new realities. For liberals, individuals are the primary unit of 
analysis; “states are the most important collective actors, but they are pluralistic, 
not unitary” (ibid, p. 37). Neoliberals make space for transnational actors, 
particularly multinational corporations. Today, neoliberal ideologies drive the 
steady decline of the state in deference to the market.1
Whereas Realists describe violence as inevitable, Liberals believe that 
humans are basically good, and violence arises as a “learned response to 
frustrated goal-seeking” (Sandole 1993, p. 5). As a result, neoliberal mediators 
use “cooperate processes of conflict resolution: nonadversarial, 
nonconfrontational, non-zero-sum (positive-sum), win-win approaches”, and 
believe that with ample effort, world peace is obtainable (ibid). NGOs are an 
important component of liberal philosophy. According to A-M Slaughter, the very 
existence of relief organizations supports the triumph of liberalism over realism: 
since “stopping massive human rights violations or feeding the hungry does not 
enhance national power”, humans must have motives beyond rational self-interest 
(qtd. in Bariyo 2007, p. 11)
While the rise of (neo)liberalism has thwarted (neo)realist supremacy, 
jockeying between the two philosophies leaves little room for alternate 
1This underscores the distinction between liberalism in international relations 
theory and in the U.S. political spectrum; neoliberalism most closely fits what is 
known in the U.S. as conservative or libertarian politics.
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paradigms. From liberalism, we have at least found space for NGO existence, and 
even NGO participation in conflict response. However, we still lack explanation 
for NGO action beyond basic service delivery. Why would NGOs bother with 
political advocacy if peace requires only citizen training and economic growth? 
Likewise, liberal / realist characterizations of humans as good (altruistic) or bad 
(self-interested) fail to explain the diverse, conflicting interests at play in modern 
conflicts. A collection of marginalized, 'post-positivist' theories grapple with these 
concerns (Hall 2011). 
Alternate Paradigms in International Relations theory
Alternatives to liberalism and realism can be classified in two categories: 
constructivism and critical theory. Constructivism, a common analytical tool in 
postmodern social critique, asserts that “the behavior of individuals, states and 
other actors is shaped by shared beliefs, socially constructed rules and cultural 
practices” (Karns 2004, p. 50). Human behaviors, like conflict and violence, stem 
not from objective truths about the human condition, but from subjective ideas 
that flux in power and currency. Thus, NGOs can influence behavior – reduce 
violence, inspire reconciliation, spur policy change, or simply convince donors to 
contribute money – just by promoting ideas (Gao and Zhao 2009). In fact, this is 
an underlying assumption of all nongovernmental organizations; as voluntary 
associations, NGOs' resources, power and membership depend largely on their 
ability to convince others that their ideas matter.
Whereas constructivism emphasizes that reality is socially constructed, a 
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diversity of critical theories posit sources of conflict and injustice that cannot be 
reasoned away. This collection of theories includes Marxism, neoMarxism, 
dependency theory, world systems theory, and feminism (Karns 2004). Marxism, 
the oldest and most well-known critical theory, explains that the hierarchical 
global system is a by-product of capitalism, wherein “developed countries have 
expanded economically... enabling them to sell goods and export surplus wealth... 
[while] developing countries have become increasingly constrained on the actions 
of the developed” (ibid, p. 53). This inequality, present at both global and local 
scales, creates social unrest leading to violence. In order to create lasting peace, 
mediators cannot simply talk their way through pithy settlements (as in 
liberalism) or scare warring parties into silence (as in realism). Instead, political 
and social leaders must restructure society, creating new systems for economic 
justice and equality. 
Constructivism and Marxism begin to answer concerns posed above, such 
as the role of advocacy and the complexity of conflict. Advocacy is effective 
because changing ideas changes behavior. Service delivery alone is inadequate 
NGO strategy because it operates within and supports the status quo, and is less 
than explicit about its long-term objectives. Theories like Marxism reveal that 
societies are not homogeneous groups of equal individuals. Oppression along 
economic necessitates the use of strategies like advocacy, education, outreach, 
and direct conflict intervention in order to challenge unjust social structures.
While Marxism theorizes about oppression based on class, other critical 
theories explain oppression along other lines. There are a range of such theories 
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for every form of social discrimination: feminism describes gender oppression; 
critical race theory, racial oppression; queer theory, sexual oppression, and so 
forth. One generalized theory functions well for understanding NGO involvement 
in conflict. Sandole (1993) describes what he calls “Non-Marxist Radical 
Thought” (NMRT), a strikingly unradical belief that peaceful societies meet their 
citizens' basic needs (p. 8). Put simply, NMRT suggests that people cannot think 
about peace when they are hungry or imprisoned. Human needs, including both 
physical requirements, like shelter, and psychological components, like respect, 
are biological in nature, innate to human existence. NMRT combines aspects of 
both realism and liberalism. Like realism, NMRT maintains that violence is 
biologically determined; when biological needs are not met, and individuals do 
not have adequate sociopolitical avenues to express these needs, violence is a 
likely result. However, the theory agrees with liberalism that peace is possible and 
will be obtained through cooperate processes of conflict resolution. Finally, 
NMRT parallels Marxism in the sense that structural – not just cognitive – 
changes are necessary to instill peace. Whereas Marxism calls only for economic 
restructuring, NMRT urges structural changes to all social, political and economic 
institutions. 
While Non-Marxist Radical Thought is not specific about forms of 
discrimination or methods of conflict resolution, it is easily linked to 
aforementioned peace and conflict theories. Whereas conflict management 
attempts to reduce violence, and conflict resolution, to end it, conflict 
transformation seeks to alter social structures (sources of injustice per NMRT) in 
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order to build toward perpetual peace. Peace work across horizontal and vertical 
constituencies allows for redistribution of material and social resources to meet 
people's biological needs and enables cooperative conflict response. Finally, 
because these processes require both cognitive and structural changes at local and 
national levels, it is essential to engage both state and non-state actors.
Diplomacy: Tracks One and Two
Despite the implications of alternate paradigms like constructivism and 
critical theory, realism remains the dominant perspective in international relations, 
with liberalism in close second. Precisely the same pattern can be observed in 
'tracks' of conflict resolution – concepts that dictate actors and roles in mediation 
and dialogue. What is known as 'Track I diplomacy' corresponds, both in 
prevalence and theoretical substance, to realism, while Track II best matches 
liberalism. 'Track 1.5' and 'Multi-Track' diplomacy, like constructivism and 
critical theory, are marginalized but growing trends in conflict resolution. These 
latter theoretical frames have contributed enormously to the inclusion of NGOs in 
direct conflict intervention. Multi-track diplomacy, in particular, has been 
described as “the single most successful concept for creating a legitimate space 
for the work of civil society organizations” (Reimann and Ropers 2005, p. 33). 
These theories will be explored in greater detail below. First, I examine the 
starting block, what remains, to this day, the mainstream approach. 
Track I diplomacy refers to official, state-to-state negotiations, an obvious 
parallel to the state-centric Realist paradigm (Chataway 1998; Mapendere 2001). 
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Participants in mediation all represent states: both belligerents and mediators are 
formal officials whose every word – whether at the negotiating table or in casual 
conversation – is taken as a legal promise by the country represented. Certainly 
Track I diplomacy has its advantages. Negotiators can use carrots and sticks to 
bend other actors to their will. Their official status heightens expectations and 
demonstrates a serious commitment to the negotiating process. When, in the end, 
negotiators reach an agreement, the decision becomes legally binding for all 
parties involved. 
The officialdom of Track I actors – the finality of their decisions, the 
gravity of their presence, the confidentiality of their work – is both their strength 
and weakness (Mapendere 2001). Officials cannot freely babble about their fears 
and frustrations; they cannot hypothetically entertain possible solutions 'just to 
see'. Even when professional diplomats follow established principles of trust, 
honesty and cooperation, these guidelines are applied gingerly, with attention to 
their first allegiance and priorities as representatives of states. 
Other drawbacks to Track I diplomacy suggest the need for alternatives 
(ibid). The concentration of unchecked power yields enormous potential for 
corruption, a gamble too risky for stakes as high as peace. Governments of 
intrastate conflicts do not represents all parties; under such circumstances, state-
to-state meetings negate, and therefore, frustrate, non-state combatants. Elite 
officials are often disconnected from the needs of local communities. Even if they 
were perfectly informed, excluding other parties disempowers the grassroots, 
thereby exacerbating inequality and conflict. Finally, when officials are elected 
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political leaders, they operate with attention to election cycles; they push to 
complete their agenda before the big E-day. When replaced, established personal 
connections, essential to successful resolution, are lost. 
Any track of diplomacy will have its limitations, and of course, the 
disadvantages of states as mediators should not deter their efforts. However, it is a 
common misconception that states are necessarily superior to other actors in 
conflict intervention. The term 'diplomacy' is so often conflated with Track I 
peace work that the 'track diplomacy' frame inherently forces unconventional 
thinking. Track diplomacy defines and delimits conventional methods (Track I) 
and then asks, 'What if this method is just one among dozens of possible ways to 
accomplish the same goal?'
With the evolution of the international system, from “one centered only in 
the actions of sovereign states, to a more complex reality of sovereign and non-
sovereign actors”, standards and assumptions about diplomacy are changing 
(Kuchinsky 1999, p. 7). In 1987, Joseph Montville coined the term 'Track II 
diplomacy', which “engages individuals and organizations from outside the 
government in the complex task of conflict resolution” (p. 162). 
Where Track I diplomacy emphasizes official state action, Track II 
diplomats, like the local leaders with whom they collaborate, are independent 
from any government action (Gidron 2002). Rather than laws and treaties, Track 
II mediators deal in ideas and relationships. A realist would have no reason to 
value track II mediators, and might even consider them “in the way” (Chataway 
1998, p. 271). However, a constructivist would argue that Track II mediators 
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produce essential changes in the cognitive and emotional position of antagonistic 
parties. In NMRT terms, Track II mediators can also help to elucidate citizens' 
unmet needs, underlying drivers of the conflict.
As Barnes (2005) explains, it can “take time before the ideas, relationships 
and personal changes that develop through these processes manifest into social 
and political change” (p. 19). Track II mediators must be ready for the long-haul. 
However, peacebuilding theorists, like John Paul Lederach, emphasize that 
conflict transformation is an on-going process anyway. Peace settlements that 
emerge from official mediation efforts can be deceptive; they are merely one step 
in the right direction, a starting point from which to launch years of peace work. 
According to Joseph Montville, Track II diplomacy can be classified in 
three distinct processes: facilitating problem-solving seminars; changing public 
opinion; and promoting “cooperative economic development” (p. 163). In the 
former process, third-party citizens, individuals or NGOs, bring together leaders 
of conflicting parties to develop personal relationships, promote understanding of 
the conflict from multiple perspectives, and ultimately, “develop joint strategies 
for dealing with the conflict as a shared problem” (ibid). According to Track II 
methodology, none of the attending members may officially represent a state. As a 
result, decisions made in these seminars are only hypothetical, not legally-
binding. This allows parties to test out ideas under the guise of “academic 
discourse” (Chataway 1998, p. 275). A Track I diplomat explains, “it is always 
helpful to have workshops. But [the conflict] will not be settled until the 
government settles it” (ibid, p. 277). 
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While seminars and workshops more closely resemble traditional 
mediation, the latter two processes of Track II diplomacy involve generalized 
work at the grassroots, “to shape the overall political environment so that [state] 
leaders might be encouraged to take positive steps toward resolving a conflict” 
(Montville 1987, p. 167). When public opinion is fiercely divided, with ingrained 
beliefs on both sides of a conflict about depravity of the 'enemy' and victimhood 
of their own community, conciliatory mediation becomes politically dangerous. 
Track II peace workers can rehumanize and empower both parties. 
Track II diplomacy has some obvious advantages. Mediators are not 
inhibited by allegiance to one state, and they have no fear of losing their 
constituency since they are not beholden to anyone. They have the freedom and 
independence to be creative, hypothetical and emotional in ways that official 
diplomats cannot match. Because Track II diplomacy emphasizes working with 
grassroots and middle-level leaders, local communities are empowered and heard. 
If Track II workers are strategic, they can select participants for workshops and 
economic development in ways that support vulnerable groups. Finally, Track II 
diplomacy eases the transition from violence to peace since track II diplomats can 
continue exactly the same activities through conflict prevention and post-conflict 
peacebuilding. 
One of the biggest concerns with Track II diplomacy is the potential for 
duplicated, haphazard or piecemeal work. To be effective, Track II requires long-
term planning, strategic integration, and an enormous web of strong personal 
relationships built on trust and commitment. If diverse NGOs flood a conflict 
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zone without communicating, or if they dabble in this or that activity without 
attention the the big-picture impact, the overall result could be more negative than 
positive. Local communities in violent conflict are wary, unsure of who to trust; 
breaking the trust of local leaders makes it just that much harder for future 
peacebuilding. Some Track I diplomats advocate for a formalized mechanism of 
collaboration between the many Track I and II actors, but most agree that this 
would undermine the biggest source of Track II effectiveness – their 
independence and informality (Chataway 1998).  
Track One and a Half
The inclusion of Track II diplomacy as a legitimate form of conflict 
response pushes NGOs into the peacebuidling picture. However, the track still 
limits civilian organizations in the range of activities they can pursue. Bartoli 
(2009) describes several rare cases of “Track I processes in which state actors, 
international organizations and nonstate actors, claiming political space and 
recognition, used the mediation services of NGOs” in official negotiation (p. 392). 
Thanks to theorist Susan Nan, this type of citizen activity is now called 'Track 
One and a Half' Diplomacy. The cumbersome terminology (imagine a social 
movement mobilized by '1.5'!) reveals both the difficulty of translating between 
reality and theory, and the novelty of NGOs in official mediation. 
Track 1.5 has been described as “hybrid diplomacy”, a bridge between 
Tracks I and II, any “public or private interaction between official representatives 
of conflicting governments or political entities such as popular armed movements, 
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... facilitated or mediated by a third party not representing a political organization 
or institution” (Mapendere 2001, p. 10). Table 3.1 distinguishes between 
diplomacy Tracks I, 1.5 and II based on the actors involved. 
Table 3.1: Actors in Track Diplomacy
Mediator Adversaries
Track I States States
Track 1.5 Citizens States
Track II Citizens Citizens
Note: 'Citizens' may include either individuals or organizations. 
This form of conflict response may be new, but it is not without precedent. 
Bartoli (2009) describes four successful cases of Peace and Conflict Resolution 
Organizations (P/CROs) that successfully applied Track 1.5 diplomacy to end 
conflict. In 1992, the Community of Sant'Egidio, a religious NGO based in Rome, 
successfully mediated a peace agreement in Mozambique that ended violence 
after a 30-year war of independence and a 16-year civil war. This agreement did 
not materialize overnight; it came only after ten years of dialogue and 
relationship-building. Because the agreement grew authentically from long-term 
peacebuilding, Mozambique has since, seen low violence and has minimal chance 
of conflict recurrence. 
The Carter Center, perhaps the most well-known Track 1.5 mediator, has 
had lasting impact on conflicts in Korea, Yugoslavia, Burundi, Haiti, Uganda, 
Sudan and Liberia. Importantly, the organization stresses that “war-torn 
countries... may be more receptive to [NGOs]... that have already provided them 
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with humanitarian or development assistance” (Bartoli 2009, p. 400). This 
perspective has motivated the Carter Center's involvement in international health. 
It also suggests a powerful mandate for relief and development organizations. 
Whereas large development NGOs may argue that conflict mediation is beyond 
their area of expertise, the relationships that they cultivate through long-term 
development actually make them prime candidates for Track 1.5 work. 
The advantages of Track 1.5 diplomacy draw on the strengths of both 
Tracks I and II. Citizens, particularly in development NGOs, have knowledge, 
experience and relationship with the grassroots level, especially if engaged in 
Track II work, that they can bring to the negotiating table. Track 1.5 mediators 
have freedom to be confidential as in Track I, or public as in Track II. While states 
may not necessarily participate in open, humanizing dialogue or hypothetical 
problem-solving, third party citizen mediators can bring these perspectives to the 
table, making themselves vulnerable in order to create space for conciliation, 
apology and compromise. The “face-saving ability of Track One and a Half 
Diplomacy is facilitated by characteristics of third parties such as non-
partisanship, political prominence, trustworthiness, lack of real political power, 
respect for, and by, both parties, and honesty” (Mapendere 2001, p. 17). Because 
states are present, decisions are binding and real peace agreements can be signed 
and enacted through NGOs' work. 
Track I, state-to-state diplomacy operates within limited cognitive frames. 
As Joseph Montville (1987) explains, “the institutions of state, diplomacy, the 
military and intelligence are engaged for the most part in deterrence and defense” 
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(p. 162). When NGOs approach mediation, they have significantly different 
priorities and perspectives. Though chapter 1 emphasized that NGOs are far from 
angelic, they are more prone to openly advocate for values such as peace, 
cooperation, truth, love and forgiveness. Thus, the inclusion of nonstate actors in 
conflict resolution, through Track 1.5, entails not just a change of cast, but a total 
cognitive shift in what it means to 'do peace'. 
Multi-Track Diplomacy
Despite its many advantages, Track 1.5 diplomacy, on its own, is not likely 
to generate lasting peace. In fact, no single diplomacy track can stand alone 
(Joseph 2003). This realization inspired 'Multi-Track' Diplomacy, the theoretical 
development of Louise Diamond and John McDonald (2001). They advocate for 
systems thinking in peace work: both the parts and their interactions contribute to 
the whole. Whereas Track II diplomacy supports and creates the space for Track I, 
multi-track diplomacy lacks hierarchy; no track is more essential than the other. 
Instead, tracks are described as components in a circle, each reinforcing the 
others. Multi-Track diplomacy breaks down conflict resolution work far beyond 
the simplistic state / non-state binary. The “multipolarity of the new global order” 
suggests increased influence of smaller actors and the increasing importance of 
collaboration between them (Mawlawi 1993, p. 392). Thus, Diamond and 
McDonald identify nine tracks in all: government (track 1), nongovernmental 
professional (track 2), business (3), private citizen (4), research, training and 
education (5), activism (6), religion (7), funding (8), and communication and the 
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media (9) (2001, p. ii). As the international system changes, conception of Multi-
Track Diplomacy must also evolve to include new actors and interactions. 
The innovation of this methodology extends beyond a list of actors. 
Diamond and McDonald also suggest new ways of conceptualizing and 
categorizing peace work (see Figure 3.1). In chapter 2, peacebuilding was seen as 
an alternative framework to peacekeeping. Here, all three strategies – 
peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding – are considered essential to 
peace work and can be accomplished by any one of nine actors. Certainly, some 
actors seem more suited to particular roles than others. Track 5, research, training 
and education, for example, is most likely to educate and build peace, but they 
may also advocate to make peace. Likewise, Track 6, activism, clearly fits best in 
an advocacy role, but may also use education or service-delivery to accomplish 
long-term strategic objectives. More generalized actors like nongovernmental 
professionals can easily transition between all three forms. This “captures the 
ideal of pluralism and overcomes the 'zero-sum' game so often associated with 
resource-based conflict” (Rupesinghe 1995, p. 11). 
Figure 3.1: Systems Thinking in Peace Work
Advocacy -keeping
Action -making
Education -building
Source: Diamond and McDonald 2001, p. 16
The complexity of Multi-Track Diplomacy has many implications for how 
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NGOs should proceed in conflict work. First and most basically, NGOs should be 
present, directly engaged in conflict response; if any of the nine spokes of the 
wheel are missing, peace will not take off. On the flip side, while NGOs are 
critical participants, they are not exclusive. NGOs must be humble about the 
limitations of their role, and work to build the capacity of other actors. Finally, 
NGOs should leap at any opportunity to collaborate with other tracks; 
interconnected spokes operate far more effectively than isolated rods. This 
cooperate-or-fail plea permeates third sector literature, and is far easier said than 
done. Methods of enhancing collaboration are further explored in chapters 4 and 
10. 
Carving Space: An On-going Process
If theorists accept only Realist propositions about international relations, 
NGOs have no place in conflict response. Even beyond conflict, NGOs, according 
to Realism, are irrelevant to international power dynamics. However, the fact that 
NGOs have had enormous impact on policy, social structure, and the human 
condition discredits mainstream Realist thought. 
The rest of this chapter offers alternative theories that open the door ever 
wider for NGO intervention in conflict. Liberalism recognizes the potency of non-
state actors and validates nonconfrontational conflict resolution methods. 
Constructivism helps to explain how NGO advocacy and education can be 
meaningful in conflict transformation. Critical theories, including Marxism and 
Non-Marxist Radical Thought, underscore the value of NGO conflict response 
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aimed at alleviating poverty and generating social equality. Finally, the various 
diplomacy tracks (II, 1.5 and 2-9) expand the definition of conflict resolution 
from one state-to-state model, to a complex web of interacting actors and diverse 
activities. In sharp contrast to the Realist belief that states are solely responsible 
for peace, Multi-Track Diplomacy makes it everyone's responsibility. 
From a theoretical perspective, it becomes clear that NGOs have a big role 
to play in resolving conflicts. Although alternate theories presented here remain 
marginalized in contrast to dominant beliefs like Realism and Track I Diplomacy, 
new paradigms are gaining traction. As NGOs continue to test new methods and 
work beyond their comfort zones, academic theory will shift to reflect the 
emerging capacity of these citizen mediators. In the following chapter, I look 
beyond the theoretical to real-world challenges experienced by nongovernmental 
conflict-responders.
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CHAPTER 4: NGOS IN CONFLICT
Understanding NGO Opportunities
The last two chapters opened with traditional perspectives on international 
peace work: conflict management and Political Realism. Because these 
approaches emphasize militarized force, rational incentives and official, state 
actors, they do not leave much room for NGO involvement in conflict. More 
contemporary theories, such as conflict transformation and Non-Marxist Radical 
Thought, contextualize NGO conflict intervention. Nonetheless, for traditional 
conflict intevenors, such as states and their diplomatic representatives, NGO 
involvement presents an enigma: just what can NGOs do? 
This question has been the object of peace scholars' investigation for 
several decades. A range of case studies, surveys and typologies document the 
breadth of potential activities. In order to suggest the wide diversity of activities – 
to indicate the enormous potential missed by excluding NGOs from conflict 
intervention – I have included a (far from comprehensive) list of activities. These 
are not merely hypothetical roles but methods used by existing NGOs either 
before, during or after existing conflicts (see Aall 2009; Barnes 2005; Bartoli 
2009; Blum 2001; Butalia 2004; Gidron et al. 2002; Kuchinsky 1999; Ropers 
2002; Steward 1998).2
Addressing Immediate Needs
 Airlifting food, clean water, health care supplies, and sanitation equipment
2 These activities are bulleted here in order to facilitate quantitative analysis of 
NGO activities, presented in chapter 8. 
67
 Constructing shelter for homeless victims
 Repairing salvageable structures
 Providing emergency shelter for refugees
 Treating life-threatening illnesses and injuries
Enhancing Local Capacity for Self-Help
 Supporting the healthy functioning of markets through coordination, 
monitoring, subsidies, cash flow, etc.
 Building the financial, technical and social capacity of local civil society 
organizations – NGOs, trade unions, religious organizations, research and 
education institutions, etc.
 Lending microfinance credit to non-combatants for small enterprise
 Training conflict-stricken communities in alternative livelihoods, such as 
new forms of agriculture and marketable goods production
Promoting Short-Term Security
 Creating zones of peace, areas declared outside the purview of war, 
through negotiation with armed forces
 Monitoring protests and demonstrations to ensure they remain peaceful
 Training community leaders in peaceful violence de-escalation
Reducing Conflict at the Grassroots; Problem-Solving with Civilians
 Mediating discussion between middle-level leaders of warring groups in 
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order to develop trust through 'successive approximation' and identify 
conflict solutions
 Promoting grassroots dialogue between members of diverse ethnic and 
religious groups
 Training grassroots community and local civil society organizations about 
conflict resolution and non-violent strategies of social change
 Organizing and supporting individuals and communities in opposition to 
war / the use of violence
 Institutionalizing an ethos of peace and nonviolence by coordinating 
government agencies and educational programs
 Creating 'next-generation' peace program such as youth camps, 
intercultural schools etc. 
 Raising awareness about alternatives to violence through art, concerts, 
demonstrations for peace processes and protests at the use of militarized 
force
Urging Action by Other Members of the International Community
 Testifying before government committees, IGOs and NGO coalitions 
regarding local conflict conditions, interests of warring parties, 
opportunities for a peaceful future, or instances of human rights abuse
 Alerting states, IGOs, and other NGOs about conflict potential ('early 
warning') 
 Publishing information (via organizational reports, public service 
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announcements, news alerts, etc.) about on-going conflict situations, 
including body counts, areas of need, changing power relations, and 
human rights violations
 Advocating for non-violent methods of state and IGO conflict response 
 Encouraging multinational corporations to use conflict sensitive 
employment practices, to end resource extraction, or to pull of out of the 
country
Mediating Conflicts with Party Representatives
 Conducting confidential, legally-binding negotiations with top officials of 
each party
 Facilitating informal problem-solving workshops with national-level 
leaders
 Implementing non-Western ('traditional African') methods of conflict 
resolution with representatives
Advocating for the Needs of Vulnerable Populations
 Collecting and disseminating information about the experiences and 
perspectives of vulnerable groups (women, children, refugees, ethnic, 
religious, and sexual minorities, etc.)
 Pushing states and IGOs to incorporate the needs of vulnerable groups in 
peace agreements
 Pressuring the host government to create infrastructure to meet the needs 
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of local populations
 Insisting on forward-looking justice in the peace settlement process
 Rallying local communities for participation in protests and 
demonstrations for human rights
Promoting Psychological Healing
 Running grassroots-level talking circles to help individuals and 
communities overcome the experience of trauma
 Using media (radio, television, newspapers, etc.) to humanize both parties 
and instill optimism about a future of peace
 Organizing cooperative economic development or environmental 
restoration across current or former opposing groups to encourage 
collaboration towards mutual goals
 Coordinating peace commissions for fact-finding, apology and forgiveness 
Supporting Infrastructure for a Functioning Democracy
 Supervising elections (including campaigns and post-election 
inauguration) to ensure a nonviolent, fair, inclusive process
 Monitoring and supporting judicial function
 Protecting freedom of speech through independent media
Assisting in the Rehabilitation of Post-Conflict Populations
 Reintegrating, housing and educating refugees
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 Training former military personnel and rebel forces
 Facilitating weapons-for-work programs
 Sustained involved in reconstruction and conflict sensitive development 
Classifying Roles
As the inexhaustive list above depicts, NGOs in conflict have enormous 
potential for intervention. More than anything, this brief survey of activities 
suggests the surprising number and diversity of intervention strategies NGOs can 
and have assumed. No particularly compelling framework has emerged to 
categorize NGO interventions (Ricigliano 2003). Scholars and practitioners 
continue struggling to move away from 'a la carte' style programming to more 
holistic, integrated approaches. 
One common approach is to classify activities by organizational form. For 
example, Aall (2009) describes five types of conflict intervening NGOs (see Table 
4.1). These prototypes include no overlapping activities: humanitarian NGOs 
provide immediate relief; human rights organizations report abuses and demand 
adherence to international norms; capacity building NGOs support local 
infrastructure and civil society; conflict resolution NGOs mediate, negotiate and 
promote dialogue; and conflict monitoring organizations brief other international 
actors on imminent, existing and former conflicts. Ropers (2002) takes a similar 
approach. However, the fact that he identifies six organizational categories, 
different from Aall's classification, suggests that this typology is not self-evident, 
and practitioners do not necessarily classify their activities based on these 
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categories. 
Table 4.1: Types of Conflict Intervention Organizations
Type Examples
Humanitarian CARE, Save the Children, Oxfam
Human Rights Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Peace Brigades International
Capacity Building Open Society Fund, National Democratic Institute, National Republican Institute, ICNC
Conflict Resolution Carter Center, Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Conflict Management Institute
Conflict Monitoring International Crisis Group, International Alert
Source: Aall 2009, p. 6
Beyond the lack of consensus, such organizational typologies also create 
false divisions of labor between actors. As explained in chapter 1, organizations 
handicap themselves when they approach large, complex issues, like civil 
violence, with only one methodology or “theory of action” (Ricigliano 2003). 
Instead, organizations should be attune to the diversity of factors – needs, fears, 
values, and interests of innumerable actors – that contribute to the production of 
violence or injustice. NGOs should select interventions based not on 
predetermined organizational identity or donor RFPs (requests for proposal), but 
rather on greatest potential impact. A conceptual model is needed to drive this 
decision-making process. 
Kuchinsky (1999) presents a multi-dimensional model for classifying 
peace work (see Table 4.2). Engagement entrance refers to the moment at which 
an organization intervenes. For example, a traditional development NGO that later 
transitions to relief work would be classified as having engaged 'pre-conflict'. 
Intervention aim, a related factor, also deals with the conflict timeline, but refers 
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to the specific activity at hand, rather than the whole organization's duration in the 
country. What Kuchinsky calls 'society-level engagement' is most commonly 
known as a 'vertical constituency', i.e. engagement across social hierarchies 
(Lederach 1997; Ropers 2002). 'Horizontal constituency' is the theoretical 
counterpart: engagement at the same social level but across warring parties. The 
'intervention strategy', the most useful component of Kuchinsky's model, is 
expanded in Table 4.3. Like others, Kuchinsky emphasizes that most NGOs today 
continue to prioritize human needs over indirect or direct efforts. 
Table 4.2: Multi-dimensional Model of NGO Conflict Intervention
Engagement 
Entrance Intervention Aim
Levels of 
Conflict
Society-level 
Engagement
Intervention 
Strategy
Pre-conflict Prevention Sub-national Grassroots Human Needs
In conflict Relief National Civil Society Indirect Efforts
Settlement Rehabilitation Regional National Elites Direct Efforts
Post-conflict
Post-
reconstruction / 
development
Source: Kuchinsky 1999
Table 4.3: Intervention Strategies Expanded
Human Needs Indirect Efforts Direct Efforts
 Relief and 
survival;
 Initial 
economy-
sustaining 
programs;
 Trauma need;
 Combatant 
reintegration.
 Community 
reintegration projects
 Capacity building
 Conflict resolution 
education; 
 Human rights 
education;
 Post-conflict 
rehabilitation and 
development; 
 Election monitoring.
 Negotiation; 
 Mediation; 
 Advocacy in local 
setting; 
 Advocacy in 
constituent setting; 
 Human rights 
monitoring; 
 Support of 
mediation 
processes.
Source: Kuchinsky 1999
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One significant flaw in the model is the failure to distinguish between 
advocacy and action. When an organization observes a particular need – such as 
mediation with national elites, local security, or inclusion of women's issues in 
negotiation processes – the organization can either respond directly to the need or 
urge another international body to act. These are two vastly different strategies 
which require different skills and position an organization differently, both with 
international actors and local communities.
Although incomplete, Kuchinsky's model best captures diverse dimensions 
of decision-making in NGO conflict intervention. As I analyze organizational 
activities in chapter 8, I use this model to consider trends, gaps and opportunities 
in organizational activity. 
Critiques of Humanitarian Relief Work 
Perhaps the most elementary function of the categories and models 
presented in the last two sections is a visual demonstration that NGOs can do far 
more than humanitarian relief. This is especially important as NGOs seek roles 
beyond the emergency aid they are accustomed to providing. Numerous sources 
agree that humanitarian relief (or, in Kuchinsky's terms, 'human needs 
intervention') often exacerbates suffering more than it solving it (Anderson 1996; 
Diprizio 1999; Hendrickson 2002; Lischer 2003; Okumu 2003; Stein 2001; 
Stewart 1998; Vogel 1996). 
Humanitarian aid contributes resources, funding and infrastructure that 
facilitates warfare and supports warring factions. Food and supplies stolen from 
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aid caravans are sold on the black market, perpetuating the political economy of 
violence. Even when relief reaches its intended recipients, it still functions as a 
weapon of war. Any real or perceived inequality in resource distribution can 
exacerbate resentment between warring groups. Combatants compete to maximize 
their population's access to aid and deprive their opponents'. In order to deliver 
aid, NGOs have to obey guidelines set by warring groups, thereby legitimizing 
insurgents. 
Short-term relief functions like a bandaid on a bullet wound: other actors 
tend to neglect local conditions because they assume NGOs have it covered. 
Local governments are less likely to emphasize infrastructure and economic 
development, communities, dependent on NGOs, are less likely to hold their 
government accountable: 
When foreign grain is dumped in an African marketplace, it's more than 
likely that hungry children will be better fed for the next month or two. 
But when African farmers go bankrupt and leave the land, then foreign 
grain has had a very different effect: destroying local agriculture to create 
a permanent dependency on food from abroad. (Mark 1997, p. 12)
Because humanitarian NGOs focus on basic needs, the political structures 
responsible for ensuring social inclusion and justice are under-emphasized. 
Internationally, humanitarian assistance alleviates concerns about humanitarian 
crises; where foreign observers may have otherwise advocated for conflict 
resolution, they are instead content to sponsor NGOs' relief work. 
Even in terms of immediate reduction in civilian deaths, emergency aid is 
often counterproductive. According to Stewart (1998), shipments of food are 
associated with “rising death rates during conflict... caused by diminished markets 
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and social entitlements, often combined with increased infection as a result of 
population movements and concentration” meant to centralize food recipients (p. 
562). 
Several attempts have been made to operationalize more responsible 
humanitarian aid. The most well-known attempt, called 'the Do No Harm Project', 
(DNH) was created in the early 1990s by humanitarian relief scholar Mary 
Anderson and the Collaborative for Development Action (CDA), a coalition of 
American NGOs. Today, DNH operates in 41 countries and advises some of the 
largest and most active humanitarian relief organizations. The project advocates 
for a “Seven Step Plan” of conflict analysis and program design, with emphasis 
on exploring the range of possible interventions: 
 Understand the context of the conflict; 
 Analyze 'dividers' and 'tensions';
 Analyze 'connectors' and local capacities for peace; 
 Analyze the assistance program; 
 Analyze the assistance program's impact on dividers and connectors (using 
the concept of resource transfers and explicit ethical messages); 
 Generate programming options;
 Test options and redesign program.
(CDA 2004)
A similar effort, called 'the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium', strives to 
inform aid workers, as well as peacebuilding organizations, IGOs, and 
multinational corporations, about the importance of operating in countries of 
conflict with attention to the sociopolitical implications of their actions. They 
provide materials such as conflict assessment frameworks, a “conflict-sensitive 
poverty reduction strategy”, and methodologies on early warning and response 
(conflictsensitivity.org). 
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The underlying message of these projects is that humanitarian aid must be 
understood as a political action, a force for both benevolence and harm, with real 
and symbolic effects on conflict. Relief workers are learning that chaotic, 
volunteer-based, unprofessional, ad hoc aid delivery will not suffice. Fortunately, 
this trend toward conflict sensitive relief is also paralleled by a growing interest in 
more direct conflict response. 
Relative Strengths in Direct Conflict Intervention
NGOs are not the most obvious actors in conflict resolution. They cannot 
threaten states with military occupation or economic sanctions, they have very 
limited ability to reward cooperative parties, and they do not have legal authority. 
Instead, their strengths lie in other areas. Bartoli (2009) describes six types of 
power: “reward, coercive, expert, legitimate, referent and informational” (p. 395). 
NGOs lack reward, coercive and legitimate powers, but they have strong expert 
and informational power derived from experience and connections. As value 
guardians, particularly when values such as peace, cooperation and egalitarianism 
are strongly reflected in their work, NGOs also have strong referent power. 
In direct conflict intervention (mediation, negotiation and advocacy), 
NGOs have at least six significant advantages relative to other international 
actors:
Lack of Coercive Power
NGOs' unofficial status, their inability to apply typical measures of force 
78
and coercion, can play largely in their favor. Just as workers more freely chatter 
with colleagues than with their boss, local leaders are more able to explore 
hypotheticals and express psychological needs with NGOs than with states or 
international bodies. 
Impartiality
Unlike combatants, who are directly involved, or other states, which have 
implicit preferences and priorities, a “trusted impartial non-governmental 
mediator may advance proposals that the parties find acceptable, but which they 
could neither initiate themselves nor accept if proposed by the opposition or by a 
less disinterested party” (Malawi 1993, p. 399). Anderson (1996) proposes that 
impartiality is most effective if NGOs promote adherence to higher values such as 
non-violence, conflict resolution, and equality of opportunity in the mediation 
process. Several scholars emphasize that it is impartiality – and not neutrality – 
that facilitates effective negotiation. According to the Oxford Dictionary (1998), 
neutrality means “not helping or supporting either of two opposing sides”; 
impartiality means “treating all sides in a dispute, etc., equally; unprejudiced; 
fair”. An impartial (fair) NGO is not a doormat and certainly does not have to 
refrain from political participation, but rather strives to function as a moral 
compass, biased towards standards of justice, without preference for either 
warring group per se. 
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Flexibility and Creativity
Independence from states and constituencies allows NGOs the freedom to 
pursue untested strategies, to change tactics at the last minute, and to say things 
governments could not say. Because NGOs rely on people power and moral 
authority rather than positional power, they can use “innovate, creative, 
noncoercive strategies to persuade people to engage in peaceful processes based 
on dialogue and deliberation” (Barnes 2005 p. 5). In circumstances in which 
official actors would be unable to act “often related to mandates, lack of political 
will or the implications conveyed by the official status”, NGOs can intervene to 
reduce tensions and question expectations about roles and vulnerabilities. 
Local Knowledge and Connections
Most NGOs – both international development organizations and national 
organizations – engage with a country pre-conflict. By the time conflict starts, 
these organizations have developed expertise about local culture, conditions and 
areas of need. Most importantly, they have established connections with local 
leaders, civil society and the government. If these organizations maintain ethical 
standards and work toward participatory development during pre-conflict stages, 
they are likely to generate trust in the community, enabling relational peace work 
(Bartoli 2009). Local knowledge also makes development NGOs prime 
candidates for early warning and response.
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Established Systems
Similarly, previous experience in a country gives an NGO the advantage of 
existing organizational structures for response (Bakker 2001). Field staff are 
already 'on the ground', with offices, transportation and equipment. Programs of 
development can be slightly modified for conflict sensitivity and continued 
without reinventing the wheel. Set procedures for communication and goods 
delivery, specific to the country of interest, have already been practiced and 
honed. 
Long-term Commitment
All three models of conflict response (management, resolution and 
transformation) agree that long-term engagement is a necessity for quality conflict 
intervention. States are often limited by political will and election cycles, while 
interstate organizations, with a mandate to ensure security all over the world, have 
enormous pressure to get in, get out and go elsewhere. By contrast, “NGOs can 
invest time in establishing credibility with disputing parties, gaining familiarity 
with the issues and psychological factors behind the conflict” and they can stay 
long after the peace agreement is signed to facilitate reconciliation, reconstruction 
and the implementation of justice. 
NGOs rely on 'soft power' – credible information, expertise, moral 
authority, flexibility and ties to local groups (Karns 2004). In order to preserve 
these advantages, NGOs must deliver on their promises, remain accountable to 
the values they espouse, and learn to work adaptively with diverse actors, 
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standards and expectations. Bartoli (2009) adds NGOs must maintain 
confidentiality to build trust with national elites, but an argument could also be 
made that public mediation helps to build trust at the grassroots. Whichever 
method NGOs select, they should remain consistent, both in rhetoric and action.
The Security Challenge
Safety remains a constant challenge for NGOs in violent conflict. It is easy 
to forget when planning from afar that the principal reality of war is competitive 
injury. NGO staff have been caught in accidental fire, killed by land mines, taken 
prisoner by armed forces, and conscripted into combat. Many organizations pull 
out of conflict for fear of harm to staff, and the perception of increased risk is one 
factor preventing more NGOs from engaging in explicitly political conflict 
resolution. 
Some organizations have begun to hire private security in the absence of 
available peacekeeping forces (Stein 2001). This helps to protect staff in the short-
term, but reduces the quality of impact NGOs are able to have. Even if security 
companies are hired for 'good' (i.e. to protect relief workers or mediators), their 
very presence still threatens local communities and warring groups. Recent 
studies found that as “foreign troops have moved into conflict settings to protect 
aid workers with arms, they have provoked hostility among local warring factions 
that see those forces as another contender for power” (Anderson 1999, p. 63). 
Civilians are less likely to stop for tea or hold informal meetings at an NGO's 
office if located in isolated facilities, surrounded by barbed wire, with camera 
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surveillance and armed guards. Staff that arrive in fancy, bullet-proof sedans with 
a cadre of uniformed men carrying big rifles probably will not convince local 
women to participate in trauma recovery sessions. Many of the advantages listed 
in the previous section – lack of coercive power, unofficial status, adherence to 
values of non-violence, connection and closeness to local populations – disappear 
in the presence of private security. NGOs are no longer equals, colleagues in the 
pursuit of peace and justice, but rather elite do-gooders from afar. 
Avant (2007) proposes a framework for decision-making about NGO 
security, what she calls the “Security Triangle” (see Figure 4.1). Management 
should balance acceptance (that some level of risk is inevitable), protection and 
deterrence. Rather than emphasizing the central importance of protecting NGO 
staff at all costs, Avant advises organizations to frame protection in terms of the 
mission. For example, if an organization seeks to alleviate poverty, then any form 
of violence is necessarily counter to the ultimate goal of the NGO. She explains, 
“rather than developing categories of 'us' and 'them', identifying 'threats' and 
'enemies', or defining issues over which a community is willing to use violence, 
this approach sees violence as the overall threat and uses the language of security 
to find ways to resolve conflicts without the use of violence” (150). Part of an 
NGO's security is maintaining its moral authority as an impartial value guardian 
of peace. This conceptualization enables both staff safety and successful conflict 
transformation.
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Figure 4.1: The Security Triangle
Source: Avant 2007, p. 150
Avant also advocates for the use of more traditional security measures, like 
rigorous personnel management and high surveillance facilities, as well as 
institutionalization of security procedures so that safety is not just left up to the 
“skills and gumption of NGO personnel” (151). However, these practices do not 
gracefully coexist with either the mission-oriented Security Triangle or 
characteristics of successful Track II and Track 1.5 mediation – flexibility, 
constant innovation, freedom from bureaucratic delays, vulnerability in 
expressing psychological needs without threat of violence, accessibility to locals, 
and egalitarian downward accountability. Just as clashing priorities of 'national 
security' and 'human security' limit conflict management strategies, so NGOs are 
limited when they begin to prioritize their own security over adherence to their 
values. Organizations continue to seek balance between these competing 
objectives.
Coalition Building, Networks and Collaboration
After 'peace', one of the most common words in the field of NGO conflict 
resolution is 'collaboration'; scholars and practitioners pay constant lip service to 
the need for integrated resource and information-sharing across NGOs, between 
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sectors, and within the host country. Benefits are obvious: more rapid early 
warning and response; more strategic programming; greater capacity for 
intervention; stronger moral and legitimate authority in initiating mediation; fewer 
instances of working at cross-purposes; and less chaos (Barnes 2005; Ropers 
2002; Rupesinghe 1995). 
In spite of all the rhetoric, it comes as no surprise that the field is far from 
a united front. NGOs have enormous pressures against cooperating with each 
other (Reimann 2005). They compete for the same funding sources, the same 
collection of government bureaucracies, foundations and individual donors. While 
RFPs often require that NGOs 'collaborate' (a stipulation that produces forced, 
paper-thin partnerships), in reality, limited resources yield tough competition. In 
order to demonstrate their productivity, organizations use short-term, quantitative 
metrics; the qualitative impacts of collaboration, such as trust, moral authority and 
long-term strategy, are devalued. In order to improve collaboration and promote 
more sustainable approaches to peacebuilding, it is critical that organizations 
develop better evaluation techniques to include qualitative, long-term measures. 
Organizations also approach conflicts from completely different world 
views. Each agency brings its own perspectives about what's good for a conflict; 
organizational culture and inertia prevent NGOs from rapidly evolving to 
incorporate alternate views (Karns 2004). Relief organizations have theories of 
humanitarian action and mediators have theories of mediation, but very rarely do 
any actors step back to consider how the whole process might work together 
(Ricigliano 2003). This is an essential activity for an integrated approach to 
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conflict transformation. In order to generate meaningful collaboration, NGOs 
must be prepared to mediate between themselves to develop a mutual 
understanding of roles, strategies, causes of conflict, prioritized solutions, values 
and approaches (Reimann 2005). 
Ricigliano (2003) proposes a “Network of Effective Action” (NEA), a 
loose coalition of organizations working in conflict (p. 457). He emphasizes that 
the network should not be formalized nor have specific requirements about 
methods of collaboration. “Central planning” and “formal hierarchies”, he 
explains, only detract from the flexibility and independence of NGOs; “more 
simply, an NEA is essentially a communication network with a common goal” 
(ibid). 
Cooperation with governments are hampered by internal pressures on 
states and IGOs, including political mandates, confidentiality, legal restrictions, 
election cycles, traditions, and standards of operation. Internal competition within 
the UN, EU, or government bureaucracies distract state and interstate actors from 
long-term integration. Relationships are further strained when governments try to 
use NGOs to hide their direct involvement in a country of conflict (Bartoli 2009).
In hopes to increase NGO-state collaboration, McDonald (2004) surveyed 
diplomats working with NGO conflict intervenors. He heard repeatedly a great 
sense of frustration with the ineptitude, lack of professionalism and ignorance of 
NGO staff. Diplomats' “anecdotes often present NGOs as being demanding, 
impatient, stubborn and overly aggressive on their single issue” (xiii). Of course, 
NGO staff could probably tell similar 'horror stories' about diplomats. The point is 
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not the flaw of one or the one group, but rather the lack of communication and 
understanding between the two sectors. Certain tips may help organizations to 
work more effectively with officials. Per McDonald's findings, organizations 
should: know the timelines, election cycles and personal priorities of politicians 
and help them meet their goals; respect diplomats' time and convey information 
only as needed when needed; and build personal relationships, rather than relying 
solely on more distanced forms of advocacy like letters and emails.
Finally, collaboration within the host country – i.e. 'downward 
accountability' – should be paramount to all other partnerships (Lindenberg and 
Bryant 2001). 'Vertical' (across social rungs) and 'horizontal' (across warring 
groups) constituencies should be fostered to counter traditional “war 
constituencies” (Ropers 2002, p. 116). NGOs have been least successful in 
cultivating diverse vertical constituencies because few organizations maintain 
contacts at multiple social levels. Generally, organizations develop habits of 
interaction – the Carter Center, for example, works with national elites while the 
Crisis Management Institute works at the grassroots (Bartoli 2009). Organizations 
should learn to be flexible in their procedures and operations in order to support 
build coalitions across social classes.
The field of peace and conflict resolution, especially among civilians 
acting independently for higher values, is strongly motivated by the notion of a 
'social movement'. Many participants in peace work are eager to create powerful 
coalitions of passionate civilians in order to restructure society in comprehensive 
and fundamental ways (Ropers 2002). However, institutional and organizational 
87
realities inhibit effective collaboration. Thus, individuals (staff, representatives, 
leaders, etc.) have to develop systems, incentives, procedures and traditions that 
promote integrated peacebuilding. Ricigliano (2003) cautions against simple 
answers: “The alternative to these entrenched, though sometimes 
counterproductive practices, is not to replace them with another preset division of 
labor or to make the practice of peacebuilding even more chaotic” (p. 456). 
Instead, diverse international actors should continue to struggle with and work 
through dynamic relations, constantly seeking opportunities for mutual 
understanding.
This chapter has presented numerous challenges: the categorization and 
modeling of NGO activities; the harms and unintended consequences of 
humanitarian relief work; the narrow distinction between impartiality and 
neutrality; the need for security without compromising organizational values; and 
the struggle to collaborate within the confines of a competitive international 
system. In the case studies that follow, I examine how organizations today are 
addressing such challenges in two countries of conflict, Somalia and Cote 
d'Ivoire.  
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CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY: SOMALIA AND COTE D'IVOIRE
Case Study Justification
In order to examine NGOs' activities in countries in conflict, I consider six 
organizations in each of two conflicts: Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire. Both countries 
are considered among the least peaceful in the world.3 High intensity violence in 
both countries is contextualized by extreme poverty. Response is urgent, local 
conditions are dire, and the needs of these countries fit NGO objectives to help 
the vulnerable. 
In both countries, conflicts are presently occurring, an important practical 
consideration in order to examine NGOs' current responses. The conflicts are 
widespread, not limited to a single region of the country. This means no 
organization can feasibly ignore the existence of conflict. Either NGOs leave, 
provide humanitarian assistance, or engage directly. 
Both Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire have low international visibility. Neither 
appears frequently in newspapers of developed countries nor is considered 
significant for international political or economic concerns (Lacey 2001; 
Desbarats 2006; Szabo 2006). While Somalia of fifteen years ago was labeled a 
'terrorist threat' by Western democracies, it has since taken a back seat to other 
North African and West Asian countries; no U.S. or UN peacekeeping forces have 
occupied Somalia since 1995 (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/). Cote d'Ivoire 
has some international support, including UN occupation since 2004. However, 
the shock and awe that keeps states and international donors and media involved 
3According to the 2010 Global Peace Index, Somalia is the 2nd least peaceful 
country and Cote d'Ivoire the 32nd. Since then, Cote d'Ivoire has become 
increasingly violent following post-election conflict in December 2010.
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with Somalia has not been a factor for Cote d'Ivoire (Convergence of Cultures 
2011; Gray 2011). In both cases, international neglect, coupled with the high 
incidence of violence, suggests a strong mandate for NGO action. 
Finally, despite the prevalence of violence, both countries still have a 
relatively active civil sector. Whereas closed societies, like North Korea or 
Burma, would not permit NGO activity, NGOs can and do operate in both 
Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire.
Two major differences distinguish conflict in these countries: dispersion of 
power and duration of violence. Power in Somalia is dispersed between multiple 
warlords and clans governed by almost no central authority, while Cote d'Ivoire 
has a strong central government with conflict rooted in imminent state collapse. 
This tests hypothesis #1 that the dispersion of power in society dictates the social 
level at which NGOs operate. In Somalia, NGOs will be more effective at the 
grassroots level, while NGOs in Cote d'Ivoire may operate more at the level of 
civil society or national elites. Second, Somalia's “intractable” conflict has lasted 
for decades, while overt violence in Cote d'Ivoire only surfaced in December of 
2010. This tests hypothesis #2 that NGOs intevene most directly in the earliest 
stages of conflict. 
In this chapter, I provide a brief history and analysis of each conflict, as 
well as an overview of recommendations in the literature about how the 
international community should respond. It is important to remember that these 
accounts, like any historical or political narrative, are inherently biased, not some 
apolitical record of facts. The way a conflict is described determines which 
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solutions appear 'obvious'. A conflict history in military terms would seem to 
require a military response; in humanitarian terms, a humanitarian response. 
Likewise, the traditional exclusion of civilians, women, children, minority groups, 
and rural populations from prevalent narratives about conflict results in their 
exclusion from peace agreements and reconstruction efforts. (This suggests one 
important role for NGOs: conflict monitoring and reporting from the grassroots 
perspective.)
In the following overview, I attempt to balance traditional (i.e. political / 
military) accounts and the less readily available histories focused on grassroots 
conditions and abstract conflict drivers. These descriptions contextualize NGO 
activities and suggest opportunities, but should not be considered complete. For 
an NGO operational in either Somalia or Cote d'Ivoire, it is critical that staff have 
far more extensive local awareness. 
Somalia: A Long History
A Brief Overview of the Country
Located in the tumultuous Horn of Africa, Somalia has been a site of 
'intractable conflict' since 1991, and is ranked #1 in the 2010 Foreign Policy 
Index of 'State Failure'. Famine, disease and widespread violence have caused 
immense human suffering and displacement; violence between national elites 
distracts the international community from assisting with local recovery. 
Before colonization, independent subclans occupied distinct, but 
unofficially demarcated geographic areas (Gutale 2008). Rather than top-down 
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governance, they relied on xeer, or informal rules of social order, to govern intra- 
and inter-clan relations (Abdillahi 1998). The consolidation of clans under one 
centralized government was a product of European colonization: Britain claimed 
Somalia in the 19th century, and in the 1940s, Italy challenged Britain for control. 
The resulting territories were divided into British Somaliland and Italian Somalia. 
After World War II, the areas were rejoined and the Somali Republic began a long 
struggle for independence, which it finally achieved in 1960. 
Today, numerous clans, sub-clans (sub-sub-clans, etc.) and family 
networks dictate most power relations in the country (Gettleman 2007). Control of 
the central government, operating out of the capital, Mogadishu, remains the 
leading manifest cause of conflict. Two regions of the country, Somaliland and 
Puntland, have existed as semi-independent units, removed from the heart of 
Somali violence (see Figure 5.1). People in these regions experience less 
emergent chaos than their southern counterparts although violence between 
Somaliland and Puntland emerged in 2007, regarding disputed territories at their 
mutual border (“Analysis on...” 2009).
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Figure 5.1: Map of Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland
Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/images/somalia-
puntland3.gif
In comparison to its neighbors, Somalia is more ethnically and religious 
homogeneous. Most are Sunni Muslim and 85% of the population is Somali. Yet, 
some observers maintain that conflict in the region has religious and ethnic roots. 
For example, al-Shabaab, an opposition group that controls two-thirds of south 
and central Somalia, seeks a stricter version of Sharia law (Inside Story 2010). 
Somalia is home to an estimated 9.3 million people, of which 2.8 million 
live in the capital. According to recent estimates by the UNHCR, about 1.5 
million people have been displaced by conflict and drought (MacDonald 1992). 
Little progress has been made in the country toward the UN Millennium 
Development Goals. There is no reliable data on income in the country, due to 
widespread violence and pastoral nomadism (www.mdgmonitor.org). However, 
940,000 people are known to be “in a state of acute food and livelihood crisis” 
and at least 43% of the population is in immediate need of humanitarian 
assistance (“Somalia: Persistent...” 2011; www.dfid.gov.uk/). According to 
UNICEF, the primary school enrollment rate falls below 23%. Girls, nomads and 
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rural children are the least likely to receive education (Moyi 2010). Similar 
gender gaps exist in employment, health care and governance (Abdillahi 1998; 
Gutale 2008). Human rights violations, violence against women and children, and 
the persecution of minorities have become commonplace occurrences (Kimenyi et  
al. 2010). However, in national governance and international intervention, such 
issues take a back burner to persistent political chaos. 
Current Political Landscape
The dominant explanation for Somalia's conflict relates to the current 
power struggle between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the 
insurgent opposition, al-Shabaab. United Nations Special Envoy for Somalia 
Ahmedou Ould Abdallah summarizes this perspective: 
The conflict in Somalia...  is neither a liberation struggle, nor an ethnic or 
religious war. It is also not just a struggle for power among the clans, as 
many believe. The frequently shifting allegiances between and within 
clans demonstrate that other factors are also responsible for the continued 
instability of the country. Within Somalia, warlords, activists, and their 
private militias have perpetuated the chaos and violence for their own 
benefit. Overall, a small group drawn from various backgrounds and 
driven by lust for money and power is fighting to fill the political vacuum. 
Some do not want peace at all. (2007, para 2). 
This narrative, about the influence of corrupt, power-seeking elites, 
underlies the bulk of Western dialogue about Somalia. Two other buzzwords are 
frequently used in association with the country: 'piracy' and 'terrorism'. Whether 
true or exaggerated, these loaded words implicitly delegitimize opposition groups. 
Looting along the Somali coast is often seen, by Western democracies, to pose a 
grave threat, when in fact it is nothing more than a “distraction from the tragic 
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humanitarian crisis unfolding on land” (Nesbitt and Yusuf 2009, p. 1). 
Gutale (2008) adds that even if groups like al-Shabaab are corrupt, lusting 
for money and power, and flagrantly violating human rights, these groups also 
have strong public support: “individual subclan members are expect to amass 
wealth while they have power and are required to share that wealth with the rest 
of kin” (p. 46). Similarly, these political rivalries are only the surface, manifest 
causes of conflict. To demonstrate the complexity of conflict causes, Gutale 
includes a chart listing 11 different regions in Somalia, each with dozens of clans 
and at least three different drivers of conflict, such as: land ownership, religious 
differences, resource abundance, water shortages, and deforestation. 
Several observers, including scholar Ahmed Samatar and the International 
Crisis Group, agree that a “disproportionate amount of international media 
attention [focuses] on Mogadishu and the grim stories of violence and TFG 
dysfunction, [which] distracts from the positive developments and remarkable 
peacebuilding and state formation processes now under way in central and 
northern Somalia” (Abdi 2011, para 7). It is true that Somalia has not had stable 
governance for at least twenty years. However, at the local level, administrators 
and civil society organizations have been able to produce areas of relative peace. 
Although death rates remain high, humanitarian needs (hunger, lack of water, 
health care, etc.) go unmet, and centralized (i.e. European-style) government has 
failed, Samatar protests the widespread international belief that Somalia is 
hopeless. Instead, he contends that hope lies with grassroots leadership, region by 
region. 
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Somalia: Recommended Next Steps
The International Crisis Group advocates for a more decentralized 
alternative to the corruption and violence of the national government. “Since 
independence, one clan, or group of clans, has always used control of the center to 
take most of the resources and deny them to rival clans. Thus, whenever a new 
transitional government is created, Somalis are naturally wary and give it limited, 
or no, support, fearing it will only be used to dominate and marginalize them” 
(“Somalia: The Transitional Government” 2011, para 2). States, like Somaliland 
and Puntland, have already broken free, and others, like Jubaland, seem to be on 
the same path. In the absence of national infrastructure and compelling leadership, 
communities continue to root their identity in clans and local geography. 
Fragmentation, or at least sub-national empowerment, may be key to achieving 
non-violence and forward-looking justice. 
However, few in the international community embrace this perspective. 
For example, UN representative Ahmedou Ould Abdallah considers three, and 
only three, possible actions: proceed as usual, pull out of the country, or increase 
political and security measures – Track I negotiation with national elites and 
military assistance to the African Union (Security Council Meeting 2007). None 
of these options represent a shift away from major warring sub-groups. 
From this local-national debate, many recommendations have emerged for 
peacebuilding in Somalia. NGOs may be dominant or primary actors in any one 
of these activities: 
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 Support economic development in relatively peaceful regions such as 
Somaliland and Puntland (Abdi 2011);
 Extend humanitarian and development assistance to “areas recently 
recovered from armed groups”, particularly focused on job creation for the 
young unemployed (“Somalia: UN Conference” 2011; Kimenyi et al. 
2010); 
 Build the capacity of local administrators in order to strengthen 
decentralized governance and support structures of justice (“Somalia: The 
Transitional Government” 2011); 
 Hold peace negotiations in Somalia – to instill a greater sense of local 
ownership for agreements reached – with TFG and rival forces, especially 
al-Shabaab (Stevenson 2007); 
 Promote mediation, negotiation and reconciliation “with 'states' [Jubaland, 
Puntland, etc], regional authorities, civil society and the diaspora” 
(“Somalia: UN Conference” 2011);
 Monitor the TFG and advocate for: transparency, cooperation with other 
clans, security reform, “anti-corruption efforts”, and “meaningful 
restructuring” (“Somalia: The Transitional Government” 2011);
 Work to end “piracy, human smuggling, illegal fighting and the dumping 
of toxic waste” (“Somalia: UN Conference” 2011); 
 Interrupt the flow of small arms trade and “disarm the population” 
(Kimenyi et al. 2010);
 Implement grassroots education, including literacy skills, citizenship 
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training and peace education in order to “promote the knowledge, skills, 
attitudes and values... that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent 
conflict and violence, both overt and structural” (UNICEF, qtd in Elmi 
2009).
Cote d'Ivoire: Peace Thwarted
A Brief Overview of the Country
Unlike Somalia, Cote d'Ivoire has not had consistent violence since its 
independence and is not dominated by clan-based rivalries. On the contrary, Cote 
d'Ivoire initially experienced strong economic growth following independence, 
with political stability in the central government. During the economic downturn 
of the 1980s, tensions began to rise between the mostly Muslim north and the 
mostly Christian south (Little 2011). Both the capital, Yamoussoukro, and the 
country's largest city, Abidjan, are located in the south, nearer to sea ports, where 
positions of power are held mostly by 'pure' Ivoirians (see figure 5.2). The north, 
by contrast, is home to many immigrants and people of mixed-heritage. This has 
been the basis for strong ethnic and religious tensions. By 2002, full-out civil war 
divided the country; an unstable peace resumed in 2007. In December of 2010, 
post-election violence resulted in the “most serious humanitarian and human 
rights crisis in Cote d'Ivoire since the de facto partition of the country in 
September 2002” (Amnesty International “Six Months” 2011). The emerging 
situation has elicited international response, as hundreds of civilians are killed and 
thousands flee to neighboring countries. 
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Figure 5.2: Cote d'Ivoire and its Neighbors
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/country_profiles/1043014.stm
Approximately 21.6 million people live in Cote d'Ivoire, representing 
more than 60 ethnic groups, including Baoule, Senoufo, Bete and Lagoon (World 
Bank; “Ivory Coast Society” 1988). The country's conflict is contextualized by 
poverty and stagnant development. Extreme poverty is not as prevalent in Cote 
d'Ivoire as in Somalia, although the percentage of Ivoirians living on less than $1 
a day has steadily increased since the 1990s (United Nations 2010). The lowest 
quintile makes up a shrinking proportion of national consumption, from 7% in 
1993 to just 5% in 2002. Undernourishment, infant mortality and disease (HIV / 
AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis) are endemic problems, exacerbated by violence. 
While the country has a relatively high rate of employment (81.2% of eligible 
males work), the gender disparity in employment, as in education, is enormous. 
Amnesty International reports consistent human rights violations, including media 
censure, systematic rape, arbitrary detention and torture, even during periods of 
relative peace from 2007 to 2010. 
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Current Political Landscape
Since the arrest of former President Laurent Gbagbo, overt political 
conflict has subsided. For many in the international community, this is an 
immense sign of hope, a turning point in the history of Cote d'Ivoire. However, 
violence by armed forces continues and tensions remain high. A flourishing arms 
trade persists in Abidjan and the empty houses of refugees and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) are frequently looted (“Cote d'Ivoire: Reluctant to 
Return Home” 2011). Thousands of people remain displaced, suffering immense 
physical and psychological trauma. Moreover, as the splintering of the pro-
Ouattara groups demonstrates, historic divisions between the geographic north 
and south linger in the hearts and minds of the people, in spite of the seemingly 
stable democracy. 
Bariyo (2007) identifies four main causes of conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. 
Political competition, the most obvious cause, has continued since 1990, with 
periodic mutinies of government soldiers. Both social and economic factors drive 
tensions between the north and south. There has been an uneven distribution of 
development. Since the south has major cities, oil refineries and coastal access, it 
proves far more lucrative to corporations and foreign governments. Socially, 
ethnic and religious clashes between the north and south have been reinforced by 
decades of ivoirité policies. Immigrants and mixed-heritage residents of the north 
are “denied passports and even national identity despite being citizens” (p. 31). 
Ideological differences between Christians and Muslims have been linked to 
existing inequalities, producing a sense of irreconcilable identity. These internal 
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factors are further amplified by external conditions in the greater West African 
region, where “ethnic tensions and rivalries, political instability, disputes over the 
control of natural resources, natural disaster, poverty, food insecurity, and the 
imperatives of development have all resulted in significant population 
displacement” (Jessice Wyndham, qtd in Bariyo 2007, p. 32). As people and arms 
migrate across borders, the resources and motivation for violence are shared 
between neighboring countries. 
The case of Cote d'Ivoire exemplifies the messiness of terms like 'conflict 
prevention' and 'reconstruction'. One might argue that the period from 2007-2010 
was merely “abeyant intractability”,  conflict suspended in the presence of a cease 
fire, but not resolved (Crocker et al. 2009). Interventions in the early months of 
2010 might thus, be explained only as ongoing 'conflict transformation'. The more 
prevalent narrative about Cote d'Ivoire maintains that peace was achieved in 2007 
and the violence of 2011 represented a new conflict (Inside Story 2011). From this 
perspective, intervention in 2010 would be considered 'conflict prevention'. 
Whether the causes of conflict remain constant across distinct instances of 
violence in the country, for NGOs the conflict of 2011 can pragmatically be 
considered 'conflict prevention' since the interim reduction in violence permitted 
three years of peace-like socio-economic development. 
Cote d'Ivoire: Recommended Next Steps
The success of peacebuilding in Cote d'Ivoire over the next year will be 
critical for the future of the country. Relative stability under President Ouattara 
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suggests an opportunity for comprehensive reconciliation and restructuring. As 
with Somalia, any of the following recommendations could be undertaken by 
national or international NGOs: 
 Continue / resume economic development, with an eye toward equal 
outcomes in both the north and south; since the south is currently more 
prosperous, this may mean extra attention in the north (Bariyo 2007);
 Promote fact-finding efforts, truth commissions, reconciliation, and public 
negotiation for transitional justice (Affa'a-Mindzie 2009; Yabi 2011);
 Emphasize traditional methods of reconciliation, using techniques of 
positive-sum mediation, reintegration and atonement (Bariyo 2007; 
Zartman 2002); 
 Support President Ouattara in his effort to re-establish the rule of law, and 
“bring to justice” those individuals responsible for serious war crimes and 
human rights abuses (Amnesty International “Video” 2011); 
 Support the development of a stronger, more independent and credible 
election commission (Affa'a-Mindzie 2009);
 Encourage both sides to respect the cease-fire (“Cote d'Ivoire: Is War the 
Only Option?” 2011); 
 Hold peace talks between RHDP (Ouattara's party: Union of 
Houphouetists for Democracy and Peace) and LMP (Gbagbo's party: The 
Presidential Majority); include local civil society leaders (ibid); 
 Work to reintegrate massive numbers of returning refugees (ibid); 
 Implement programs of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, 
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with equal emphasis on both major armed groups (Bariyo 2007); 
 Use national media sources to foster public support for a peaceful and 
unified future (ibid); 
 Include Cote d'Ivoire in international media to increase stakes for peace in 
the country, and to hold Ouattara's government more accountable (Gray 
2011). 
Recommendations offered for Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire demonstrate that 
NGOs have numerous opportunities for intervention, despite intractability in the 
former and elite politics in the latter. In the following chapter, I provide an 
overview of organizations working in the countries, from withdrawal, through 
strategies of basic humanitarian relief, to direct conflict intervention. With six 
target NGOs in each country, I compare internal dynamics, such as funding and 
structure, and assess their level of engagement with conflict resolution as a 
programmatic strategy. 
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CHAPTER 6: OVERVIEW OF ORGANIZATIONS IN TARGET COUNTRIES
NGOs Pulling Out of Conflict
Despite the magnitude of need in Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire, there are not 
as many NGOs in these countries as in impoverished but peaceful locations such 
as Bangladesh or Haiti. When need is most intense, i.e. when violence erupts, 
deteriorating the social, psychological, economic, political and institutional 
components of society, many NGOs evacuate. The cause is not hard to discern; 
organizations must be concerned for the safety of their staff and the unintended 
political implications of their work. Intergovernmental organizations and 
international financial institutions, like the UN and World Bank, respectively, tend 
to cut back on all activities in the country other than peacekeeping. As a result, 
NGOs lose both funding and operational support (d'Almeida 2011). Finally, 
international NGOs (INGOs) have to consider the opportunity costs of working in 
conflict. If an organization intends to end poverty worldwide, they may not view 
conflict intervention as the most efficient use of their time and resources. 
According to AlertNet, a self-identified “humanitarian news site”, the Cote 
d'Ivoire civil war saw a dramatic decrease in NGO involvement over a three week 
period following an rash of escalating violence (2004). Relief agencies evacuated 
staff and recuperated what they could of their damaged equipment. The same 
pattern of rapid evacuation has occurred in response to recent post-election 
violence. For years, Handicap International had been providing health assistance 
to disabled refugees. The organization evacuated pre-emptively in 2009. 
Similarly, the Norwegian Refugee Council had been doing development and 
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reconstruction work since the civil war of 2002. In 2010, the organization 
explained, “Due to the insecurity linked to the post-electoral crisis in Cote 
d'Ivoire, NRC has suspended most of its field activities.”
Secours Catholique, a French NGO, seeks to implement principles of the 
church: “the dignity of the human person, justice, solidarity, brotherhood, 
reconciliation, peace, the best option for the poor, integrated development of the 
human person, subsidarity, the universal destination of goods, the indivisibility of 
rights”. Despite stated objectives for long-term change, the organization still 
pulled out of Cote d'Ivoire in 2010. The organization's mission commits to 
“fighting against the causes of poverty”, which certainly include conflict. With 
$210 million and 65,000 volunteers, Secours International even had substantial 
capacity to provide its own security and experiment with new conflict 
interventions. Like many others, they removed their field staff, initially provided 
monetary assistance to NGOs that stayed, and later, disconnected from the 
country altogether. 
Kouassi (2011) observes that INGOs “suffer from the current 
disinformation campaign portraying them as logistical supporters for pro-Ouattara 
forces”, the internationally recognized government (para 1). As a result, INGO 
staff are more frequently killed by pro-Gbagbo troops. AlertNet suggests this may 
be because warring groups have grown accustomed to the UN, which engages in 
both military and humanitarian activities (2004). Combatants learn to distrust 
humanitarian aid workers. In Abidjan in particular, this means local NGOs are 
forced to take up the slack where international organizations left off (Kouassi 
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2011). Unsurprisingly, local NGOs do not have the financial, staffing or 
informational capacity to assume all the duties of INGOs. 
Another example of NGO evacuation demonstrates a shocking case of 
missed opportunity. Africare considers itself a “leader in development assistance 
and humanitarian aid to Africa” with work in more than 36 countries on the 
conflict-ridden continent. The organization touts its “unparalleled knowledge of 
the continent, its challenges and opportunities”, and has well-established 
“relationships with key figures ranging from community leaders and traditional 
authorities to presidents and prime ministers”. In other words, Africare describes 
itself as a textbook example of an effective Track 1.5 mediator: it has developed 
knowledge, trust and relationships over a long period of time at multiple levels of 
society. Africare could be a pioneer in the resolution of Ivoirian conflict. Instead, 
the organization “ceased activities” in 2005 due to “civil disturbance”.
Similarly, Africare had been working in Somalia in the 1970s. While the 
country underwent widespread famine in 1975 and the Ogaden War in 1978, 
Africare provided emergency relief to refugees and IDPs. When conflict subsided 
in the 1980s, the organization was even able to initiate development work, with 
programs for agriculture and environmental sustainability. After the outbreak of 
civil war in 1991, Africare attempted to provide humanitarian aid, but eventually 
gave up and left in 1994. Even the world's oldest and largest African-American 
development organization, with a firm commitment to ending poverty, has 
avoided Somalia for the past 17 years.
NGOs leaving Somalia are not as easy to trace as in Cote d'Ivoire since 
106
conflict did not begin as recently. However, many of the organizations still 
working in Somalia report the absence of their peers. Trocaire, an international 
development organization, explains that it is “one of the few remaining NGOs 
operating in Somalia”. This begs the question: if it is so dangerous that the 
majority of INGOs have evacuated, what inspires some to stay? The persistence 
of certain organizations seems to be motivated by a commitment to the particular 
needs of the country's people which cannot be calculated in terms of opportunity 
costs or efficiencies elsewhere. Sarah Omwane of Save the Children UK explains, 
“It is very simple. We can maintain our program in Somalia and children can live. 
Or we can leave, and children can die.” 
Survey of NGOs in Each Country
While it is concerning that so many organizations have left Somalia and 
Cote d'Ivoire when they were most needed, dwelling on their absence is also 
problematic. Organizations that stick around begin to seem heroic despite 
mundane activities. Is Save the Children UK really securing a better future for 
Somali children via food aid and basic education? The question is at least worth 
investigating. 
Table 6.1 lists NGOs operating in Somalia by activity; the same can be 
found for Cote d'Ivoire in table 6.2. Both of these tables were generated through 
haphazard selection for an overview of organizations in target countries. These are 
neither complete nor representative samples. For Somalia, I began with the listing 
provided by the Somalia NGO Consortium and added additional organizations via 
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snowball sampling (known organizations identified others). The same method was 
used for Cote d'Ivoire, starting with the UN NGO database and the Doha 
International Institute. This sampling method helps to capture organizations with 
more integration, and thus, power within the NGO community. (The ten case 
study organizations have been excluded from this brief survey.)
Table 6.1: Survey of 53 NGOs Currently Operating in Somalia
Activity Organizations
Food aid
ACT Alliance; Agency for Technical Cooperation 
and Development (ACTED); Adventist 
Development and Relief Agency (ADRA); 
Agency for Peace and Development; Burhakaha 
Town Section Committee (BTSC); Concern 
Worldwide; Cooperazione Internazionale; Danish 
Refugee Council; Integrated Development Focus 
(IDF); International Medical Corps; Islamic 
Relief Worldwide; Medair; Oxfam Novib; Social 
Life and Agricultural Development Organization 
(SADO); Save the Children UK; Solidarites 
International; Youth Organization for Relief and 
Development (YORD)
Other forms of emergency 
relief
e.g. distribution of water, 
buckets, blankets, hygiene 
supplies; immediate health 
care; latrine construction in 
refugee camps
ACT Alliance; Adventist Development and Relief 
Agency (ADRA); American Friends Service 
Committee; Bani' Adam Relief and Development 
Organization; Burhakaha Town Section 
Committee (BTSC); Comitato Internazionale per 
lo Sviluppo del Popoli (CISP);  Cooperazione 
Internazionale; Danish Refugee Council; Family 
Empowerment and Relief Organization (FERO); 
International Aid Services; International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); 
International Medical Corps; International 
Rescue Committee; Jubba Foundation; Medair; 
Oxfam Novib; Relief for Africa; Relief 
International; Social Life and Agricultural 
Development Organization (SADO); Save the 
Children UK; Solidarites International; Trocaire; 
WASDA
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Educational development
e.g. funding and resources 
for existing schools; 
construction and building 
rehab; teacher training
Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA); 
African Educational Trust (AET); African Rescue 
Committee (AFREC); Comitato Internzaionale 
per lo Sviluppo del Popoli (CISP); Concern 
Worldwide; Family Empowerment and Relief 
Organization (FERO); International Aid Services; 
Integrated Development Focus (IDF); Jubba 
Foundation; Norwegian Church Aid; KISMA 
Peace and Development Organization; Relief 
International; Save the Children UK; Swedish 
African Welfare Alliance; Trocaire; World 
Concern; Youth Organization for Relief and 
Development (YORD)
Health care development 
e.g. funding and resources; 
for existing clinics; 
construction and building 
rehab; doctor and midwife 
training; community health 
education
Action Africa Help – International; Adventist 
Development and Relief Agency (ADRA); 
African Rescue Committee (AFREC); Comitato 
Collaborazione Medica; Family Empowerment 
and Relief Organization (FERO); International 
Aid Services; International Medical Corps; 
Intersos – Organizzazione Umanitaria per 
l'emergenza; Islamic Relief Worldwide; Jubba 
Foundation; Doctors of the World UK; KISMA 
Peace and Development Organization; Relief 
International; Swedish African Welfar Assistance; 
Swiss-Kalmo; Trocaire
Employment assistance
e.g. adult literacy programs; 
vocational training; food or 
cash for work; microloans for 
small businesses
Agency for Technical Cooperation and 
Development (ACTED); Adventist Development 
and Relief Agency (ADRA); African Educational 
Trust (AET); African Rescue committee 
(AFREC); Bani' Adam Relief and Development 
Organization; Comitato Internzaionale per lo 
Sviluppo del Popoli (CISP); Concern Worldwide; 
Family Empowerment and Relief Organization 
(FERO); Integrated Development Focus (IDF); 
Intersos – Organizzazione Umanitaria per 
l'emergenza; Norwegian Church Aid; Oxfam 
Novib; Relief International; Veterinaires Sans 
Frontieres
Development with particular 
vulnerable populations
e.g. handicapped adults; 
street children; single 
mothers
Family Empowerment and Relief Organization 
(FERO); Handicap International; Horn of Africa 
Voluntary Youth Committee (HAVOYOCO); 
Handicap Initiative Supporting And Networking 
(HISAN); Youth Organization for Relief and 
Development (YORD)
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Capacity building of local 
civil society
American Friends Service Committee; Integrated 
Development Focus (IDF); Nooleeynta 
Naruurada Mustaqbalika; Oxfam Novib; 
SaferWorld; Swedish African Welfare Alliance; 
Somali Family Services
Peace and reconciliation at 
the grassroots
e.g. peacebuilding 
workshops; trauma dialogue; 
psychosocial assistance; 
social integration across 
warring groups
African Rescue Committee (AFREC); American 
Friends Service Committee; Family 
Empowerment and Relief Organization (FERO); 
Intersos – Organizzazione Umanitaria per 
l'emergenza;  Norwegian Church Aid; KISMA 
Peace and Development Organization; 
SaferWorld; Somali Family Services
Advocacy directed at 
national or international 
institutions - for human 
rights, protection of 
vulnerable populations, or 
peace 
Family Empowerment and Relief Organization 
(FERO); Handicap International; Jubba 
Foundation; Oxfam Novib; Youth Organization 
for Relief and Development (YORD)
Other
Environmental conservation: African Rescue 
Committee (AFREC)
Conflict / human rights monitoring: IREX
Refugee legal aid: Danish Refugee Council
Weapon Confiscation: Mines Advisory Group
Table 6.2: Survey of 30 NGOs Currently Operating in Cote d'Ivoire
Activity Organizations
Food aid
Action Against Hunger; Helen Keller 
International; International Committee of the Red 
Cross; Merlin; Oxfam International; Solidarites 
International; SOS Children's Village
Other forms of emergency 
relief
e.g. distribution of water, 
buckets, blankets, hygiene 
supplies; immediate health 
care; latrine construction in 
refugee camps
Action Against Hunger; African Child Care 
Foundation; African Progress Foundation; Espoir 
Tiers Monde; Helen Keller International; 
International Committee of the Red Cross; Oxfam 
International; Save the Children UK; Soldarites 
International; SOS Children's Village
Educational development African Progress Foundation; Espoir Tiers Monde
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e.g. funding and resources 
for existing schools; 
construction and building 
rehab; teacher training
Health care development 
e.g. funding and resources; 
for existing clinics; 
construction and building 
rehab; doctor and midwife 
training; community health 
education
African Child Care Foundation; African Progress 
Foundation; Center for Communication Programs; 
Doctors of the World UK; Population Council; 
Population Services International
Employment assistance
e.g. adult literacy programs; 
vocational training; food or 
cash for work; microloans 
for small businesses
African Progress Foundation; Doctors of the 
World UK; Ecumenical Microfinance for Human 
Development (ECLOF)
Development with particular 
vulnerable populations
e.g. handicapped adults; 
street children; single 
mothers
Scolej Orphanage Home; SOS Children's Village
Capacity building of local 
civil society
Alliance Internationale pour les objectifs de 
Millenaire; Centre feminin pour la democratie et 
les droits humains en Cote d'Ivoire (CFEC); ONG 
Femme Active de Cote d'Ivoire (OFACI); 
Population Services International
Peace and reconciliation at 
the grassroots
e.g. peacebuilding 
workshops; trauma 
dialogue; psychosocial 
assistance; social integration 
across warring groups
Children's International Summer Village (CISV); 
Convention de la Societe Civile Ivoirienne; ONG 
Femme Active de Cote d'Ivoire (OFACI)
Advocacy directed at 
national or international 
institutions - for human 
rights, protection of 
vulnerable populations, or 
African Rally for Defense of Human Rights 
(RADDHO); Association Africaine de Defense 
des Droits de l'Homme (ASADHO); Centre 
feminin pour la democratie et les droits humains 
en Cote d'Ivoire (CFEC); Observatory for a New 
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peace Africa; International Refugee Rights Initiative; ONG Femme Active de Cote d'Ivoire (OFACI)
Other
Conflict Monitoring: IREX; Islamic Relief 
Worldwide
Youth Development: Center for Communication 
Programs
Environmental Conservation: La Vie en Vert; 
Network for Environment and Sustainable 
Development in Africa
Intervention strategies of these organizations can be divided into nine 
categories: emergency relief; educational development; health care development; 
employment assistance; development with particular vulnerable populations; 
capacity building of local civil society; peace and reconciliation at the grassroots; 
advocacy for peace or human rights; and a miscellaneous 'other' category, 
including conflict monitoring, weapon confiscation, and environmental 
conservation. This covers only a very small range of activities relative to 
theorized NGO potential described in chapter 4. In particular, none of the 
surveyed organizations indicate any involvement in conflict mediation, 
negotiation or arbitration, either on Track II (with civil society) or 1.5 (with state 
leaders). 
The most obvious difference between tables 6.1 and 6.2 is the number of 
organizations: there are far more in Somalia than in Cote d'Ivoire, even taking into 
account the haphazard sampling method. Although Somali conflict has been going 
on for longer, it is still more compelling than Ivorian plight. Save the Children 
UK explains, Somalia “is synonymous with pirates, militia and shattered 
buildings”, an icon of extreme poverty, conflict, anarchy and human desperation. 
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For a conflict-intervening organization, Somalia is the first natural choice. 
Notably, Somalia also has more international NGOs (e.g. ACT Alliance, 
Concern Worldwide, Relief International), whereas Cote d'Ivoire has more 
national NGOs (e.g. Centre feminin pour la democratie et les droits humains en 
Cote d'Ivoire; ONG Femme Active de Cote d'Ivoire). The Alliance Internationale 
pour les objectifs du Millenaire mentions the lack of international organizations 
working in Cote d'Ivoire in comparison with other similarly impoverished African 
countries. This fits the observation by Kouassi (2011) that INGOs have left 
Abidjan (CI) in the hands of local NGOs.
Organizations in Somalia are heavily weighted toward emergency relief 
over advocacy or peace work. This parallels a common note in literature that 
relief remains the dominant strategy of NGOs in conflict (see chapter 1). Cote 
d'Ivoire is also weighted toward basic needs provision, but not as far skewed as 
Somalia. This is probably because local NGOs – with more independence and 
fewer resources than INGOs – are more prepared for advocacy than service 
delivery.
Surprisingly, 16 of the 53 organizations surveyed in Somalia still use food 
aid, despite overwhelming evidence that distribution of basic food stuffs causes 
more harm than good (see chapter 4; also: Barrett 2001; Blouin and Pallage 2009; 
Kirwin and McMillan 2007; Murphy 2008; Rivera and Conn 2006). As though to 
mask the simplicity of the task, organizations refer to the distribution of 
sustenance as anything but 'food aid'. Terms like “emergency food security”, 
“nutrient-rich biscuits”, “emergency feeding”, “nutrition services in the context of 
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emergency relief”, “hunger alleviation”, and even “disease-preventing nutritional 
interventions” all describe the same elementary activity. No amount of theorizing 
seems to diminish the appeal of easy and immediately gratifying food distribution. 
Several organizations described the trajectory of their activities throughout 
the conflicts. In Somalia, International Medical Corps proudly advertises that it 
was the first group to enter the country following the overthrow of Siad Barre in 
1991. However, their activities have since remained static. The Adventist 
Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), on the other hand, explains that, while 
initial interventions consisted of emergency and relief work, today, the 
organization incorporates rehabilitation and development activities, including 
“health, water, education, road development, institutional capacity building and 
food security”. While International Medical Corps' strategy suggests adherence to 
a strict mission, the shifting priorities of ADRA suggest it is a 'learning' 
organization. 
In Cote d'Ivoire, several organizations describe the opposite shift. Whereas 
ADRA learned to incorporate more long-term development strategies over the 
course of the Somali conflict, groups like Save the Children UK exchanged 
development activities for emergency relief upon the outbreak of violence. The 
organization, Islamic Relief Worldwide, left the country and explains that it has 
“emergency teams on standby for deployment”. This begs the question: who will 
determine when to deploy these teams and how will they know? In the past five 
months, Cote d'Ivoire has seen hundreds of deaths, flagrant violations of human 
rights, mass displacement, starvation and disease. IGOs and NGOs alike are 
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crying for more international support. While Islamic Relief Worldwide waits, it 
continues “conflict monitoring” and urges the international community to “do 
something”. The organization seems to believe that while it can do something 
(teams are ready and waiting), it is somehow less suitable actor than states or 
IGOs.
These organizations grapple with the politics of their geography. Due to 
the level of violence in the country, many Somali INGOs have “local” offices in 
Kenya. This seems to be an effective strategy for security, but isolates 
organizational field staff from local communities. Some NGOs indicate 
operations only in Puntland and Somaliland. They are careful to explain these 
“states” declare themselves independent, but are not officially recognized by the 
international community. In this way, they walk a fine line, neither affirming nor 
rejecting their independence. This may help organizations to remain impartial and 
trusted by the community. However, organizations' failure to embrace Somaliland 
and Puntland as fully independent states weakens Somalia's strongest shot at 
peace: relative stability in these autonomous territories. In Cote d'Ivoire, most 
NGOs operate in the south and headquarter in Abidjan. For tactical ease, this 
makes sense; as the biggest port city, Abidjan facilitates travel and 
communication. However, as a peacebuilding strategy, it runs counter to logic 
presented in chapter 5. Northern Cote d'Ivoire is less developed, more 
impoverished, and more ethnically marginalized than the south. In order to reduce 
inequality and resentment between halves of the country, NGOs should focus 
more on the north than the south. 
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Rationale for Organizations Selected
In order to examine organizational programs and principles more closely, I 
analyze six NGOs from each country. Five considerations motivate selection. 
First, on a practical level, the studied organizations must have well-developed 
websites so that I can access information and understand, with some degree of 
specificity, what they are doing. This limits the study to transnational or large, 
national organizations. 
Second, organizations must have some explicit involvement with the 
conflict mitigation in the target country. Any reference to conflict resolution, 
conflict prevention, conflict mediation, conflict transformation, reconciliation, 
peace advocacy, or peace building satisfied this requirement. However, if an 
organization spoke generally of conflict resolution, but listed no such activities in 
the target country, it was excluded. For example, Oxfam International lists arms 
control and peace advocacy among its organizational objectives, but only provides 
emergency relief in Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia, and so cannot be included in the 
study. 
Further, studied organizations must be engaged in some way 'on the 
ground'. Because I wish to identify NGOs' roles within countries of conflict, 
watchdog organizations that inform and motivate other international actors have 
been excluded. For example, Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis 
Group could not be considered directly engaged in conflict resolution even though 
they indirectly contribute to violence reduction. 
116
Among selected organizations, I sought diversity in size, funding structure, 
and founding mission. For example, the Carter Center was initiated to prevent and 
resolve conflicts, while Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) originally set out to 
deliver medical humanitarian aid. Both organizations have experienced 'mission 
creep'; their objectives are more similar now than when they started. Today, the 
Carter Center includes medical relief, and MSF engages in peace advocacy. 
Nonetheless, I hypothesize that organizations will interpret their responsibilities 
quite differently drawing from their divergent founding missions. 
Finally, I sought at least two organizations present in both countries in 
order to draw interstate comparisons with a constant organization. These selection 
criteria lead to the following set of organizations (same as table 1.2): 
Table 6.3: Case Study Organizations
Cote d'Ivoire Somalia
Medecins Sans Frontieres Medecins Sans Frontieres
Care International / Care UK Care International / Care UK
Carter Center interpeace
Caritas World Vision
International Rescue Committee Mercy Corps
Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammernarbeit (GIZ) Horn Relief
Comparing Internal Dynamics
One advantage of studying such a small number of NGOs is the ability to 
scrutinize diverse, competing internal and external factors that influence 
organizational decision-making. There is a constant “tensions between lofty 
aspirations and the multiple external pressures that relief and development NGOs 
are experiencing” (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001, p. 31). Table 6.2 outlines the 
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structure, size and funding of target organizations.4
Table 6.4: Basic Facts and Figures about Target Organizations
Organization Form Headquarter country
Number 
of staff
Annual 
Operating 
Budget*
Funding 
Sources
Care 
International
International 
confederation USA 10,000 709
Individuals, 
government, 
IGOs
Caritas 
Internationalis
International 
confederation Rome 440,000  ~5,500
Primarily 
individuals; 
also: 
foundations, 
corporations, 
IGOs
Carter Center International organization USA
175 
staff;
116 
interns
91
Individuals, 
foundations, 
corporations, 
IGOs
Deutsche 
Gesellschaft 
für 
Internationale 
Zusammernarb
eit (GIZ)**
International 
organization Germany 15,760 2,079
79% 
government; 
21% 
corporations 
and 
international 
financial 
institutions
Horn Relief National organization Somalia
Not 
reported 8
Individuals, 
foundations, 
NGOs, and 
governments
International 
Rescue 
Committee 
(IRC)
International 
organization USA 8,000 289
39% 
government, 
31% IGOs, 
30% 
individuals 
and 
foundations
Interpeace International organization Switzerland 300 26
97% 
governments 
and IGOs
4 This data is self-reported, from organizations' websites. 
118
Medecins Sans 
Frontieres 
(MSF)
International 
federation Switzerland 22,462 774
86% 
individuals 
and 
foundations; 
12% 
government
Mercy Corps International organization USA 3,700 235
66% 
government, 
33% 
individuals 
and 
foundations
World Vision International federation USA 1,700 2,634
80% 
individuals, 
foundations, 
and 
corporations 
– esp. child 
sponsorships
*Reported in millions of dollars for fiscal year 2009/10. For some organizations, 
like MSF, the dollar amount is an estimated conversion from euros. 
**GIZ is a merger of three organizations as of January 1, 2011: DED, GTZ, and 
Inwent. The numerical data on the organization (staff, budget, percentage from 
each funding source) refers only to GTZ, however, which is the international 
development branch of the entity. 
Four kinds of organizations are represented here: international 
confederation, international federation, international organization and national 
organization. A confederation is a loose coalition of similarly-minded groups. In 
the case of Caritas Internationalis, there are over 165 different Catholic 
development organizations that are guided by the same principles. A federation, or 
NGO “family”, is a group of NGOs with a strong central authority, but with 
independence in certain affairs, such as raising funds, marketing or setting 
program priorities. Unlike a confederation, a federation usually has only one 
member organization per country. An international organization is a unitary entity. 
There may be regional or local offices, but they answer directly to the 
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international headquarters. Finally, a national organization operates in only one 
country. This is not quite as easy a distinction as it sounds; Horn Relief still has 
offices in Nairobi, Kenya and depends on international contacts for financial and 
advocacy support. Additionally, the organizations has programs in Somaliland and 
Puntland, which may or may not be separate states (this dilemma explains why 
the organization is called 'Horn Relief' and not 'Somali Relief'). However, the 
purpose of the organization's existence is to improve conditions in one (formerly 
unified) state. As a result, Horn Relief's goals and perspectives will be very 
different from a large federation, like World Vision.
International federations have the most fiscal and social capacity at their 
disposal. They “get economies of scale and efficiency through central support 
services” and develop “a strong global identity and scale because of the resources 
they can amass” (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001, p. 144). Through central planning, 
these federations hone standards of operation that define their brand identity. 
Whether people encounter MSF France or MSF Japan, for example, they can 
expect to find the same commitment to neutrality and emergency trauma care. 
IGOs, governments and local communities encounter federations more frequently 
and learn to trust and respect the organization's standards, knowledge and 
capacity. These are essential ingredients for peace advocacy and conflict 
resolution. Federations are more apt Track 1.5 mediators; their international 
presence increases the stakes for mediation. 
The advantages of size and reputation can also be debilitating, inhibiting 
flexibility, creativity and growth. To maintain their trust and uniformity, 
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federations have to act jointly, what becomes a substantial collective action 
problem. They have more of a reputation to defend; in order to change, they have 
to convince both regional branches as well as donors that the change is a good 
idea. This explains why the largest relief and development organizations have 
moved so slowly away from direct service, at most devoting just 10% of their 
resources to advocacy (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001). By contrast, national 
organizations can more rapidly adapt their programs and priorities to 
accommodate changing conditions in the field and experiment with new 
interventions. 
An NGO's headquartering country also influences its decision-making. An 
organization in the U.S., for example, is likely to receive money from USAID, 
along with the political priorities of the development agency. Similarly, Caritas 
Internationalis, operating out of the Vatican City, is explicitly tied to the politics of 
the Catholic Church. Donors in the U.S. tend to seek service delivery over 
advocacy; the reverse is true in many European countries (ibid). NGO literature 
speaks frequently of the Northern / Southern divide: NGOs in the global north 
generally have more power and resources, and use their 'partners' in the global 
south as contract workers, rather than egalitarian collaborators. Because Northern 
NGO staff have the freedom to pick up 'Third-world' social problems at will, their 
work functions as more of an occupation, compared to locally originating 
Southern NGO staff, who are more likely to 'live' the conditions they struggle 
against. Southern NGOs tend to be more frequently self-identify as 'social 
movements', compared to more project-oriented organizations in the global north 
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(Alvarez 2009). 
Similarly, an organization's funding sources influence the how and what of 
their conflict intervention. Medecins Sans Frontieres, for example, makes a 
special effort to limit their government funding (to just 12% of their income) in 
order to maintain independence and impartiality. On the other end of the 
spectrum, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammernarbeit (GIZ) 
accepts almost 79% of their funds from the German government. GIZ considers 
itself a mission-driven, non-profit corporation that implements principled 
development “on behalf of” the German government, as well as IGOs, 
foundations and companies. Rather than an independent entity with its own 
priorities and perspectives that others fund, it functions with almost total 
deference to its donors. World Vision receives most of its funding from private 
individuals through 'child sponsorships'. This enables independence from 
government, but limits the organization in other ways. Sponsorships, in theory, go 
toward specific, pre-determined expenses for a single child. Changes to political, 
economic or social structures may be essential for the livelihood of a child, but do 
not fit within the short-term objectives of sponsorship. 
These ten case study organizations range widely in size and capacity. On 
one end of the spectrum, Caritas Internationalis, with $5.5 billion and 440,000 
staff, has the financial and personnel resources of a small government. Since 
Caritas is a loose confederation, these organizations do not centralize their 
financial or human resources management. Despite is dependence and virtual 
anonymity on the international stage, GIZ also has enormous – and very 
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centralized – capacity, with nearly $2.1 billion and 15,760 staff. World Vision is a 
close contender among these development giants. By contrast, the budget of Horn 
Relief is less than 0.2% of Caritas (even this is large for a national organization in 
the global South). Interestingly, the two peace-focused organizations – the Carter 
Center and Interpeace – have the fewest staff. Hypothetically, peace organizations 
working across vertical and horizontal constituencies should require as many staff 
as any service-delivery organization. The small number of staff may be locking 
these organizations into one type of intervention: either working exclusively with 
national elites or participating only in short phases of the entire conflict timeline. 
Although these organizations were selected for their involvement in some 
form of conflict-resolving activities, they range widely in their overarching goals. 
Table 6.5 outlines the principles and programs of each organization. 
Table 6.5: Values and Objectives of Target Organization
Organization Religious Affiliation
Mission / Vision 
Principles Program Categories
Care 
International None
Social justice; 
ending poverty; 
self-help; 
economic 
opportunity; 
advocacy
Agriculture; youth development; 
economic development; 
education; emergency relief; 
health; HIV / AIDS; nutrition; 
water
Caritas 
Internationalis Catholic
Human dignity; 
sustainable 
development; 
peacebuilding; 
emergency relief 
Peace and reconciliation; 
emergencies; economic justice; 
climate change; HIV / AIDS; 
women and migration
Carter Center None
Alleviate human 
suffering; prevent 
and resolve 
conflicts
Democracy; human rights; 
conflict resolution; disease; 
agriculture; mental health
Deutsche 
Gesellschaft 
None Human rights; 
dignity; rule of 
Rural development; political 
reforms; environment and 
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für 
Internationale 
Zusammernar
beit (GIZ)
law; market-
based economy; 
peace and 
security
climate change;  employment; 
emergency relief; healthcare; 
peacebuilding; women's 
empowerment; education; trauma 
recovery; advocacy; refugee 
resettlement
Horn Relief None
Pastoral 
livelihoods; 
sustainable peace 
and development; 
youth 
development; 
women's 
empowerment
Resource management; 
participatory education and skills 
training; peace and human rights; 
food security and livelihoods; 
emergency relief
International 
Rescue 
Committee
None
Emergency relief; 
post-conflict 
development; 
resettlement 
services; human 
rights; advocacy
Anti-trafficking; child soldiers; 
economic recovery; education; 
violence against women; 
governance and rights; 
humanitarian aid; immigration; 
post-conflict development; 
protecting children; reproductive 
healthcare; resettling refugees; 
water and sanitation
Interpeace None
Lasting peace; 
non-violent 
conflict 
resolution; 
peacebuilding; 
participation; 
dialogue
Conflict research and analysis; 
facilitated negotiation; dialogue 
across society; creating 
sustainable institutions
Medecins 
Sans 
Frontieres
None
Emergency 
medical 
assistance; 
neutrality; 
impartiality; 
bearing witness 
and speaking out; 
dialogue
Emergency medical assistance; 
advocacy
Mercy Corps None Aid to 
communities in 
transition from 
disaster, 
economic 
Agriculture; children; civil 
society; climate change; conflict 
and war; disability; disaster risk 
reduction; displacement; 
economic development; 
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collapse or 
conflict; self-help
education; emergencies; 
environment; food / nutrition; 
governance; health; HIV / AIDS; 
hunger; livelihoods; marginalized 
groups; microfinance; migrants; 
peaceful change; sports; 
technology and internet; water / 
sanitation; women's 
empowerment
World Vision Christian
Ending poverty 
and injustice; 
working with the 
most vulnerable; 
bearing witness; 
reaching the root 
causes of poverty
Poverty alleviation; emergency 
response; advocacy
Only two of the organizations are explicitly religious – Caritas 
International and World Vision. Their mission / vision statements tend to reflect 
religious principles. Beyond mention of Jesus and God, they also emphasize 
human dignity and aid to the most vulnerable. World Vision in particular tends to 
operate on the “Starfish Model” (a philosophy of service based on an old parable: 
a man tosses beached starfish back to sea; when a friend asks, “you can't possibly 
toss them all back, why bother?”, the man picks up another starfish and replies, “it 
matters to this one”). Individual impact is prioritized above changing long-term 
social structures. While Mercy Corps has no explicit religious affiliation, its 
principles, activities, and even its name are often mistaken for religiosity. The 
organization asserts its commitment to vulnerable people, to empowerment of the 
needy, and to compassionate peace.
As a semi-corporate, semi-governmental organization (something of a 
GONGO / BONGO fusion), GIZ has absolutely no religious ties. Instead, its 
support of national security, the rule of law, and the market-based economy mimic 
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state priorities. Surprisingly, despite its funding structure and contract model, GIZ 
has developed extensive reports about its perspectives on how to achieve social 
objectives like political reform, women's empowerment and universal healthcare. 
Of the ten organizations, five provide generalized relief and development: 
Care, Caritas, GIZ, Horn Relief, Mercy Corps, and World Vision. Their activities 
are not exclusively related to conflicts or emergencies, and they are most 
connected to development frameworks, philosophies and networks. Conflict 
intervention is only one small component of their work. The other four 
organizations focus only on intervention in crises: Carter Center, International 
Rescue Committee, Interpeace, Medecins Sans Frontieres. For the IRC and MSF, 
the term “crisis” includes any emergency, including armed conflicts, disputes, and 
natural disasters. Medecins Sans Frontieres strives to deliver medical relief to 
anyone in immediate peril; all other activities are secondary, meant to support 
their primary relief mission. The International Rescue Committee primarily serves 
refugees through international processing and eventual resettlement in other 
countries. Their involvement in conflict transformation and peacebuilding is an 
extension of their work with refugees, meant to reduce the flow of migrants in 
need. Only the Carter Center and Interpeace focus exclusively on intervention in 
human-caused conflict. While the Carter Center has begun to expand its activities 
to include medical care, disease contamination and agricultural support, 
Interpeace works solely towards political and psychological peace. 
Conflict Resolution as a Programmatic Strategy
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Two organizations make ideological opposition to war and violence a 
central tenet of their identity. These are not the peace-oriented organizations, as 
one might expect, but rather, the International Rescue Committee and Caritas 
Internationalis. The IRC justifies a commitment to long-term peacebuilding:
Modern wars no longer take place on the battlefield. In the wars of the 
1950's, the death rate of soldiers to civilians was 9 to 1. Today, the reverse 
is true: for every soldier killed, nine civilians die... The root causes of 
today's conflicts will not be quickly extinguished; conflicts will be long-
term, with lasting consequences. In modern warfare, countries are not only 
physically destroyed, but the human capital and social fabric are torn 
asunder. 
Rather than a single programmatic category, peacebuilding and conflict 
transformation activities and ethos fit across multiple areas of the IRC's work: 
post-conflict development, youth protection and development, emergency 
response, and public advocacy. The IRC takes three approaches to post-conflict 
development: social interventions, such as health, education, gender-based 
violence; economic intervention in the sustainable livelihoods framework; and 
governance programs to create responsive democratic institutions and robust civil 
societies. Similar priorities are applied to children in conflict, with more emphasis 
on immediate needs such as family reunification and psychosocial care. 
Emergency response teams deliver humanitarian relief, with the assistance of 
“specialists who focus on human rights protection, the special needs of children in 
crisis, the prevention of sexual violence, and aid for rape survivors”. Finally, the 
IRC advocates for international intervention in “forgotten” crises, in order to 
protect refugees and other “vulnerable” and “oppressed” populations. 
Whereas the IRC is fundamentally driven by the plight of refugees, Caritas 
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works for international development. Conflict intervention is a major component 
of the organization's work because it sees war as the “mortal enemy of 
development”. Caritas speaks strongly against war: it “can wipe out years of 
progress in a single bomb blast to a school or hospital... [and] cause a lifetime of 
anguish with a rape of a woman or killing of a child”. The confederation supports 
trauma work to address the psychosocial effects of violence, promotes 
reconstruction for physical and institutional recovery, and facilitates “inter-
religious dialogue” to “create spaces where trust, respect and solidarity can 
flourish”. Caritas, like the IRC, works at the grassroots to rebuild peaceful social 
relations. 
The Carter Center and Interpeace spend more time celebrating positive 
peace than disparaging violence and war. The Carter Center's peace programs are 
strongly rooted in values of democratic governance. Staff monitor elections and 
promote legal principles, such as justice, human rights and the rule of law. It 
rejects the debate between peace and justice, and instead advocates for “peace 
with justice” which it implements through long-term efforts beyond the moment 
of elections to “build an inclusive democratic society that respects human rights 
and laws, administers justice fairly, and encourages full citizen participation in 
government”. As an influential diplomat and former president, Jimmy Carter's 
involvement with the organization blurs the line between diplomacy tracks; “the 
traditional distinction of mediators as individuals, states and organizations is 
somewhat challenged by the emergence of organizations that are deeply 
connected with one founding figure” (Bartoli 2009, p. 393). 
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In comparison to the Carter Center, Interpeace was created much more 
recently, an outgrowth of a UN peace project initiated in 1994. The organization 
works to build peace in “war-torn societies” following five principles of action: 
local ownership, cross-societal inclusion, trust at all costs, long-term commitment, 
and holistic solutions. Interpeace stresses that peace will not result from modest 
efforts:
Strengthening the foundations of a society that has been torn apart by 
conflict is not business as usual. Mistrust tends to be deeply ingrained. 
Every major issue is explosive, political and urgent. Because of this 
urgency, the tendency is to bring technical solutions to [complex] 
problems.
Interpeace works with local institutions, involved at the grassroots and 
with civil society leaders. Its history with the United Nations makes it an effective 
go-between for NGO and IGO collaboration. 
Relative to all other organizations studied, Medecins Sans Frontieres has a 
very specific mission: helping people with one particular need (medicine) during 
one particular time (crisis). They aim to relieve medical need. Ending conflict is 
merely a side effect, what staff feel to be a moral obligation to “bear witness” to, 
and “speak out” about “violence, atrocities and neglect”. In this way, MSF has 
had a significant role in international advocacy. However, its hands-on 
involvement host countries remains exclusively relief-oriented.
Horn Relief falls somewhere in between conflict intervention and 
generalized development work. Somalia, the Horn Relief's only country of 
operation, experiences constant violence which the organizations strives to end. 
However, its strategies for achieving violence de-escalation include youth 
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leadership, women's empowerment, environmental protection and poverty 
alleviation, what might be described as conflict sensitive development work. 
 The peace and conflict work of GIZ spans various themes, including 
“good governance” and “security and reconstruction”. The organization 
approaches governance from a utilitarian perspective: “in the United Nation's 
Millennium Declaration, the international community reached a consensus that 
good governance is not only an aim in itself but also a key factor in attaining 
human development and in successful poverty reduction and peacebuilding”. GIZ 
interprets security and reconstruction as a two-pronged activity: peace 
development and emergency relief. 
World Vision aims to end global poverty, but does not explicitly connect 
concomitant forces of poverty and violence. Although many of its programs are 
conducted in countries of conflict, they are not driven by any stated philosophy 
about its role in conflict intervention. Nonetheless, the organization's commitment 
to relief, development and advocacy can be applied to conflict response: 
community empowerment, capacity building, resilience, and welfare. 
Mercy Corps is slightly more vocal about its response during conflict, and 
contextualizes “peaceful change” as one of thirty-four different objectives. While 
Caritas and the IRC express clear disapproval of violence, highlighting the pain 
and destruction of war, Mercy Corps considers violence only one of various 
causes of poverty. As a small component of their work, staff strive to “[engage] 
potential adversaries in productive dialogue”.
Care International also excludes peace and conflict awareness from its 
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mission and vision statements, and does not discuss a theory of peace work. The 
organization's only mention of conflict in its description of its work is in reference 
to emergency relief, “including food, temporary shelter, clean water, sanitation 
services, medical care, family planning, reproductive health service, and seeds 
and tools”. Care also implements development strategies in post-conflict 
environments to support rehabilitation efforts. Nonetheless, the organization does 
not mention any intangible programs aimed at emotional or political growth, such 
as mediation, reconciliation, or dialogue. 
Much to its credit, Care highlights that it is “not a single-issue 
organization because people do not live single-issue lives”. In other words, Care 
does not focus exclusively on one segment of the population, one type of 
intervention, or one form of injustice. Its development work is holistic, although 
its conflict response leaves much to be desired. Care's own logic supports the 
argument for integrating peace and development work. Development 
organizations like Care should promote conflict transformation because 
communities at war cannot achieve holistic well-being.
The preceding two sections have documented internal and external factors 
that influence organizations' conflict intervention. In the following chapter, I 
examine the extent to which these ten NGOs rhetorically engage with theories like 
“conflict transformation” and “peacebuilding”. This provides some insight to their 
awareness and esteem for trends in peace and conflict studies, and has 
implications for clash and collaboration with other members of the international 
community.
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CHAPTER 7: RHETORICAL ANALYSIS
Why Rhetoric Matters
Since NGOs do not have legitimate or coercive power, their strength lies 
in their ability to promote ideas. When a 'humanitarian' NGO distributes blankets 
to refugees, for example, its lasting impact is not in the number of blankets it 
distributes, but rather in the implicit statement that no human being should have to 
suffer the cold. The stronger the symbolic value of an action, the greater and more 
enduring the impact. In an analysis of Medecins Sans Frontieres and the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Dechaine (2002) finds that “[NGOs'] 
influence is felt both at the level of political action and, importantly, at the level of 
symbolic action, in their ability to persuade and mobilize constituencies to take 
action on specific issues, and in their proclivity to rhetorically 'craft' a new ethos 
of global community among various publics” (ii). 
Organizations must be attentive to their discourse in order to cultivate 
donors, mobilize local constituencies, garner organizational partners, and inspire 
the trust of governments and IGOs. These are tasks critical even for an 
organization's continued existence. For an organization to render significant 
structural change, as many scholars have suggested is necessary to produce peace, 
NGOs must create a message so compelling that people not only engage with the 
organization, but change their behavior in other areas of their lives. 
Rhetoric, what I use here to mean discourse or word choice, delineates 
divisions and connections between and within social groups. Transnational 
advocacy networks, like International Campaign to Ban Land Mines or the 
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“Global Campaign for Women's Human Rights”, depend on rhetoric to coalesce 
loose alliances and identify blurred objectives (Karns 2004; Keck and Sikkink 
1998). A single persuasive phrase can be the linchpin in the consolidation of a 
movement. The notion of “violence against women”, for example, merged diverse 
actors working to stop women's abuses ranging from systematic war rape and 
sexual slavery to female genital mutilation (FGM) and domestic violence. 
Without the concept “violence against women”, these efforts were isolated and 
impotent; a rhetorical link was needed to propel the movement to the next level. 
In the movement against contemporary slavery, terms such as 'victim', 
'survivor', 'trafficker', 'prostitute', and 'sex worker' have been relentless sources of 
debate and fission among advocates and political actors. In the United Nations' 
various committees and commissions on the issue, the definition of 'slavery' has 
been debated, written and rewritten more times than thought possible, consuming 
decades of international attention (Miers 2003). Why should powerful political 
figures waste years of their lives with definitions and details? Reimann (2005) 
contends that such debates are critical: “social actors constitute the social reality 
through engaging in discussions about the meaning of activities, interactions, 
ideas and perceptions” (p. 30, emphasis added). These rhetorical practices – both 
the use of conclusive terminologies and the process of debate to arrive at these 
terms – generate “collective identity” among participants (ibid). Advocates today 
can claim, quite rightly, to be part of the 'anti-slavery movement' or the 
'movement against violence against women'. 
In peace work, terminologies are not yet as cemented. 'Peace movements' 
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of the 1960s and '70s caught fire, but within a limited group of people, with a 
limited set of actions, predominantly through government-directed activism. State 
diplomats remained largely untouched by this rhetorical community, continuing 
their work for national security (Kriesberg 2009). The recent emergence of NGOs 
directly intervening in conflict has begun to connect the rhetoric of peace activism 
with the actions of conflict intervenors. However, as the brief overview in the 
previous chapter reveals, organizations still draw on all kinds of different terms 
and ideologies – 'rule of law', 'free markets', 'social justice', 'human dignity'. They 
all tend to cite 'peace' as some relief and development holy grail. Yet, as Friedrich 
(2007) notes, “we have grown accustomed, but also somewhat desensitized, to the 
word peace” (p. 4). 
NGOs in conflict (what can we call them? conflict resolution NGOs? 
humanitarian NGOs? peace NGOs? each term comes with its own baggage and 
inadequacies) need to work together to find common rhetorical ground. Rhetoric 
particularly matters in the framing of conflicts. While conflict transformation 
scholar Terrel Northrup rightly reminds us that conflicts are not merely reducible 
to misperception, there is some role of communication strategies in the 
persistence or resolution of conflict; “establishing jargon is a way for NGOs to 
influence how negotiations and observers perceive various issues and proposals in 
a negotiation” (Gotz 2008, p. 238). 
In particular, the range of terms presented in chapter two – conflict 
management, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and so forth – represent vast divisions 
in the theoretical understanding of peace work. Yet, their definitions, like their 
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impacts, remain fuzzy, infringed by caveats and operational realities. The 
presence and esteem of relatively new terms like 'conflict transformation' 
represents a positive step for multi-track, positive-sum, 'peace with justice' 
approaches. As “Hannah Arendt once observed... giving a stray dog a name 
greatly increases its chance of staying alive” (Keane 2003, p. xiii). It also matters 
who names the dog; theorists can speak endlessly of 'conflict transformation', but 
without the buy-in of practitioners, the term has little value. Fortunately, Hugh 
Miall observes that NGOs have begun to follow conflict transformation principles 
more closely, staying in conflict during longer periods of time, working with 
people at different levels of society (Rhodes 2009). These are positive signs, but 
would have far more potential – more permanent and widely embraced – if 
accompanied by a common discourse. 
Scholar Frank Dukes laments, “the field of conflict resolution, whose 
study so clearly reveals the costs of distorted communication, does not itself have 
a shared language” (quoted in Rhodes 2009, p. 14). In this chapter, I examine the 
rhetoric used by NGOs to describe local conditions (e.g. conflict, crisis) and NGO 
responses (e.g. peacebuilding, conflict transformation). I find an overwhelming 
disagreement among actors about suitable word choice, and propose rhetoric as a 
space from which NGOs can increase collaboration. 
Conflict Decontextualized
Conflicts are inherently political. Whether about resources, ideologies or 
goals, conflicts – i.e. disagreements or controversies – involve contested power. 
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Parties seek new sociopolitical futures: resources and authority in new hands, 
justice manifested in new ways. Surprisingly, many of the target organizations 
decontextualize the political nature of conflict. It is quite frequently described as 
synonymous or equivalent to natural disaster, an unprecipitated occurrence 
beyond anyone's control. CARE documents its response to “four regions of 
Puntland that were affected by drought, civil strife and floods”; violence is 
sandwiched between the twin villains of too much rain and too little, as though 
conflict poured haplessly from the sky. Medecins Sans Frontieres “provides aid... 
to people whose survival is threatened by violence, neglect or catastrophe”. 
Caritas speaks of “disaster”, lumping violence and natural tragedy together, and 
soothes, “we're the place you go for safety, the neighbor who organizes food and 
blankets, and the coalition of the good that pulls together global resources to 
support you”. World Vision provides “emergency assistance to those affected by 
natural disasters and conflicts”. GIZ describes the “crises, conflicts and disasters” 
riveting the world. This common association may contribute to the misconception 
that emergency response, appropriate in a post-flood or hurricane-struck region, is 
also an adequate solution to politicized violence. 
The distinction emphasized in chapter two between 'violence' and 'conflict' 
is sometimes, but not always, acknowledged by these organizations. The use of 
terms like “armed conflict” or “violent conflict” suggest that some conflicts can 
be non-violent or un-armed, an organizational awareness that conflict is not 
inherently destructive. GIZ speaks carefully of “crisis prevention”, a strategy for 
managing conflict (dissimilar from violence) in order to prevent its escalation into 
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violent chaos. However, phrases like “preventing conflict”, “resolving conflict”, 
“ending conflict” or even “post-conflict work” reflect a lapse in agreement with 
the aforementioned idea that conflicts are endemic to any unjust society. By the 
logic of conflict transformation, conflicts do not end, and until utopia, there is no 
“post-conflict” period, only a transformation in the methods of negotiating 
conflict, from violent aggression to non-violent communication. 
Mercy Corps, using the framework that conflicts, like natural disasters, fall 
from the sky, describes “innocent civilians caught in this conflict”. Here, conflict 
is used synonymously with violence (what Mercy Corps means to say is that 
civilians were caught in the destructive impacts of conflict, the competitive injury 
aspect of war). But, since conflict is not synonymous with violence, the 
organization deligitimizes the conflict itself, as though it were only a product of 
elite power struggles and military might. While violence may be a military 
problem, conflict results from more holistic societal dilemmas. The carelessness 
of this rhetoric unintentionally silences grassroots perspectives.
Most of the organizations shift between various words for conflict, what 
seems to be motivated purely by discursive variety, rather than strategic 
communication, per se. Whereas theorists spend volumes discerning between 
“dispute”, that which can be adjudicated or easily resolved, and “conflict”, deep 
issues that run to the core of social identities, most of these organizations seem to 
use the terms interchangeably. Care works to “[resolve] local disputes”, “manage 
communal violence” with a “community-based approach to conflict mitigation”. 
The IRC contends that “disputes can be resolved”. Interestingly, the new era of 
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complex conflicts seems to have made more traditional terms like “war” or “civil 
war” outmoded. A few of the organizations use the term, but only rarely. In fact, 
Interpeace was initially called “War-Torn Societies Project” and changed its name 
in 2006 to “reflect the new scope of its work”. 
Perhaps the most common word used to describe local conditions is 
“crisis”. The International Rescue Committee addresses the “world's worst 
humanitarian crises”; Mercy Corps confronts “ongoing conflict and crisis”; World 
Vision “recognizes that even in the midst of crisis, the destitute have a 
contribution to make”; the Carter Center seeks to intercept “minor crises” before 
they cause “deteriorating societal and political stability”. The word “crisis” 
conveys urgency, immediate need. The term is compelling, a useful tack for 
cultivating donors and inspiring international action. Yet, urgency that becomes 
haste inspires rapid, unilateral decision-making and easy answers – exactly the 
opposite of what countries in conflict need. Conflicts are crises, but they require 
long-term responses, with multiple actors, deep integration and complex 
solutions. Moreover, organizations use relief-focused modifiers when speaking of 
crisis. Mercy Corps describes a “food crisis”; World Vision and Horn Relief speak 
of “humanitarian crises”. The way a problem is stated directs the answer that 
appears obvious; a “food crisis” compels food aid and a “humanitarian crisis”, 
humanitarian aid. In my observation, none of these organizations speak of 
“political crises” or “crises of justice”. If the goal is to mobilize more political, 
long-term, justice-oriented solutions, we should perhaps seek similar words to 
describe the problem. 
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Finally, the organizations occasionally fall into the trap of fatalistic 
discourse. Care describes Somalia as a case of “chronic complex emergencies”: 
chronic, like a disease that can never be cured, only dulled, treated for the 
symptoms. Cote d'Ivoire, according to Care, rests on the precipice of “state 
failure, ethnic violence and disorder”. These words connote anarchic devolution 
into a condition so helpless that political, strategic work would not be worth the 
while. Caritas works in “violence-prone” countries, while Mercy Corps responds 
to “conflict-stricken” zones. These phrases describe permanent states of being: a 
proclivity for violence, catching violence like the plague. Organizations could 
certainly select more conscientious rhetoric to reflect the value of conflict, the 
distinction between conflict and violence, the potential for transforming conflict 
into non-violent form, and the reality that no society is ever stuck in one 
permanent state of being. 
'Peace and' : The Ambiguous Catch-All
Medecins Sans Frontieres and the International Rescue Committee focus 
on aspects of destructive conflict: medical emergencies and refugee displacement, 
respectively. As a result, the rhetoric of these two organizations is almost 
exclusively problem-focused, speaking to “violence”, “abuse”, “violations”, and 
“injustice”. The other eight organizations, on the other hand, constantly evoke the 
promise of “peace”. The Carter Center and Interpeace are perhaps the farthest on 
the solution-side of the spectrum, describing “peace programs”, “a world at 
peace”, “a peaceful future”, “peacemaking initiatives”, “peace implementation”, 
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and “vital peace function”. These two peace-centric organizations are also the 
most involved in conflict mediation, negotiation and reconciliation processes, and 
the least engaged with humanitarian relief. This suggests that invoking hope of a 
peaceful future generates more long-term strategic planning, relative to crisis-
oriented rhetoric. 
This sentiment is echoed by a story from a field staffmember of an INGO 
in Mary Anderson's book Do No Harm: 
Every time I relax with my local staff, I ask them to tell me about their war 
experiences. The more horrible the story, the more riveted my attention. I 
commiserate, and together, we relive the horrors of war. What if I asked 
them instead to tell me about their relationships with the 'other side' before 
the war? What if we spent more time talking about people they like and 
trust from the other side? What if we dealt with what we would like their 
future to be? I just realized that I am reinforcing their negative experiences 
and attitudes with my questions. I seem more interested in how bad things 
are than in how to improve them. What kind of example am I setting? 
(1999, p. 62) 
It makes sense that organizations would want to describe the horrors of 
war in their websites and publications. In order to compel donors, activists and 
partners, NGOs must state the problem, reeling in their observers to generate 
support. This is at least the prevailing marketing strategy. However, the Carter 
Center and Interpeace, in accordance with Anderson's story, demonstrate that the 
opposite strategy may actually be more effective for long-term prospects in the 
country. Counterintuitive as it may seem, these observations suggest that in order 
to end violence, we must speak, not of bloodshed, but of peace. 
Frustratingly, the term 'peace' seems to evade meaning. In its slogan, 
Interpeace explains that it “builds peace that lasts”. Lasting peace necessarily 
refers to peace in the negative sense, the absence of violence. What Interpeace 
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means by its shorthand is that it creates conditions such that the absence of 
violence persists after peace agreements are signed. By contrast, Caritas describes 
“just peace”, “a haven of peace”, referring, instead, to positive peace, the presence 
of justice and equality that becomes inherently self-perpetuating. 
The word is also lumped with a wide range of other concepts. The Carter 
Center considers “conflict prevention... a bedrock of peaceful and just societies”; 
peace and justice go hand in hand. Caritas works toward “the long-term project of 
building peaceful, stable communities”. Although, perhaps, both are desirable 
states, stability and justice are often at odds with one another. A corrupt leader 
may hog power, inflict human rights abuses, and repress the voices of the 
impoverished. Such a society could maintain stability for some time, without any 
significant disturbance, but it would certainly not be a just society. The same 
dichotomy reappears in the distinction between the “peace and human rights” of 
Horn Relief and “peace and development” of the International Rescue Committee. 
Several organizations link “peace and reconciliation” or “peace and 
reconstruction”, as though 'peace' were merely a time-period indicator, a moment 
beginning upon the enactment of a cease-fire. 
The word peace cannot mean all these things at the same time if it is to be 
a useful discursive tool. As it is, peace refers to such a wide range of concepts that 
it might best be defined as 'goodness' or 'desirability'. In this sense, phrases like 
“working for peaceful solutions” become absurd; of course everyone desires 
'desirable' solutions. In order to avoid this tautological pitfall, organizations might 
strive to articulate their particular understanding of peace. Better yet, NGOs could 
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use the process of defining peace – both in concept and in localized application – 
as a point of collaboration. Such discursive democratic practices draw attention 
toward solutions rather than problems, and demand organized and political 
thought.
Invoking Humanity
In order to generate widespread support for activities, inspire action by 
people distant and disconnected from the problems at hand, and cultivate the kind 
of unconventional forgiveness and non-violence necessary for peace processes, 
NGOs need big ideas. They need to demonstrate that their work supports 
universal values, yields progress towards new and brighter futures, and even 
satisfies moral obligations to the well-being of the international system or the 
human rights of the suffering underdogs. 
These are no small tasks; nothing less than the weight of “humanity” culls 
such authority. In his analysis of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(ICBL), Robert DeChaine (2002) observes:
The ICBL network calls upon the name of 'humanity' to serve as a basis 
for the assertion that its anti-landmines activism is representative of a 
'global community', united against 'the scourge of landmines'... In today's 
world, the invocation of the discursigraph 'humanity' signifies a bundling 
together of particular claims to moral conduct with universal claims to the 
inherent dignity of all human beings... 'Humanity' gains cultural capital 
through its incorporation of other discursigraphs ('freedom', 'justice') and 
by means of powerful metaphors which construct a line between the 
humane and the 'inhumane', the 'good' and the 'bad', the 'just' and the 
'unjust'. (p. 280)
Every organization in this case study uses the same “discursigraph” (a web 
of rhetorical concepts) to legitimize its work. Care and Caritas respond to 
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“humanitarian emergencies”. The International Rescue Committee works to 
provide “humanitarian assistance”. Horn Relief conducts “innovative 
humanitarian projects in pursuit of a peaceful, self-reliant and greener future”. In 
fact, this concept to the heart of many of these organizations. MSF exists to 
distribute “medical humanitarian aid”. World Vision self-identifies as a 
“humanitarian organization”. Carter Center believes it has a “humanitarian 
mission”. Only GIZ begins to unpack this vague attribution of 'humanity': “the 
transition from humanitarian aid to sustainable development cooperation is... 
becoming increasingly blurred”. 
“Humanitarian”, what the Oxford English Dictionary defines as 
“concerning the promotion of human welfare”, is not used by these organizations 
to simply mean the well-being of humankind. Many things can promote human 
welfare: a quality health care bill, an international court ruling in favor of 
indigenous rights, a shift in global economic policy, a just redistribution of land 
between rival tribes. But these are not the kinds of actions meant when NGOs use 
the term “humanitarian”. In every instance that the ten studied organizations use 
the term, it refers to short-term relief: blankets, food, water, emergency medical 
care, emergency shelter, immediate safety from physical harm. The word always 
appears under the programmatic category of “emergency relief”. Serving 
'humanity' has become synonymous with providing short-term aid. 
We have seen in previous chapters that this so-called humanitarian relief 
may actually do more harm than good, is certainly not the most proactive 
intervention, and is least likely to achieve transformative peace and justice. But if 
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emergency relief is seen as the only 'humanitarian' action, if it has the sole claim 
on 'humanity', what kind of message does this send about more 'political' work? 
Activities couched in politics, i.e. struggles for power, issues at the heart of any 
conflict or controversy, are demoted to something less than 'humanitarian'. 
Politics, preference, and partiality are seen as unprofessional, inappropriate roles 
for NGOs. But if these modes of intervention result in nonviolence, justice, 
reconciliation or development, should they not also be 'humanitarian'? If engaging 
politically somehow increases the well-being of humankind, it seems to deserve 
equal invocation of the action-mobilizing term 'humanity'.
Mitigating, Managing, Resolving – But Not Transforming?
Scholar Hugh Miall seems to be right in saying that NGOs are 
increasingly attentive to the principles of conflict transformation: Mercy Corps 
seeks “solutions to issues fueling violence”; Caritas emphasizes “post-conflict 
reconciliation”; and Interpeace explains that local “participation is key as active 
interaction transforms relationships”. Almost all organizations talk about the value 
of “lasting”, “sustainable” or “permanent” peace. However, the term 'conflict 
transformation' itself does not seem to impact the way most organizations think 
about their intervention strategies. 
Of the six peace and conflict terms mentioned in chapter 2 (conflict 
management, resolution, transformation; peace keeping, making, building), 
'peacebuilding' is by far the most frequently used. Care, an organization that 
stresses women's empowerment, believes “peacebuilding and gender equity are 
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intertwined”. GIZ sees “peacebuilding” and “crisis prevention” as similar efforts, 
both intended to stem the outbreak, escalation or persistence of violence. For the 
Carter Center, “peacebuilding” is a follow-up activity to “implementing peace 
agreements”. Organizations seem to apply the term rather vaguely to refer to any 
activities that cultivate peaceful conditions across multiple actors in society. The 
construction allegory is frequently used beyond the term 'peacebuilding': 
“building trust”, “building capacity”, “building a future”. These idioms imply 
processes conducted over a period of time, beginning with basic foundations, 
slow steps, working up to social structures. Phrases like “from the ground up”, 
“the root causes of poverty”, “communities have deep roots” underscore the 
importance of mastering foundations of the process. This allegory certainly has 
value for promoting long-term solutions and grassroots attention, but 
organizations should be cautious not to take it too far. Unlike a house, peace 
requires effort at all levels at once, at the grassroots, civil society and national 
elites, at the underlying causes of the disagreement, and at the superficial level of 
immediate violence. Just as states should not content themselves with only 
working with elite diplomats, so NGOs should not relegate themselves only to the 
grassroots. 
The name Interpeace is short for “International Peacebuilding Alliance”; 
the organizations speaks of 'peacebuilding' as a central organizing principle of its 
work. In particular, Interpeace states that it works “with local peacebuilders”. As 
an occupational status, the term legitimizes peace work, compels conflict 
sensitivity, and allows people to define their identity by their commitment to 
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peace. Rather than simply volunteering for a relief and development organization, 
even more than “development worker”, the label “peacebuilder” helps to propel 
international conflict intervention toward the movement side of the profession-
social movement spectrum. 
In most cases, organizations seem to shift fluidly between peace and 
conflict terminologies with little regard to their 'branded' meaning. According to 
Care, “it is widely recognized that resolving local disputes is a prerequisite to 
national reconciliation” (emphasis added). Only a paragraph later, the 
organization describes its work to “mitigate and manage communal violence”, 
tossing around the terms “conflict mitigation” and “conflict prevention and 
management”. Under the Carter Center “Conflict Resolution Program” heading, it 
describes its work on “dispute resolution”. Even while Mercy Corps merged with 
the “Conflict Management Group” in 2004, it still contends that “conflict 
resolution can help avoid tomorrow's wars and other crises”. Chapter 2 
highlighted a vast theoretical difference between between conflict (deep 
disagreement that must be transformed over time) and dispute (a minor 
controversy that can be quickly decided); between conflict management (scaring 
or manipulating parties into peace) and conflict resolution (crafting a mutually 
satisfying peace agreement). NGOs do not appear invested in these distinctions, 
using terms more in their colloquial sense than as significant discursigraphs, 
linked to a web of theory. 
The same fuzzy application of the word 'transformation' prevents any clear 
discussion about the need to support and sustain conflict (controversy) through 
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non-violent methods. World Vision uses the word quite frequently, although never 
in accordance with the peace and conflict field. The organization “believes that 
true transformation comes when each of these needs are addressed 
simultaneously”; here, World Vision references a development framework, the 
socioeconomic renewal of community livelihoods. Elsewhere, World Vision 
affirms that “the need for transformation is common to all”. This speaks more to 
the organization's religiosity, a belief in the potential for redemption of the human 
spirit. 
Surprisingly, the rhetoric of GIZ consistently demonstrates that it is the 
most connected to current conflict transformation literature. As it describes 
“conflict prevention”, GIZ mentions “conflict transformation and peace 
development”, “designed to gradually break the vicious circle of escalating 
violence”. The organization highlights that it is alleviating the structural causes of 
violent conflict”. In its sections on education and economy in conflicts, GIZ 
equates “peace education and conflict transformation”, explaining that “education 
is a precondition for peacebuilding and crisis prevention”. In certain cases, GIZ 
veers from conflict transformation theory. For example, it lists a timeline of 
conflict intervention – “preventive measures, emergency aid and reconstruction” – 
reverting to immediate relief during conflict. Nonetheless, GIZ tends to self-
publicize in the rhetoric and principles of conflict transformation more than any 
other studied organization. I can only speculate why this is so, but perhaps, since 
GIZ is tied to the government and thus, clearly values traditional forms of 
legitimacy, it also hires academic consultants for thematic design. 
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Isolated Theories of Action
What this rhetorical analysis reveals, more than anything, is a disconnect 
between NGOs working in conflict intervention. Each organization approach 
peace and conflict work from its own perspective. The Carter Center uses 
governance rhetoric, Caritas uses religious rhetoric, Care, international 
development and women's empowerment rhetoric, and so forth. They are neither 
speaking the same language nor operating under the same theories of action. 
Ricigliano (2003) explains that “an organization first defines its goals and 
strategies based on its theory of action, and if collaboration can help it achieve 
these goals and strategies, the organization will pursue one or more collaborations 
with other intevenors” (p. 451). Certainly these ten organizations share similar 
goals; they would all like to end violence and suffering in Somalia and Cote 
d'Ivoire. Yet, they speak about these goals, and methods of reaching these goals, 
in such different ways that they are handicapped in efforts to collaborate. Without 
a common language, organizations are less effective at implementing cooperative 
projects, and cannot rise above the piecemeal, isolated service delivery model to a 
more holistic and integrated social movement. 
In order to maximize collaboration, generate a movement-oriented ethos, 
ensure long-term commitment to complex and nuanced strategies, and 
contextualize conflicts within their political realities, NGOs should work towards 
more self-conscious rhetoric. The meaning, theory and implication of peace and 
conflict terms should be a topic of constant struggle, a space for growth, 
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integration and participatory management, both internally, within organizations / 
organizational families, and externally, with donors, partners and other NGOs. 
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CHAPTER 8: TARGET NGOS: RESPONSES TO CONFLICT
Responses Classified
The project-based structure of most NGO interventions makes it 
challenging to systematically classify organizations' activities. With the exception 
of Medecins Sans Frontieres which almost exclusively distributes emergency 
medical relief, all of the case study NGOs have multiple programs dedicated to 
diverse areas of social, political and economic need. Even organizations with 
narrow focus on long-term peacebuilding, like the Carter Center and Interpeace, 
still engage in an enormous range of activities, given the complexity of 
peacebuilding. 
Within the wide range of mission-driven objectives, organizations tend to 
report activities project-by-project. A given number of staff completed a certain 
task in a particular region: for example, fifteen Care staff distributed water to 
20,000 IDPs in the northern Puntland region; two Carter Center staff met with a 
group of election officials and civil society leaders in Mogadishu. This project-
based approach facilitates upward accountability. Donors (governments, 
foundations, private individuals, etc.) generally rely on organizations themselves 
to self-report impact. It sounds far more impressive for an organization to report 
involvement in emergency relief, education, health care, employment, local civil 
society, governance, and human rights advocacy, than to mention activities in only 
one area. External observers cannot know the depth of organizations' involvement 
in these activities. In some cases, NGOs attempt to quantify their work, but only 
certain types of activities can be meaningfully quantified. Though critical to 
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conflict transformation, the impact and scope of trust-building, dialogue-oriented 
peace work is not easily represented in organizational materials nor easily 
communicated to organizational donors. 
It is essential to remember from earlier chapters that 'doing good' is not 
good enough. All of the organizations examined here have excellent programs that 
serve people in need. However, long-term changes to the human condition will 
require more discerning evaluation. Are organizations completing the activities 
that best meet local needs? Are they duplicating services provided by other 
organizations, or ignoring areas of need across geographic space or level of 
society? Are the activities of organizations in the country, taken as an integrated 
whole, the most effective, strategic methods to achieve peace and justice?
Models for classifying NGO conflict intervention help to answer some of 
these questions; they can demonstrate gaps and duplications in NGO work for 
certain characteristics. However, the complexity of conflict intervention means 
that no model will capture all the relevant characteristics of strategic, multifaceted 
peace work. In this section, I attempt to apply some of the classification systems 
presented in chapter 4 to the activities of the ten case study NGOs. 
The bulleted lists below uses the same hypothetical intervention categories 
as in the first section of chapter 4. I record programs from each of the ten 
organizations, representing activities in both countries. When a single program 
fits multiple categories, I include it only once under the category it best 
approximates.5
5 Parenthetical abbreviations identify NGOs: Medecins Sans Frontieres = MSF; 
Care International = Care; Carter Center = CC; Caritas Internationalis = Caritas; 
International Rescue Committee = IRC; Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
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Addressing Immediate Needs
 Rehabilitation of water sources, water trucking, non-food items 
distribution (HR/S)
 Drinking water and latrines (MC/S) 
 Child-friendly centers for safety and education (MC/S)
 Child-friendly spaces for safety and trauma recovery (WV/S)
 Provision of shelter, blankets, cooking pots, clean water, sanitation 
(WV/S)
 Disease treatment and containment (WV/S)
 Emergency health care to refugees, including emergency evacuation (IRC/
CI)
 Emergency water delivery and sanitation system repair (IRC/CI)
 Drop-in centers for women facing immediate violence (IRC/CI)
 Emergency medical treatment, disease containment and water distribution 
(MSF/S)
 Primary and secondary medical care, including mobile clinics and capacity 
building of hospitals (MSF/CI)
 Emergency distribution of food, water, shelter, cash and non-food items to 
“disaster-stricken” households (Care/S, CI)
 Disease treatment and containment, especially malaria and tuberculosis 
(Care/CI)
Zusammernarbeit = GIZ; Interpeace = Ip; World Vision = WV; Mercy Corps = 
MC; Horn Relief = HR. Letters after the dash represent the country of operation: 
S for Somalia, CI for Cote d'Ivoire.
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Enhancing Local Capacity for Self-Help (Empowerment-focused Development)
 Cash for work programs (HR/S)
 Grassroots education in natural resource management, animal health, 
human health, literacy, business, leadership development (HR/S)
 Environmental rehabilitation to support economic development (MC/S)
 Cash for work programs (MC/S)
 Technical assistance to government for water and sanitation (MC/S)
 Teacher training to improve local educational quality (MC/S)
 Vocational training, social and health education of unemployed adults 
(WV/S)
 Training in sustainable agricultural practices (GIZ/CI)
 Private partnerships to enhance local economic development (GIZ/CI)
 Rural economic development via micro-projects and national park 
conservation (GIZ/CI)
 Training of midwives and doctors (IRC/CI)
 Monitoring childrens' educational progress (IRC/CI)
 Community training on water sanitation, safety and hygiene (IRC/CI)
 Capacity building of local NGOs working on water, agriculture and the 
environment (Care/S)
 Capacity building of local health care providers, public awareness to 
improve maternal health (Care/S)
 Food and cash for work programs to improve public sanitation (Care/S, 
CI)
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 Support for natural resource management and animal health services 
(Care/S)
 Vocational training and education for “disadvantaged youth” (Care/S)
 Teacher training, management and support to improve educational systems 
(Care/S)
 HIV/AIDs awareness and prevention (Care/CI)
 Disease eradication, especially guinea worm (CC/CI)
 Programming for health esp. HIV/AIDs, education, water, sanitation, 
environmental restoration, micro-credit, and employment (Caritas/CI)
 Support to local infrastructure and public construction projects 
(Caritas/CI)
Promoting Short-Term Security
 Security management support to international and national NGOs (Care/S)
Reducing Conflict at the Grassroots; Problem-Solving with Civilians
 Capacity building of women's organizations (HR/S)
 Peace education (HR/S)
 Awareness campaigns on human rights and governance (HR/S)
 Mediation services to resolve local clan disputes (MC/S)
 Sporting events for community reconciliation (WV/S)
 Forums for local discussion about Somali peace and conflict (Ip/S)
 Capacity building to media and civil society organizations working on 
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“peace, reconciliation and good governance” (Care/S)
 Reconciliation efforts tied to “concrete material incentives” for 
cooperation (Care/CI)
 Capacity building of local peace and women's groups to promote peace 
and conflict prevention (Care/CI)
Urging Action by Other Members of the International Community
 International awareness campaigns about violence against civilians (MSF/
S,CI)
 Regional advocacy with West African institutions “on peace and justice 
issues” (Caritas/CI)
Mediating Conflicts with Party Representatives
 Support to national, regional and local authorities for mediation processes 
(Ip/S)
 “National meetings” with government, NGOs and civil society leaders on 
peace and reconciliation (Care/CI)
 Meetings with election officials, party leaders, civil society leaders, and 
others in the international community regarding elections and transitional 
justice (CC/CI)
 Dialogue with National Civil Society Convention to promote peace and 
reconciliation (Caritas/CI)
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Advocating for the Needs of Vulnerable Populations
 Environmental protection of land for pastoral livelihoods (HR/S)
 Advocacy for the inclusion of women in mediation process (Ip/S)
 Local awareness campaigns about violence against women (IRC/CI)
 Advocacy and local outreach to decrease the prevalence of FGM practices 
(Care/S)
 Outreach about children's rights (Care/S)
 Advocacy and outreach against child labor (Care/CI)
 Meetings with national elites about child labor and abuse (Caritas/CI)
Promoting Psychological Healing
 Psychosocial trauma recovery for IDPs (MC/S)
 Counseling and psychosocial healing for survivors of violence (IRC/CI)
 Counseling and reconciliation across local communities (Caritas/CI)
Supporting Infrastructure for a Functioning Democracy
 Governance and resource management in pastoral communities (HR/S)
 Monitoring compliance with peace agreements (Ip/S)
 Civil society outreach to promote electoral participation (Ip/S)
 Capacity building of Somali national government  and infrastructure (Ip/S)
 Train justice personnel at the national level (GIZ/CI)
 Judicial reform measures introduced and discussed (GIZ/CI)
 Enhancing efficiency and transparency of local police (GIZ/CI)
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 Monitoring elections for open transparency (CC/CI)
Assisting in the Rehabilitation of Post-Conflict Populations
 Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (GIZ/CI)
 Vocational training, education, micro-credit and food for work projects for 
returnees (Care/S)
 Reconstruction and resources for schools in returnees' communities (Care/
S)
 Vocational training, education, micro-credit for returning youth (Care/S, 
CI)
 Reconstruction and rehabilitation of returning IDP communities (Care/CI)
The first obvious trend in the distribution of organizations' activities is the 
preference for relief and development work over any other form of conflict 
intervention. Every organization, with the exception of Interpeace, has programs 
in these two categories. Although response to immediate needs remains a staple of 
organizations' work, recent attention to long-term impact seems to manifest 
primarily as a shift towards more structural development. Unlike short-term aid, 
development activities are meant to sustainably increase the material or economic 
conditions of local communities. These programs certainly may help to alleviate 
underlying causes of conflict rooted in poverty and inequality. However, few of 
the organizations mention transformation or resolution of conflict as a motivator 
for their development work. 
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Scarce attention is given to programs that promote short-term security, 
such as negotiating zones of peace, monitoring protests for non-violence, or 
training community leaders in violence de-escalation. Such activities would not 
ensure long-term peace, but would promote short-term safety, and communicate a 
deviation in popular opinion away from an ethos of violence. The only security-
related activity reported by any of the organizations is a NGO training program 
organized by the Somalia NGO Consortium which instructs staffmembers from 
multiple NGOs on how to navigate dangerous field conditions.
NGOs' work on grassroots problem-solving seems to exist primarily as a 
conflict-sensitive outgrowth of more traditional development activities. The Track 
two approach to cooperative economic development, a strategy promoted by 
Joseph Montville and described in chapter 2, is a popular tack among these 
organizations, especially the environmental restoration model. Unlike human-
centered development, environmental work demands that communities focus on 
communal goods, something 'bigger than themselves', forcing grassroots 
adversaries to see their goals as mutually entangled. Multiple international NGOs 
also emphasize capacity building of local peace and women's organizations 
working on grassroots dialogue and community-level reconciliation. This may be 
a product of the development trend toward local empowerment, or may simply be 
a strategy of convenience – easier to support the people already doing the work 
than to reinvent the wheel. Certainly the effort is laudable in theory, but more 
information is needed to determine whether the material and technical support of 
INGOs substantially increases the impact of local organizations.
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Organizations make surprisingly little reference to international advocacy; 
none highlight international advocacy as a programmatic category. Of course, 
most of the organizations present information on their websites, continually 
monitoring and reporting on local conditions, but they tend not to offer opinions 
about what the international community should do. Occasionally, organizations 
plead for more financial support or, vaguely, more involvement from the UN, but 
even this is rare. Moreover, organizations do not defend particular policy choices, 
advocate for peace agreement outcomes, or even push for the existence of a 
settlement. Despite their unique, transnational position as local knowledge centers 
and international conduits, organizations overwhelmingly shrink from statements 
more political than the mere acknowledgment of suffering.  
Meetings with party representatives typically assumes a Track two or 
unofficial approach. NGOs offer support to mediation processes, facilitate inter-
sector dialogue between government and civil society, and work with election 
officials and commissions to establish post-settlement electoral procedures. 
Organizations contextualize their activities as informal gatherings meant to build 
trust, rather than formal decision-making events aimed at the eventual signing of a 
peace agreement. These Track two approaches are largely initiated by Carter 
Center and Interpeace, the organizations with peace-driven missions. This makes 
sense considering that elite-level mediation differs greatly in strategy, skills and 
participants from traditional grassroots-level development work. Organizations 
cannot gradually slide their way into national peace work, but must have explicit, 
objectives for long-term peace. 
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While organizations are minimally involved in international advocacy, half 
of all target organizations include local advocacy for vulnerable populations. The 
needs of three groups were represented, women, children and pastoral 
communities, particularly in three areas: violence against women (domestic 
abuse, female genital mutilation, rape, etc.), child labor, and rural economic 
development. In most cases, this local advocacy was described as the capstone to 
a related development project. For example, Horn Relief's advocacy for 
environmental protection for pastoral livelihoods is connected to its direct service 
programs on environmental restoration and partnerships with pastoral 
communities. Care International's human rights work in Cote d'Ivoire against 
child labor is part of a larger development project in support of the country's 
cocoa farmers. 
Similarly, psychosocial healing tends to be described with other 
emergency relief activities, contextualized more as an effort to stabilize 
individuals than to produce nation-wide reconciliation. For example, under the 
heading “providing emergency support”, Mercy Corps lists distribution of 
drinking water, creation of child-friendly safe spaces, and “psychosocial services 
to help trauma victims recover”. This reflects an awareness of complex 
psychological and emotional needs, but a disconnect from the communal and 
political levels at which these needs can operate. 
Support for governance and democracy seem to take three forms: 
monitoring of government activities, training of government personnel and 
technical / financial capacity building. Three organizations particularly dominated 
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this area of operation: Interpeace, the Carter Center and GIZ. For the former two 
organizations, public infrastructure is a means to peace, whereas GIZ seeks good 
governance as an end in itself. 
Finally, NGOs' post-conflict reintegration of communities mostly focuses 
on refugees and IDPs. In Cote d'Ivoire, these projects were conducted prior to the 
election violence of 2010, while in Somalia, they were geographically confined to 
Somaliland and Puntland. Rather than a nation-wide campaign to reintegrate 
returnees, either with or without government cooperation, these rehabilitation 
projects are done piecemeal, community by community. 
In order to capture overarching trends in NGOs' activities, I assess 
organizations' activities using two axes from the model created by Michael 
Kuchinsky (1999; see chapter 4). Each of the programs bulleted above I classify 
by society-level engagement and intervention strategy (see figure 8.1 and 8.2). 
For example, provision of shelters, blankets cooking pots, clean water and 
sanitation is clearly a grassroots-level activity, while capacity building of Somali 
national government and infrastructure is an activity at the level of national elites. 
Likewise, training of midwives and doctors supports basic 'human needs', while 
mediation services to resolve local clan disputes is a 'direct effort'. 
Organizations' objectives were divided into programs based on their own 
representation. This is somewhat arbitrary; what one organization presents as a 
single program could easily be four separate programs to another group. 
Therefore, this analysis is not meant to be viewed quantitatively. However, 
relative distributions across both axes are so skewed that qualitative conclusions 
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can be drawn with some certainty. 
Figure 8.1: Society-level Engagement of Case Study NGOs
Figure 8.2: Intervention Strategy of Case Study NGOs
Three important lessons can be extracted from this analysis: 
 NGOs spend more time working at the grassroots than with civil society or 
national elites. 
 NGOs tend to prioritize basic human needs over direct or indirect efforts 
to transform conflict.
 Although many choose not to, NGOs are capable of operating at the 
national level and engaging in direct conflict intervention. 
These conclusions fit previous observations that organizations in conflict 
still overwhelmingly provide emergency relief. Theoretical criticism about 
organizational short-sightedness has produced more long-term development 
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strategies focused on communities' material needs. However, organizations less 
frequently pursue structural changes to society, the politicized redistribution of 
power and resources, or a holistic resolution / transformation of conflict. 
Such trends fit a Liberal division of labor between states as conflict 
mediators and NGOs as agents of grassroots relief (see chapter 3). They also 
reflect the continued dominance of Track one (state-centered) diplomacy over 
Track two (unofficial mediation with civil society) over Track 1.5 (official 
mediation conducted by civil society). 
Since some organizations do have programs that work with national elites 
and intervene directly in conflict, these are evidently viable strategies. However, 
cognitive and practical impediments continue to limit organizations' involvement 
in these areas. 
Comparisons between NGOs
Literature on NGOs emphasizes that organizations are not unitary, rational 
actors. Instead, they are complex, collective actors influenced by a myriad of 
internal and external factors. Organizational decisions and activities, generated 
through dialogue and power struggles, do not necessarily reflect the convictions 
or theories of action of any of the organization's staff. Dynamics such as 
management style, internal structure, size, mission / vision, stated goals, funding 
source, and headquartering country all influence NGOs' programming. In order to 
maximize an organizations' impact, managers and observers alike should 
understand what makes an NGO in conflict behave as it does, what factors cause 
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an organization to veer away from 'rational' strategies (i.e. strategies through 
which the organization most effectively achieves its stated goals). 
Comparing the activities of the ten case study NGOs reveals wide 
variation in activities. Using the same methodology as above, I assess NGO 
society-level engagement and intervention strategy (see figure 8.3 and 8.4). 
Figure 8.3: Society-Level Engagement by Organization
Although Figure 8.1 depicts a strong overall trend toward activities at the 
grassroots, organizations actually vary widely in the level of society at which they 
engage. Care, Caritas, Horn Relief, the International Rescue Committee, Mercy 
Corps, MSF and World Vision all have significantly more involvement at the 
grassroots than at any other level of society. In fact, the last four relief and 
development organizations are so strongly skewed towards grassroots activities 
that they alone may be responsible for the overall preference for grassroots 
interventions. 
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Activities of GIZ and the Carter Center are almost evenly dispersed across 
all levels of society, with slight preference to intervention at the level of national 
elites. As noted in chapter 6, these organizations are both very governance-
oriented missions: the Carter Center emphasizes democracy as a means to peace, 
and GIZ, governance for its own sake. Thus, it makes sense that they emphasize 
national elites based on their frame for evaluating the needs of a country. 
Interestingly, Interpeace is the only organization with no work at the 
grassroots, with the most dedication to national elites and civil society. This 
conflict-oriented organization uses 'peacebuilding' as the conceptual organizing 
frame for its work. Its interpretation of peacebuilding emphasizes more traditional 
conflict resolution methods (mediation, negotiation, etc.) than conflict 
transformation, which requires operation at all levels of society. 
Interpeace is not the only organization to exclude entire levels of society 
altogether. Horn Relief, the IRC and Mercy Corps exclude national elites; MSF 
excludes civil society and World Vision excludes both civil society and national 
elites. Only four of the ten organizations work at all three levels of society. This is 
concerning in light of John Paul Lederach's assertion that successful 
peacebuilding requires integration across horizontal and vertical peace 
constituencies. However, the observation is not surprisingly; as mentioned in 
chapter 4, other studies have noted NGOs' tendency to operate only at one level of 
society. The skills and principles required for community-level work do not 
translate well to work with national elites, but to be maximally effective, to 
generate trust, local knowledge, credibility and holistic conflict transformation, 
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organizations are going to have to learn to be flexible across boundaries of social 
status. 
Organizations with strong government / IGO funding – GIZ and 
Interpeace – tend to operate more at the level of national elites. By contrast, 
organizations with strong reliance on individual donors – the IRC, MSF, World 
Vision, Caritas – tend to operate more at the grassroots. There are several 
plausible explanations for this correlation. Governments may be more familiar 
with state-level interventions and thus more comfortable supporting such 
interventions. Governments also tend to fund organizations based on RFPs and 
grant applications, whereas organizations have mere seconds to capture the 
attention and interest of individual donors. Thus, organizations may find it more 
difficult to communicate the importance of long-term, national strategies like 
mediation, dialogue and trust-building; service delivery to the grassroots makes a 
more compelling donor plea. Finally, the observation may also just be an artifact 
of organizational history: GIZ was created by the German government and 
Interpeace emerged from a branch of the UN. The organizations may be 
responding more to internal tradition than to donors' wishes. Most likely, these 
explanations are all correct in part, cementing the distinction between the 
organizations' perspectives and strategies. 
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Figure 8.4: Intervention Strategy by Organization
Like society-level engagement, intervention strategy varies widely 
between organizations. Multiple organizations emphasize human needs almost 
exclusively: the IRC, Mercy Corps, MSF, and World Vision. Care International 
engages in all three forms of relief, but with less involvement in direct action. 
Horn Relief and GIZ work almost equally for human needs and indirect efforts, 
and Caritas and the Carter Center have programs equally distributed across all 
three areas. Only Interpeace is skewed towards more direct intervention strategies. 
Despite the similar, peace-oriented missions of the Carter Center and 
Interpeace, the organizations differ widely in their propensity for direct 
intervention. Religion may be a factor influencing World Vision to work more for 
human needs. I hypothesize this is the case based on a conservative manifestation 
of Christianity that promotes charitable service without major structural changes 
to society. However, this does not seem to influence Caritas. 
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Interestingly, all U.S.-based organizations – Care, the Carter Center, the 
IRC, Mercy Corps and World Vision – are either entirely or largely skewed 
towards meeting basic needs. Even the Carter Center, which was initially started 
as a conflict resolution organization intended for direct intervention, has shifted to 
include more needs-oriented work. This trend parallels observations in NGO 
literature that organizations from the U.S. tend to prefer service over advocacy, 
relative to their European counterparts (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001). 
It would make sense to observe some correlation between organizational 
size and intervention strategy (for example, larger organizations might have more 
material and reputational capacity to intervene directly through advocacy or 
mediation). However, case study NGOs do not display any consistent correlation 
in this regard. Similarly, there is no significant correlation between the 
organizational funding source and intervention strategy. 
Perhaps most notably, there is significant overlap in the organizations' 
tendencies in both society-level engagement and intervention strategy. This is 
understandable since most relief and development work occurs at the grassroots, 
geared towards meeting human needs. However, this need not be the case; direct 
efforts – mediation, advocacy, etc. – are just as applicable at the grassroots, and, 
conversely, national elites are quite capable of implementing programs for basic 
needs. Strong similarities between Figures 8.3 and 8.4 indicate that organizations 
tend to compartmentalize: grassroots work meets human needs, national work 
signifies direct conflict intervention. In other words, organizations conceive of 
these axes as parallel, when in fact they should be perpendicular (see figure 8.5).
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Because organizations operate as though grassroots and basic needs 
provision were synonymous, NGO case study activities tend to fall in quadrants I 
and III of Figure 8.5B. Organizations are engaged in some indirect efforts at the 
grassroots (e.g. reconciliation, psychosocial trauma recovery) and occasionally, 
direct efforts (e.g. outreach and public advocacy against FGM) – activities that 
would fall under quadrant IV. However, these are exceptions to the rule. For 
holistic conflict transformation, with meaningful engagement across peace 
constituencies, organizations need to consciously strive for more activity in 
quadrants II and IV: basic needs provision through national elites, and direct 
conflict intervention at the grassroots. Quadrant II activities might include 
structural changes to national education policy, redistribution of land rights at the 
national level, or agricultural training programs implemented through national 
bureaucracy. Quadrant IV activities might include community forums about the 
future of peace, negotiation between communities about conflict issues, or 
advocacy for village-level protection of the rights of vulnerable populations. 
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Comparisons between Countries
Chapter 5 contrasted conflicts in Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire. The countries 
are both undergoing immense and forgotten suffering, but numerous factors 
differentiate between the two local conditions. Somali conflict is more dispersed 
and has lasted for decades, while conflict in Cote d'Ivoire is nationally centralized 
and only (re)surfaced in the last few months. The conflicts are rooted in different 
social, political, and economic factors, including colonial histories; disparities in 
development across geographic areas; unmet material needs driven by extreme 
poverty, famine, drought, etc.; clashes between religions, ethnicities and clans; 
influence by and tensions with unstable neighbors; intervention and political 
interests of international actors. Each of these factors differ between countries and 
require unique, country-specific interventions. In order to examine how NGO 
activities differ by country, I assess society-level engagement and intervention 
strategy of NGOs' programs by country (see figure 8.6). 
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Figure 8.6: Society-Level Engagement and Intervention Strategy by Country
Figure 8.6 shows the same general trend observed in Figures 8.1 and 8.2: 
grassroots-level interventions and strategies for human needs are prioritized over 
other intervention methods in both countries. In Cote d'Ivoire, there is slightly 
more attention to intervention strategies at the national level, while NGOs in 
Somalia spend slightly more time working with civil society. This fits my initial 
hypothesis that Cote d'Ivoire, as a centralized power struggle, would require more 
intervention at the level of national elites, compared to decentralized conflict in 
Somalia. 
Aside from this minimal deviation in society-level engagement, there is 
generally very little difference in NGO strategy between countries of conflict. The 
1-3% difference in program characteristics between one country and the other is 
far from significant (especially considering that this analysis, derived from semi-
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arbitrarily divided programming, is meant to be qualitative). The most supported 
conclusion is a null set: there is no substantial difference in NGO programming 
between these two countries. 
Two of the case study organizations operate in both Cote d'Ivoire and 
Somalia: Medecins Sans Frontieres and Care International. MSF uses the same 
strategy everywhere it works: medical humanitarian relief coupled with efforts to 
'bear witness' when necessary. In both Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia, MSF is treating 
refugees, IDPs and victims of violence. Its publications on both countries include 
information about episodes of violence, victim testimonies, and international 
intervention strategies. 
As a more generalized relief and development organization, the 
intervention strategies of Care International are a little bit more difficult to assess. 
In both countries, Care provides emergency relief, has cash-for-work and food-
for-work programs, conducts vocational training and other reintegration efforts 
for returnees, builds the capacity of local civil society, and advocates for the rights 
of women and children. 
Using the same methodology as presented above, I assess the society-level 
engagement and intervention strategy of Care International across both countries 
(see table 8.1). Percentages listed horizontally across the table are virtually 
identical, never more than 11% deviance, even considering the small sample size 
(total number of programs < 25). 
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Table 8.1: Comparing Activities of Care International across Countries
Society-Level Care – Cote d'Ivoire Care – Somalia
Grassroots 0.73* 0.71
Civil Society 0.18 0.29
National Elites 0.01 0
Intervention Strategy Care – Cote d'Ivoire Care – Somalia
Human Needs 0.44 0.50
Indirect Efforts 0.33 0.36
Direct Efforts 0.22 0.14
*Numbers are reported as percentages of total programs conducted by Care in this 
country. 
Both comparisons overall (figure 8.6) and within the same NGO across 
different countries (MSF and Care, table 8.1) demonstrate that NGO activities do 
not differ substantially between countries. In other words, organizations are using 
one-size-fits-all strategies for conflict intervention rather than politically sensitive, 
context-dependent approaches. Although programs like the Do No Harm Project 
and ConflictSensitivity.org push NGOs to alter their strategies based on local 
realities, this research suggests that organizations make programmatic decisions 
based on other factors external to the country of conflict. For example, 
organization may be more influenced by donors' interests, organizational 
structure, internal organizational politics, their original founding mission, or a 
particular theory of action. Organizations may also see context-dependent 
programs as overly political. Human needs remain consistent across all countries 
(everyone needs health, education and employment), but direct interventions in 
issues such as resource distribution, territorial disputes, historical trauma, lack of 
official recognition require local awareness and political engagement. 
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CHAPTER 9: TARGET NGOS: ADDRESSING CHALLENGES
The challenges facing an NGO in conflict are often as cognitive and 
symbolic as they are material. The chaos, violence, and destruction of a warzone 
creates unstable ground for intervention, putting the staff, tangible resources and 
reputation of an organization at risk. For traditional relief and development 
organizations, accustomed to conditions of relative peace, conflict inspires fear 
and uncertainty. Organizations want to minimize their risk, to move on to other 
locations where they are more comfortable and have more certain impact. 
Rational albiet counterproductive fears of flubbing up, looking dumb, or 
getting hurt drives much decision-making in conflict. These are legitimate fears; if 
an organization errs in conflict, where the stakes are higher and the activities less 
familiar, it loses legitimacy among local communities, the international 
community, donors, IGOs, governments, partner NGOs, and even its own 
employees. Thus, organizations continue basic relief and development work 
because it is familiar and safe, almost guaranteed to produce goodwill among 
constituents. Nonetheless, pursuit of global peace and justice will require no less 
than the most innovative, directly engaged strategies.
In this chapter, I examine how the ten case study organizations have 
responded to challenges such as field staff security, the balance between 
impartiality and justice, and the need to measure abstract objectives. More than a 
set of operational procedures, I find symbolic and rhetorical principles, statements 
that affirm organizations commitment to nonviolence, belief in human rights and 
certainty that peace is everyone's responsibility. As with with activity, NGOs' 
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success with direct conflict intervention – their security, legitimacy and efficacy – 
depends less on what they do, and more on how they frame their decisions. 
The completeness of this analysis is limited by information availability. 
Some organizations more fully detail their principles and methods than others. In 
the case of Horn Relief, for example, this is merely an artifact of organizational 
capacity; an $8 million organization cannot devote as much time to website 
design as one with $6 billion. However, in other cases, the absence of information 
is as significant as its presence. For example, the IRC describes the death of a 
staffmember, but does not use the tragedy to detail and reinforce its security 
strategy in Cote d'Ivoire. It downplays issues of organizational safety, and focuses 
instead on organizational opportunity. While certain organizations, such as 
Interpeace and Care, describe evaluation strategies associated with particular 
programs, most of the NGOs do not even mention how they measure success, a 
difficult process in such a complex environment.
Security of Field Staff
Staff safety remains one of the biggest concerns of organizations operating 
in conflict, motivated either by political or personal concerns. Many of the 
organizations document incidences of staff threatened or killed, often with 
reaffirmed commitments to ensuring security and neutrality, balancing imminent 
danger with the urgent short-term needs of local populations. For example, David 
Gilmore, the CARE country director, explains: 
The safety of our staff is paramount to our operations. These kinds of 
targeted and public threats ultimately force us to choose between the 
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safety of our colleagues on the ground and our commitment to deliver aid 
to hundred of thousands of Somalis who are in desperate need of 
assistance. We take security threats of this nature very seriously... The 
situation in Somalia is extremely tense, with dozens of civilian casualties 
every week, periodic abductions and killing of aid workers. Since the 
beginning of 2008, at least 24 relief workers have lost their lives, while 10 
remain hostages. 
Perhaps the biggest fallout from these security threats is organizations' 
inability to work strategically toward long-term conflict solutions. With bullets 
flying – or, more realistically, with news reports mounting in the aftermath of a 
staffmember's death – NGOs must respond urgently, minimizing risk, putting staff 
in harm's way only when absolutely critical. From this panicked perspective, it is 
far easier to see carnage, disease and famine as essential areas of focus rather than 
weakened trust and shattered relationships. Yet, conflict resolution and 
transformation theories underscore that long-term trust-building is of primary 
importance for any shot at peace. 
It seems likely that many of the case study organizations have developed 
technical solutions to conflict, such as armed guards, private security companies, 
and facility surveillance. However, these are not the solutions that organizations 
advertise, perhaps because organizations wish to de-emphasize their similitude to 
military interventions. 
Instead, NGOs most frequently describe geographic adaptations to 
security; NGOs limit where they operate for the sake of staff safety. Care 
International and Horn Relief conduct the majority of their Somali development 
work in nearly peaceful Somaliland and Puntland. These regions do need 
development work, and many analysts agree that capacity building in these semi-
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autonomous states will do much to reduce piracy and general instability of the 
entire east African horn. However, post-conflict reconstruction in these northern 
states does not directly contribute to resolution or transformation of concurrent 
violence in Somalia proper. 
Rather than treating sick or injured patients in the field, Medicins Sans 
Frontieres urges victims to approach their clinics. When MSF vehicles do go out 
in search of the wounded, staff follow strict protocol, bringing patients back to the 
secured clinic, triaging patients for priority surgery. Remote rural areas of Cote 
d'Ivoire remain beyond the purview of the organization: “We don't know how 
many people are still hiding in fear in the Ivorian bush, or what levels of violence 
they may be currently exposed to, but the horrific stories we have heard from 
people are cause for alarm. We increased our mobile clinics up to 12 to reach the 
most vulnerable, but it still remains too insecure to access the deepest bush to 
assess needs.” 
The International Rescue Committee in Cote d'Ivoire works in the buffer 
zone between the “northern-held rebel territory and the government-held south”. 
Much like operating from a neighboring country, the buffer provides a sideline 
safe haven, from which the IRC can access civilian victims without operating in 
the line of fire. Peace agreements mandate cease fire across the buffer, and French 
and UN peacekeepers enforce the agreement. The IRC does not discuss its access 
to vulnerable populations from this region; one can only guess that communities 
in the far north or south of the country would have less access to the IRC's help. 
However, compared to many organizations setting up camp in Abidjan, the IRC's 
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buffer position at least does not favor either the north or south. Like MSF, the IRC 
explains that it generally sets up base, then allows locals to approach on their 
own. As a result, the IRC does not have to worry as much about the dangers of 
looting and attack en route to communities in need. On the other hand, “the 
presence of militias and harassment at road blocks also makes it more difficult for 
survivors and others to access healthcare services”. 
From observation of the case study organizations, standard approaches to 
security seem to include as much risk minimization as possible, political 
neutrality and abstention from conflict, coupled with international and national 
advocacy for peace enforcement. For example, the IRC advises that “Ivorian 
authorities must urgently restore security and rule of law, effectively monitor the 
armed forces, and work toward easing political and ethnic tension in 
communities.” 
The Carter Center offers an alternate, more mission-oriented strategy for 
promoting security. The first part of the strategy relies heavily on preventive 
communication. Through election observation in Cote d'Ivoire, the Carter Center 
works directly with the government to ensure safety of foreign observers. It 
clarifies in its “Declaration of Principles for International Election Standards”:
An international election observation mission therefore should not be 
organized unless the country holding the elections takes the following 
actions: issues an invitation...; guarantees unimpeded access to all persons 
concerned with election processes...; guarantees freedom of movement 
around the country for all members of the international election observer 
mission; ...guarantees that no governmental authority will pressure, 
threaten action against or take any reprisal against any international or 
foreign citizen who works for, assists or provides information to the 
international election observer mission.
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By now, June 2011, the legitimacy of President Ouattara's rule has almost 
unanimous international support, so there are fewer concerns about privileging the 
accepted government. However, unilateral government support a year prior would 
not have been as apolitical or straightforward. Because the legitimacy of power 
and identity are often central to civil conflict, the Carter Center's de facto support 
for the status quo government yields security and stability, but may not 
necessarily produce justice.  If a minority faction arises in response to repeated 
human rights violations or unchecked oppression, it may not be in the best interest 
of a humanitarian-minded organization to stabilize pre-existing conditions.
The Center's preventive security makes up one prong of Avant's Security 
Triangle, usually accompanied by deterrence and acceptance (see chapter 4). The 
organization also follows the core of the security approach: mission comes first. 
In exchange for the government's agreement not to injure or impede intervenors, 
the Center agrees to abide by an explicit Code of Conduct. The code includes such 
principles as “respect for sovereignty and international human rights” and 
“respect [for] the laws of the country and the authority of the electoral body”. By 
drawing on international standards such as 'human rights', the 'rule of law' and 
democracy, the Center justifies its intervention and identifies higher grounds on 
which to make decisions. Even if the Center acted in opposition to the 
government based on known human rights violations, the government would, 
hypothetically, still have a contractual obligation not to injure election observers. 
Impartiality vs. Protection and Justice
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The Carter Center's Declaration of Principles and Code of Conduct are a 
perfect example of the struggle between impartiality and justice. On the one hand, 
the Center maintains the value of principled intervention, given human rights 
violations or disrespect for the rule of law. On the other hand, the organization 
compels staff to “maintain strict political impartiality at all times”. Clearly there is 
a limit to how impartial or un-opinionated NGOs deem to be acceptable, 
otherwise organizations would not intervene (or even exist) at all. The term 
'political', a frequent modifier for unacceptable forms of partiality, seems to hold 
the key to understanding this balance. The Carter Center elaborates: “[Election 
observers] must not express or exhibit any bias or preference in relation to 
national authorities, political parties, candidates, referenda issues or in relation to 
any contentious issues in the election process.” Here, the Center prioritizes the 
democratic process over outcomes; even if a leader violently oppressed minority 
populations, but was elected by majority vote, the Carter Center's principles 
demand acceptance of the leader. 
In its Declaration of Principles, the Center declares, “No one should be 
allowed to be a member of an international election observer mission unless that 
person is free from any political, economic or other conflicts of interest that 
would interfere with conducting observations accurately and impartially...” Is it 
possible to be entirely free of conflicts of interest? Organizations depend on 
financial support for continued existence from particular countries, particular 
people with political views. Even the Center's blatant support for human rights is 
a bias. What does it mean to accurately observe elections? Is it relevant, for 
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example, that countless war crimes were committed by either side during the post-
election violence? That hundreds of civilians were killed, many detained, beaten, 
raped, abused. Amnesty International, an explicitly political human rights 
organization, speaks extensively on these violations (see for example “Video: 
Cote d'Ivoire Forces”). By contrast, the Carter Center does not mention anything 
about the human rights violations. Each organization chooses the extent and 
conditions of its impartiality. All approaches may be equally moral, equally 
effective, but they are independent decisions along a spectrum between total non-
intervention (a political decision in support of the status quo) and direct military 
support for one side. Organizations fall at different places along this spectrum. If 
they fail to acknowledge their particular, politicized understanding of partiality, 
organizations will find it difficult to collaborate, and even more challenging to 
build the trust and transparency necessary for successful mediation. 
In general, organizations seem most willing to take political sides in a 
conflict when rooted in less controversial values like the rule of law, rather than 
minority rights. All of the six NGOs in Cote d'Ivoire have expressed support for 
Alassane Ouattara, since the international community accepted his presidency as 
the legitimate outcome of the election. For example, MSF places blame with 
former president Gbagbo for the conflict, “The worst of the fighting that broke out 
earlier this year ended in late March, several days before the fall of the regime of 
Laurent Gbagbo, the former president whose refusal to accept his electoral defeat 
triggered the violence in the first place”. It is unclear whether this support is 
genuinely based on a principled belief that democracy is the highest value or the 
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knowledge that partiality of this kind would not be frowned upon by the 
international community.
Other instances of advocacy suggest that organizations are at least 
influenced the general consensus in the international community. The case study 
organizations support for minorities is restricted to the least politicized groups – 
women, children and pastoral nomads. Controversial minority affiliations by 
ethnicity, race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or profession (sex workers, 
beggars, etc) do not have universal international support. Advocacy (i.e. partiality) 
on behalf of these vulnerable groups, though equally critical from a human rights 
perspective, is not as safe an organizational strategy. The issues on which 
organizations advocate also tend to be less internationally disputed: especially, 
female genital mutilation, domestic violence, and child labor. Organizations 
confront social problems that require cultural changes, education and outreach, 
rather than changes at the level of national policy. 
Finally, many organizations take the stance that violence itself is wrong, 
that neither warring group is inherently right or deserving of power. Instead, 
organizations push both groups to work to end the violence. This involves 
outspoken advocacy against violence, documenting abuses, or in the language of 
MSF, “bearing witness”, without placing blame. Medicins Sans Frontieres has 
published numerous stories of the wounded, killed and abused: “Boy, 17, village 
near Pehé, western Ivory Coast. May 2011”, “Man, 26, Western Ivory Coast. April 
2011”. In a video produced by the IRC, survivors of violence place their hands 
over their eyes and report abuses. On one hand, the video is a powerful problem 
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statement, communicating the sentiment that something needs to be done to stop 
the violence. On the other, the video does not say what that 'something' is, what 
kinds of interventions should be taken, how international actors should behave, 
and the focus on past traumas distracts from forward-looking optimism about a 
future of peace. 
Conflict Sensitivity
The think tank and NGO consulting agency, Conflict Sensitivity 
Consortium, defines “conflict sensitivity” as: 
The ability of [an] organization to: understand the context in which [it] 
operates; understand the interaction between [its] intervention and the 
context; and act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to 
avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts. Note: the word 
'context' is used rather than 'conflict' to make the point that all socio-
economic and political tensions, root causes and structural factors are 
relevant to conflict sensitivity because they all have the potential to 
become violent. 'Conflict' is sometimes erroneously confused with macro-
political violence between two warring parties.
Organizations conflict interventions should be rooted in local contexts. 
Figure 9.1 demonstrates the cyclic and multi-layered process: first organizations 
“monitor and evaluate” the context, then plan programs, implement pilot 
programs, re-evaluate, plan again, and implement a modified program, constantly 
observing and adapting to diverse conflict causes, dynamics and actors. 
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Figure 9.1: Operationalizing Conflict Sensitivity
Source: “Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development” 2011
Almost all of the ten organizations seem to have internalized these 
recommendations at least to some extent. The Carter Center, for example, justifies 
its programs in Cote d'Ivoire based on the country's politicized peace processes: 
“free, open, transparent and democratic elections are a central component of the 
2007 Ougadougou Political Agreement (OPA), established between the 
government of Cote d'Ivoire and rebels known as the Forces Nouvelles”. By 
evoking the commitments of the peace agreement, the Carter Center roots its 
programs in local decision-making, albeit at the national level. 
GIZ also references the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement, what has been 
considered the most successful phase of the Ivorian peace process. The GIZ 
outlines a history of the country's unrest: “Since September 2002, Cote d'Ivoire 
has experienced a several political and economic crisis and this has divided the 
country geographically and politically...The situation began to improve when the 
peace treaty of Ouagadougou was signed.” Given the organization's assessment 
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that violence in Cote d'Ivoire emerged in response to political and economic 
crisis, the organization's activities for governance and rural development make a 
lot of sense. 
The IRC demonstrates sensitivity to complex dynamics and unequal power 
relations within grassroots communities. The organization describes a village in 
“west-central” Cote d'Ivoire “whose population is majority Bete – the same ethnic 
group as former president Gbagbo”. Since political tides have shifted, particularly 
in the south, against Gbagbo and his supporters, the ethnic group, even civilian 
members, now face “reprisal raids by unidentified armed groups allegedly looking 
for hidden weapons”. As a result, “seven people were killed... and many more 
have been threatened, had their livelihoods destroyed and their savings stolen. 
Because males are being targeted, some men are hiding out in the forest, leaving 
behind vulnerable women and children.” The violence is neither so simple as 
attack of one clearly marked military against another, nor rampant, indiscriminate 
attacks on civilians. Ethnic groups and genders experience the violence 
differently, producing uneven needs – both in terms of immediate relief and 
reconciliation. 
Although one might easily fall into the trap of oversimplifying the Ivorian 
conflict as a case of political violence, Bariyo (2007) makes it clear that 
presidential control is only one small aspect of the conflict (see chapter 5). The 
IRC acknowledges the deeper complexity of the conflict: “What we have now is 
an explosive mix of political, economic and ethnic tensions that's boiling over into 
incidents like the killing in Duekoue.” This awareness seems to influence IRC 
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programming, with its emphasis on economic development and advocacy against 
violence against women. However, the organization has done little to address 
political or ethnic components of the conflict. Clearly, awareness of the conflict 
context is not enough, only one step of the process of operationalizing conflict 
sensitivity. 
One of the contributing factors that Bariyo (2007) identifies as a cause of 
Ivorian conflict is the disparity in development and poverty of the northern and 
southern regions of the country. Many scholars and organizations suggest more 
development work in the less economically advanced, more culturally 
marginalized north, in hopes of reducing inequality on either side of the cease fire 
line. None of the case study organizations apply this advice. The Carter Center 
does most of its work in Abidjan supporting election processes and meeting with 
government officials. Its field office is also based out of Abidjan, and while the 
organization has expanded some of its voter identification efforts into rural areas, 
it remains primarily focused on high urban density in the south. Care also works 
primarily in southern cities, including Man, Daloa and Bouake. Although GIZ 
underscores the cross-ethnic nature of its programs, its main hub of operations are 
in the south-west regions of the country, especially in and around the Tai National 
Park, a conservation area near the Liberian border. As mentioned previously, the 
IRC operates from the buffer zone between the two regions, surprisingly, the 
closest any of the organizations come to geopolitical sensitivity. The 
organizations' tendency to emphasize the south makes sense for many reasons: it 
has access by sea and air, better security, better roads, access to government 
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officials and national government, the highest density urban populations, better 
communications technology, and so forth. But all the same reasons that make 
southern Cote d'Ivoire operationally simpler also make work in the north that 
much more important. 
Interestingly, organizations in Cote d'Ivoire seem to spend much more 
time talking about the political context of the conflict than organizations in 
Somalia. Aside from the blogs of its field staff, Mercy Corps publishes one 
sentence on Somalia: “In a failed state, small successes go a long way toward 
building self-reliant communities.” World Vision makes no mention of either 
particular clans, political leaders, political parties or past peace agreements in 
Somalia. Instead, the organization focuses on the anarchy and struggle in the 
country: “With a mostly arid landscape and scattered settlements with nomadic 
traditions, Somalia has experienced prolonged humanitarian crises with the 
absence of a functioning central government since 1991.” Organizations 
universally condemn Somalia as a 'failed' state, a 'state-less' territory, a region of 
chaos and turmoil. As a result, organizations are less discerning in their conflict 
sensitivity; they less readily assess causes of conflict and instead describe the 
problem in terms of human needs. 
Many organizations, particularly in Cote d'Ivoire, apply the process-model 
to conflict intervention: assess, test, try again. GIZ is currently in in pilot phase of 
a project to reintegrate ex-combatants. Once it tests and modifies training 
curriculum for its staff, GIZ will implement “a second phase in which the training 
activities are expanded and a service center set up”. In its first phase of a rural 
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development and biodiversity program, GIZ quite usefully discovered that 
“development measures are possible even during a crisis, provided adequate 
attention is paid to the specific context.” World Vision similarly describes its pilot 
and future planned phases of its sports programs for local reconciliation and youth 
development. 
In 2008, Care spoke of plans to “launch an 18-month project to field test 
and promote a practical community-based approach to conflict mitigation,” 
implemented in three phases: conflict assessment, tentative reconstruction and 
reconciliation efforts, followed by national and international discussion about the 
methods, advantages and opportunities of the projects. These discussions 
“contribute to the national policy dialogue and framework for peace and capacity 
building of national networks”. As a step-by-step procedure, this seems a brilliant 
approach to organizational growth and new programming: the (inter)national 
discussions allow staff an opportunity for debrief, give Care management a 
chance to reassess from a bird's eye view, and helps to integrate Care within an 
international conflict-responding community. The dialogue, following only a short 
phase of implementation, positions Care not as an instructor, but a collaborator 
with a shared interest in growth towards more conflict sensitive interventions. 
Local Empowerment and Program Design
The most effective ways that NGOs gain legitimacy as third-party 
mediators is through trust and relationship-building over the long-term. Trust or 
accountability comes in multiple forms: commitment to organizational rhetoric, 
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upward accountability to donors, adherence to higher values, and downward 
accountability to local needs (Lewis 2001). As Interpeace emphasizes, peace 
requires “local ownership”; communities must have reason to believe not only 
that organizations will do what they say, but also that they are guided by the needs 
and interests of the community. Citizens must feel that peace was their idea, and 
that solutions depend on everyone. 
In a small way, Medicins Sans Frontieres introduces a local empowerment 
approach to emergency relief. More than a process or activity, MSF's impact on 
grassroots capacity depends on its standards of intervention. The organization's 
doctors do not just treat diseases, but patients. An MSF new report describes “As 
Dr. Ledecq does his ward round between two operations, he spends a while with 
every patient. No need to pick up the clip-board as he knows their name, the 
status of their treatment”. Although the organization delivers only primary 
medical care, its strives to maintain an ethos of respect for local knowledge. 
Dignifying patients with communication, permitting them to be the expert in their 
own lives, in their own physical pain, and modeling (but not preaching) peaceful 
human interaction helps to restore “the value of a human life”. 
Other organizations describe more direct efforts to include local 
communities in program design, training, dialogue and decision-making about 
peace work. Care, in particular, frequently emphasizes local partnerships and 
decision-making, perhaps as an outgrowth of the organizations' focus on women's 
empowerment frameworks in non-conflict development. Many models exist for 
reintegrating returnees; the process of rebuilding a community requires so many 
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different interventions that any number of approaches might be beneficial – 
emergency cash distribution, arms-for-work, education, vocational training, 
trauma care, conciliatory mediation, and so forth. Rather than selecting methods 
arbitrarily, Care explains that its programs to “reintegrate returnees” were 
designed based on “the most commonly requested assistance articulated by 
refugees and returnees; priority needs identified by Somaliland Ministry of 
Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration; pressing needs identified in 
interview with government ministers; priorities identified by local governmental 
'plans of action', mayors and one governor”. As with all effective peacebuilding, 
the program seeks long-term structural changes over short-term care. The process 
of consensus-building and opinion-gathering across multiple social groups takes 
time, but is a critical component of empowering reconstruction. 
Care also writes extensively about its collaboration with local NGOs. In an 
emergency cash distribution project, Care elicits the support of local organizations 
for delivery systems. Through collaboration on emergency relief, Care develops 
rapport with these organizations that allows them to collaborate in developing 
“more holistic understanding of the constraints faced by the affected families and 
identify appropriate, long-term interventions”. What Care describes is nearly an 
ideal partnership. Trust is developed gradually through a series of approximations 
working towards increased collaboration; programs begin with basic needs and 
work towards more long-term solutions; and both parties are respected for having 
critical knowledge and resources to contribute. To determine whether the 
programs are executed as cleanly as they sound would require more field 
190
investigation, but at least in theory, the partnership seems to be a model of local 
inclusion. By contrast, Care describes another program of emergency relief in 
which Care Somalia only observes, holding local NGOs accountable, offering 
technical and financial assistance, while “most of the activities [are] carried out 
by Somali NGOs”. The diversity of programming quality within a single 
organization points to the influence of mitigating internal factors preventing 
purely rational decision-making. 
The latter Care partnership is more representative of relationships between 
case study INGOs and local / national organizations. Lewis (2001) explains that 
most partnerships tend to be “passive” in character, “with resource-based origins, 
primarily to gain access to funds” (p. 159). For partnerships to be empowering, 
and thus peace-generating, they should be “active”, with “clear purpose, roles and 
linkages”, “negotiated, changing roles” and “activity-based origins, emerging 
from practice” (ibid). Instead, organizations overwhelmingly cite technical and 
financial capacity building. Care Somalia, Care Cote d'Ivoire, Medicins Sans 
Frontieres, Interpeace, the International Rescue Committee, Horn Relief, GIZ and 
the Carter Center all have programs to enhance the material capacity of local 
NGOs. Of course, these local organizations work on a diversity of issues, ranging 
from basic emergency relief to governance to grassroots reconciliation. However, 
INGO involvement in these north-south partnerships is the same: resource-driven. 
IRC consultant Lina Abirafeh explains that this type of capacity building 
peace work is “in vogue”, particularly to address “gender-based violence”, 
supporting local women's organizations (2011, p. 1). Abirafeh worked with the 
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IRC in Sierra Leone to analyse national capacity, assess the work of local 
organizations, and evaluate the impact of IRC's support. She found that technical 
and financial capacity building can either “help or hinder service provision”, 
depending on the quality of the partnership (p. 3). Even a resource-driven 
collaboration between INGOs and national NGOs must be rooted in long-term 
solutions to conflict, as well as a long-term investment in holistic, measured 
growth of the local organization. Abirafeh chides NGO staff who mistake capacity 
building for a simple strategy to achieve peace, development or local 
empowerment: 
Capacity building is not a box to be ticked in order to satisfy a donor but a 
long-term process that requires significant resources. Most of all, it entails 
a willingness to let go, trusting that those whose capacity is being 
strengthened have the ability to be flexible and to continue to make a 
difference long after international agencies and their funds have moved 
elsewhere. (p. 2)
Collaborations and Cross-Sector Partnerships
Beyond partnerships with local organizations, it is also critical that INGOs 
engage with other sectors in the country, with other members of the international 
community, and with each other. As Interpeace says, peace work is not “business 
as usual”; a lasting cease fire and a holistic peace will take the total commitment 
and coordination of numerous, diverse actors unaccustomed to working with each 
other, with vastly differing world views, theories of action and spheres of 
influence. In order to achieve meaningful conflict transformation, these bridges 
must be strong. 
As an inter-sector organization itself, a cross between government (70% 
German funding), private sector (a self-described corporation) and non-profit 
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(mission-oriented international development), GIZ is unsurprisingly the most 
successful at implementing cross-sector coordination in its programs. Its work to 
support the economic stability of cocoa-producing communities manifests a a 
series of public-private partnerships for cocoa sustainability certifications. As a 
result, West African producers have greater access to the growing international 
market for cocoa. GIZ has also engaged national organizations in the project, 
“such as the Ghanaian state-owned cocoa marketing board”, with the aim to 
ensure lasting development of the cocoa farmers.
The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, along with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, commissioned a 
similar, market-driven economic development program called the African Cashew 
Initiative. GIZ provides trains cashew farmers on agricultural techniques and 
business practices. Three other NGOs work on the project under GIZ's lead: “the 
African Cashew Alliance, an international platform of public and private partners 
involved in the cashew value chain, FairMatchSupport, a Dutch non-profit 
organization, and the US-based NGO for rural business, TechnoService”. The 
terminologies used, the types of organizations involved and the specificity of 
contracts underscores the business-like nature of conflict intervention and 
development, what many have called the “aid industry”. 
Finally, GIZ also works closely with national governments, implementing 
similar programs across multiple countries, and collaborating across vertical 
constituencies. The aforementioned judical training program in Cote d'Ivoire is 
also implemented in Sierra Leone and Liberia. GIZ ensures “a lively exchange of 
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experiences between experts from the three countries”, particularly with a mind 
toward “networks... established for future case-related regional cooperation in the 
justice sector”. In Cote d'Ivoire, GIZ works with the Ivorian Institut National de 
Formation Juridique to design and implement the program. Almost as a tack-on, a 
symbolic component of the program, the judicial program also includes grassroots 
legal assistance “particularly in remote areas without access to out-of-court legal 
assistance.” Through a single program, GIZ promotes greater interdependency 
between national governments of three countries, national officials, and local 
communities. Even if the actions have more symbolic than practical value, the 
program is at least a significant example of Track II peace work, helping diverse 
social groups to see their mutual goals. 
Just as GIZ is mostly connected to corporations and national governments, 
the Carter Center forms most of its partnerships where it is most comfortable, 
with IGOs and other INGOs. Among its human rights programs, the Carter Center 
works closely with the UN High Commissioners for Human Rights and the 
Brookings Institution's Managing Global Insecurity Initiative. To monitor 
elections in Cote d'Ivoire, the Center collaborates with the Electoral Institute for 
the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA). The partnerships of the case 
study organizations overlap so little because each organization exists within a 
different peer community, with different terminologies, methodologies and 
priorities. 
Consistent with the pattern of organizational expertise, Care's cross-sector 
collaboration takes form as cooperative development projects. For example, its 
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“Diaspora Partnership Program” builds the capacity of local “NGOs, government 
agencies, private sector organizations [and] community-based organizations”, 
implemented in cooperation with “NedSom, a Netherlands-based Somali NGO”. 
Care collaborates with the World Food Program (WFP) on food aid to Somali 
communities; with ICRC, CONCERN and ADRA to deliver emergency water; 
with Save the Children UK and the BBC World Service Trust to provide basic 
education services; and with Save the Children US and Vetereinaires Sans 
Frontieres Suisse to support natural resource management among pastoral 
communities. Within the Care International family, national branches collaborate 
on a project-by-project basis. For example, the Care International Gender 
Network in Somalia includes Care Norway and the Care Regional Management 
Unit for East and Central Africa. Care Somalia, Care Kenya and Care Ethiopia 
cooperate to enhance pastoral livelihoods. 
Several organizations, including Care and Mercy Corps, mention working 
with OCHA, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs. Care explains in a project proposal, “Care and the partner NGOs will 
regularly report the progress of the activities and the humanitarian needs to 
OCHA's emergency coordination meetings”. The office works to make emergency 
relief more coordinated, systematic, predictable and efficient by “assessing 
situations and needs; agreeing on common priorities; developing common 
strategies to address issues such as negotiating access, mobilizing funding and 
other resources; clarifying consistent public messaging; and monitoring progress” 
(ocha.org). While structures like OCHA help to coordinate relief and programs 
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like the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium coordinate conflict-sensitive 
development, very few mechanisms, either formalized or informal, help to 
coordinate multiple actors in direct conflict intervention (mediation, negotiation, 
advocacy, etc). 
Evaluating Success in a Complex System
Organizations depend on evaluations to foster organizational growth, 
create and improve projects, and demonstrate impact to donors, partners and 
future employees. For the most part, organizations tend to report their successes in 
quantitative metrics: the number of people served, number of items distributed, 
number of organizations supported. This preference for numerical success fosters 
overly simplistic, reproducible strategies, rather than long, variable, context-
specific processes. While it may be relatively easy to measure and communicate 
the value of emergency relief and even certain development projects, “projects 
which aim primarily at the promotion of processes rather than products, and 
which target critical yet intangible objectives such as good governance, 
participation, and peacebuidling, are particularly challenging to evaluate” 
(Menkhaus 2002, p. 11). Indicators of abstractions like “good governance” are 
inadequately defined; conditions in conflict, characterized by violence, urgency 
and distrust, impair transparent and open dialogue about project effectiveness; and 
complex causality troubles any links made between NGO activities and progress 
toward peace. 
For many of its projects, Care identifies objectives by which it plans to 
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evaluate its work. In most cases, these are quantitative goals (e.g. “By the end of 
2006, the project will have distributed over 2,500 tons of food and will have 
assisted over 16,590 vulnerable people with food and nutrition education”). 
However, there are several instances of qualitative objectives. For example, Care 
lists “expected project outcomes” of an IDP and refugee reintegration program: 
“peace constituencies are fully functioning and are fully effective; sustainable 
social cohesion and inter-community dialogue is ensured; dignified and 
sustainable reintegration of IDPs is ensured; living conditions of youth and 
women have improved”. No explanation is offered for the process by which Care 
assess its completion of these outcomes. On another project, Care explains that it 
conducts information sessions, dialogues and participatory workshops with its 
field offices and partner organizations to periodically assess and modify its 
programs. This follows the process-oriented form proposed by the Conflict 
Sensitivity Consortium, but does not necessarily ensure the inclusion of local 
perspectives. 
World Vision, by contrast, describes a very informal, locally driven 
evaluation process. Its publication “Small Feet, Deep Prints”, for example, 
“documents lessons learned” from children's involvement in peace work in East 
Africa. Evaluations and conclusions are based on qualitative interviews with 
members of the community affected by the projects: youth participants, parents, 
grassroots community leaders, and local civil society. Evaluators sought to 
document the program's impact on “children's perceptions of peace”, “children's 
perception of militia” and “children's perception of their role in peacebuilding”. 
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While the interviews do not capture the depth and breadth of the impact, they at 
least demonstrate significant community buy-in. For example, one grassroots 
leader draws a contrast between conflict problem-solving before and after the 
project: 
The children have served as a bridge towards minimizing differences 
between communities. People used to fight over water catchment, grazing 
pasture and the like. But ever since the children began to interact and 
socialize with children in other communities, communication lines have 
been opened. We are able to talk openly and hence resolve our differences. 
We no longer fight, we dialogue!
Of all the organizations, Interpeace has the most publicly available records 
on its evaluation methods and outcomes. The organization's focus on academic 
conflict assessment, as well as its history with the UN, both likely contribute to its 
rigorous attention to impacts. In many cases, the organization hires consultants to 
do external evaluations. For example, in 2002, political science professor Ken 
Menkhaus evaluated the “Somaliland Academy for Peace and Development” and 
found that most of the project objectives were met, with even additional value 
added. Nonetheless, Menkhaus documents continued challenges, such as 
communication and cooperation between field and headquarter offices, financial 
management, and staff time management. These conclusions were drawn based 
on three weeks of site visits: 7 days in Nairobi, 13 days in Somaliland and 2 days 
in Geneva. A total of 55 people were interviewed, including staff in field and 
headquarter offices, project participants, government officials, civic leaders, 
donors and staff of international aid agencies. 
Ideally, evaluations should reinforce local autonomy and empowerment, 
enhance interagency communication and collaboration, and contribute to a 
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professional body of knowledge on the do's and don't's of conflict intervention. 
This requires big picture thinking, accepting that evaluation processes will take 
time and resources away from imminent needs provision, while ensuring more 
effective interventions in the long-run. In order to move towards direct conflict 
intervention, NGOs are going to have to prioritize and advance qualitative 
evaluation methods. Menkhaus observes the challenge with which NGOs are 
confronted: “Ironically, at the same time that aid agencies are called upon to 
promote more intangible, process-oriented development goals, they are also under 
growing pressure from both internal monitoring procedures and external donors to 
produce 'measurable outputs'.” Particularly, dialogue for peace, including 
mediation, negotiation and advocacy at all levels of society, does not easily 
translate to measurable results; however, to justify their work and legitimize their 
role as Track II or Track 1.5 mediators, NGOs must test and improve strategies to 
evaluate and communicate intangible outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS: NGOS IN CONFLICT
Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire into the Future
The presence of numerous national and international NGOs operating in 
Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire discredits assertions that these war-torn countries are 
too dangerous for civilian intervention. Case study organizations are conducting a 
wide range of activities in both countries, including emergency relief (e.g. food 
and water delivery, shelter, emergency medical care, drop-in centers for women 
and children) and long-term development (e.g. improvements to education and 
health care, employment and micro-finance, environmental restoration and public 
infrastructure). Some organizations also work to mediate and heal, promoting 
dialogue, advocacy and awareness at multiple levels of society for different 
purposes: recovery from psychological trauma, reconciliation of historical 
divisions between social groups, protection of vulnerable groups, and discourse 
meant to guide warring parties towards peace agreements. Organizations' diverse 
interventions reveal that NGOs are more flexible, pioneering and capable than 
many governments and IGOs acknowledge. 
Nonetheless, organizations demonstrate a limited capacity for context-
specific intervention. Analysis of organizations' society level engagement and 
intervention strategies suggests that organizations are more inclined to apply one-
size-fits-all methods (see figure 8.6). Ideally, organizations would assess a 
conflict, design strategies, implement pilot stages, reassess and modify the 
program, constantly working to maximize impact given the complex and unique 
sociopolitical, cultural, economic and geographic circumstances. While 
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organizations' activities in both countries are virtually identical, there is 
significant variance from one organization to the next. From this we can 
reasonably infer that internal organizational dynamics, such as funding, 
management structure, mission, vision, headquartering country, and 
organizational history, play a bigger role in NGO decision-making than the 
conflict itself. 
The disparity between actual organizational interventions (chapter 8) and 
context-specific approaches with relative consensus in academic literature 
(chapter 5) further reinforces the conclusion that organizations are not as 'conflict 
sensitive' as they could be. For example, the bulk of literature written about 
Somalia wrestles with the resolution of intractable conflict. There are numerous 
books, academic journals, research centers and think tanks on intractability, and 
Somalia is their poster child. Yet, NGO programming in Somalia rarely touches 
on the subject; when NGOs describe the country as a 'failed state', the term is used 
to justify short-term strategies of relief and material development, rather than 
political negotiations or advocacy. Crocker et al. (2009) advises that negotiation 
of intractable conflict should be reinforced with strong incentives; NGOs certainly 
have ample capacity in this regard, able to use material and relational bait to coax 
parties into peaceful discourse. Bar-Tal (2000) emphasizes the psychological 
nature of intractability; civilians and combatants alike develop a persistent ethos 
of violence. Through public outreach, education, and media, NGOs can reinforce 
“psychological infrastructure” such as “truth, which requires open expression of 
the past; mercy, which requires forgiveness for building new relations; justice, 
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which requires restitution and new social restructuring; and peace, which 
underscores common future, well-being and security” (p. 356).
Both political scientists and watchdog organizations, like International 
Alert (IA), express consensus about Somalia's TFG, or Transitional Federal 
Government. Currently, it may be the country's best hope for a stable, centralized 
government, but it is also corrupt and abusive. I found no mention of this reality 
by any of the case study organizations. NGOs could quite easily work to monitor 
the TFG; their local presence lends some authority to their reports. Without taking 
a side or actively advocating against the government, NGOs could certainly 
disseminate factual information about the activities of the government, including 
positive efforts to include other clans and increase transparency, as well as 
destructive instances of corruption. 
Politicized power struggles occur in the country between more than just 
two major groups. Observers have noted resentment among excluded clans for the 
power concentration of the TFG. Within the TFG itself, there is splintering along 
historical divisions. Much of the violence in the south-central region of the 
country results from the insurgent group, al-Shabaab. Thus, mediation, even at the 
elite national level, requires multi-layered approaches to generate peaceful 
dialogue within and among each of these groups. Organizations that wait for 
government invitation, like the Carter Center, are immediately at a disadvantage, 
since they are able to respond to only one of many warring parties. NGOs should 
also be careful not to fall into the trap of calling al-Shabaab a 'rebel terrorist 
group' or assuming the rightful authority of the TFG. Supporting the powerful for 
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no reason other than tradition and stability falls nowhere on the scale between 
impartiality and justice, and is simply not an effective long-term strategy. 
Meanwhile, as organizations monitor and mediate at the national level, 
they might also work to support regional governance, building the capacity of 
local administrators. Many scholars agree that centralized governance, imposed 
by colonialism, simply does not make sense in the highly pluralistic, clan-based 
society. One organization, Horn Relief, has started down this path, bolstering the 
management capacities of pastoral leadership. Their efforts could be expanded 
geographically, to other rural and even urban communities, and substantively, to 
include more than just resource management, but also community development 
and social inclusion. Horn Relief certainly could also use the support of larger 
international NGOs.
The separation and self-declared autonomy of Somaliland and Puntland is 
another political tension aching for reconciliation. Organizations are clear about 
identifying Somaliland, 'the region', excusing themselves from any statement that 
might either recognize or delegitimize the state's independence. This may help 
organizations access vulnerable populations in the short-term, but does little to 
instill healthy communication between the three Somali states. Instead, 
organizations might promote mediation and negotiation through Track II methods 
- problem-solving seminars, public outreach and education, cooperative economic 
development – or Track 1.5, dialogue with government representatives from the 
TFG and official leaders of Somaliland and Puntland. Compared to violence 
between the TFG and al-Shabaab, the border dispute between Somaliland and 
203
Puntland, like the conflict between Somalia proper and the northern states, is 
relatively peaceful. This is a perfect opportunity for NGOs to intervene, build 
trust and prevent further violence through open channels of communication in 
what is otherwise an abeyant conflict. 
Finally, case study organizations are currently doing little to address 
lawlessness, such as “piracy, human smuggling, illegal fighting and dumping of 
toxic waste” (“Somalia: UN Conference” 2011). This reflects an unspoken 
division of labor between governments/ IGOs and NGOs. Because these issues 
involve security concerns, have historically been addressed through military and 
police force, and relate to the rule of law, NGOs likely perceive these problems as 
beyond their purview. However, organizations committed to peace, justice and 
poverty alleviation certainly have a reason to push for solutions to these social 
ills. One approach scholars recommend is economic development along the 
eastern coast of Somalia. While case study organizations have implemented 
development programs in Somaliland, Puntland and Jubaland (in the north, 
northeast and southwest, respectively), they do not report much activity in other 
regions, particularly in the southeast, along the coast where most of the piracy 
occurs. For development to be an effective, stabilizing antidote to piracy, it must 
be geographically strategic. Organizations might also work to disarm civilian 
populations in Somalia to reduce the prevalence of illegal fighting. None of the 
case study organizations reported such a program, although the Mines Advocacy 
Group, one of the 53 NGOs surveyed in Somalia, has a weapons confiscation 
program that might be used as a model for other INGOs working to demilitarize. 
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There are also models for NGO response to human trafficking, even in violent 
conditions. Several organizations in Cote d'Ivoire have programs related to child 
labor, including public outreach, national and international advocacy, and 
alternative livelihoods. These strategies could be modified to address human 
trafficking in Somalia. 
In Cote d'Ivoire, one of the biggest underlying causes of conflict, 
underscored in almost all historical accounts of the country, is the policy of 
ivorité, privileging citizens with two Ivoirian parents. This pits the north, home to 
many immigrants and mixed race minorities, against the south. The concentration 
of urban centers, technology, communication and trade in the south has produced 
resentment, fueling much of the violence over the past decade. Case study 
organizations make surprisingly little mention of the north-south divide, neither in 
terms of development disparity, ethnic tensions, nor militarization. Bariyo (2007) 
urges the international community to support development in the north with an 
eye toward equal outcomes in the South. More organizations should be working 
in the north, even though security, transportation and communication may be 
more difficult. NGOs should also advocate for policies that support poverty 
alleviation to soothe some of the tensions and resentments. Framed as a 
component of post-conflict reconciliation or forward-looking justice, the agenda 
might be approached with more urgency than otherwise. Finally, organizations 
might work toward grassroots mediation and healing, across the cease fire line, 
between immigrant and native communities, between supporters of Ouattara and 
Gbagbo. The International Rescue Committee has begun this work, with 
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counseling and reconciliation for survivors of violence. This should be extended 
to include all communities, and focused not only on the trauma of violence, but 
also, on deeper issues, related to resources, history, identity, and belief systems. 
On International Alert's website, the country profile of Cote d'Ivoire has an 
icon of a dove, to symbolize recently achieved peace. To many observers, the 
capture of former President Laurent Gbagbo in late April was a national victory. 
The democratically elected President Alassane Ouattara now holds office and pro-
Gbagbo troops have markedly demobilized. However, this does not guarantee 
lasting peace and stability. For NGOs, this should a critical moment; violence has 
subsided to the extent that organizations can operate with fewer security concerns, 
and the country's future depends on the quality of transitional justice today. As 
Amnesty International reports, Ivorians have endured immense suffering over the 
past six months, including death, disease, displacement, and, particularly, war 
crimes and mass human rights violations. In order to facilitate healing and prevent 
future violence, NGOs should promote fact-finding missions, truth commissions, 
reconciliation and public negotiation. Here, they will need to apply the careful 
balance between peace and justice, moving away from retribution and punishment 
toward restoration and protection. At the level of national elites, this might 
manifest as dialogue between the existing Ouattara-led government and Forces 
Nouvelles, and within the splintering pro-Ouattara coalition. However, this post-
conflict work should also traverse vertical constituencies; organizations should 
make an effort to integrate government, civil society and grassroots, fostering 
communication despite boundaries of social status, custom and power. The Carter 
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Center has initiated this effort; “national meetings” gather political and civil 
society leaders. However, these have been predominantly election-focused. Since 
the violence in December 2010, the Center regressed to monitoring and 
observation. Now, the Center, along with other NGOs in the country (for whom 
peace and mediation should be equally concerning), should resume dialogue for a 
peaceful transition. Post-conflict discourse might also be accompanied by 
demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. 
Even though pro-Ouattara groups emerged victorious in the election, DDR 
programs should equally emphasize both armed groups so as not to exacerbate 
animosity of pro-Gbagbo supporters. 
Now that the crisis is over, it is easy for Cote d'Ivoire to slip out of the 
international spotlight. To ensure that peace sticks, that wrongs during the months 
of violence are acknowledged, that the material and psychological needs of 
populations are met, and that the government is transparent and inclusive, NGOs 
should push to keep Cote d'Ivoire in the media. Specifically, they should report on 
human conditions, governance, peacebuilding efforts, and policy needs. When 
advocating for the needs of communities beset by violence or famine, it is 
inadequate to urge international actors to 'do something'. NGOs' advocacy during 
conflict too often takes form as vague petitions for support. Instead, organizations 
should capitalize on their local expertise and reputation for upholding values, 
stating precisely who should do what. 
These country-specific recommendations are limited by research methods. 
Organizations' websites and publications indicate how organizations view and 
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present themselves, but do not provide adequately thorough information about 
organizations' activities and impacts. More research is needed from scholars 
operating in-country, able to evaluate first-hand the range, scale and efficacy of 
NGO conflict interventions, with specific attention context sensitivity, direct 
peace efforts, and persistent challenges such as security, cross-sector collaboration 
and evaluation. 
Hypotheses Re-Examined
Chapter 1 introduced three hypotheses to begin to narrow in on the 
question, what can NGOs do to end violent conflict and create long-term 
sustainable peace, while minimizing the negative impacts of their work: 
1. The dispersion of power in society dictates the social level at which NGOs 
operate.
2. NGO intervention is most direct during the earliest stages of conflict. 
3. NGOs prioritize the needs of vulnerable populations such as women and 
racial minorities. 
The actions of case study NGOs do not fully support any of these 
hypotheses. Pertaining to hypotheses 1 and 2, organizations' activities do not 
differ greatly from one country to the next. Although this was not the expected 
conclusion, it is still significant, because it suggests that organizations are less 
context sensitive than they should be, applying strategies based on internal 
organizational dynamics, rather than local conditions, such as the dispersion of 
power in society or the stage of conflict. Overall, organizations spend more time 
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working at the grassroots than with civil society or national elites, with no 
correlation between the dispersion of power in society and the societal-level of 
NGOs' intervention. Direct NGO intervention, mediation, negotiation, and 
advocacy, is rare; organizations are more comfortable with meeting basic needs. I 
found no clear correlation between the stage of conflict and the use of direct 
intervention. 
Nonetheless, theoretical literature and the reports of think tanks like 
International Alert, the Do No Harm Project and the Conflict Sensitivity 
Consortium, all support the normative version of hypotheses 1 and 2, that 
organizations should engage at the level of power dispersion in society and 
intervene most directly in earliest stages conflict. Observers advocate elite 
mediation in Cote d'Ivoire, where power is concentrated in the national 
government, but emphasize local administrators and civil society in Somalia, 
where power is decentralized across clans and regions. Similarly, observers 
underscore the importance of conflict prevention, early warning and early 
response, where violence is low, and communities have not yet internalized an 
ethos of violence. The discrepancy between normative conclusions in support of 
hypotheses 1 and 2, and NGO activities which do not reflect either hypothesis, 
suggests and opportunity for NGO growth. In order to maximize their 
effectiveness, organizations should: design conflict interventions with most 
attention to the level of society at which power is most concentrated and focus 
their efforts during the very earliest moments of violence. 
Case study analysis partially supports the third hypothesis: NGOs are 
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certainly out-spoken advocates for vulnerable populations, but they choose their 
beneficiaries with caution. For example, organizations support women, but not 
lesbians or sex workers; children, but not the disabled; pastoral communities, but 
not ethnic minorities. The frequent inclusion of women's issues in conflict 
intervention is a fortunate carry-over from women's empowerment development 
frameworks: capacity building of women's organizations, support for girls in 
school, microfinance programs for women, vocational training, local awareness 
campaigns about violence against women. Only Interpeace follows the advice of 
Butalia (2004), advocating for the inclusion of women's voices and issues in 
mediation processes. 
As Non-Marxist Radical Thought explains, the needs of vulnerable 
populations – ethnic, racial, tribal, religious, or sexual minorities, refugees, IDPs, 
and the extremely impoverished – are often at the heart of conflicts. Their 
oppression perpetuates resentment, spurring violence. Yet, case study 
organizations tend to prioritize impartiality over protection, siding with the status 
quo whenever the treatment of vulnerable populations intersects with central 
conflict issues. This strategy only serves short-term basic needs, not long-term 
peace or justice. When the behaviors of warring parties or the policies of a 
particular political leader produce or reinforce inequalities, NGOs should be 
active advocates, calling for non-violent solutions to social exclusion. 
Collaboration, Rhetoric, and the Profession of Peacebuilding
Theorists and NGOs alike agree that collaboration is an essential precursor 
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to peace. Donors – foundations, corporations and governments – further reinforce 
the organizations' commitment to cooperative program design, preferentially 
supporting NGOs that can demonstrate instances of collaboration. As a result, 
case study NGOs have formed numerous partnerships with local civil society, 
international NGOs, the host country government, other foreign governments, and 
corporations. However, these partnerships often seem to be “alliances of 
convenience”, based on resource sharing and a strict division of labor (Last 1995, 
para 25). 
Case study NGOs form collaborations based on their comfort zone, with 
other actors who share their own theory of action. GIZ partners with Western 
governments and multinational corporations. The Carter Center aligns with IGOs 
and other INGOs. Care cooperates with other relief and development agencies, as 
well as local civil society focused on women's empowerment. Interpeace partners 
with other academic-cum-practitioner agencies specializing in peace. NGOs need 
to push themselves to work beyond their comfort zones, to generate collaborations 
across sectors, at different levels of society, and with actors with different 
priorities. Chapter 8 identified at least 50 INGOs / large national NGOs actively 
operating in each country; there is no reason why these organizations could not all 
collaborate. The Somalia NGO Consortium has had some success in this regard, 
gaining recognition for NGOs' peace work, providing collective security for 
organizations. However, this Consortium is still primarily focused on 
development work (rather than direct conflict intervention). Its activities remain 
project-driven, and there are few reported instances of staff at different member 
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organizations meeting for critical discussions in person. 
I agree with the conclusions of Ricigliano (2003) that organizations need a 
loosely defined network or regional body for coordinating conflict interventions. 
In particular, organizations might form a network for direct conflict intervention: 
mediation, negotiation and advocacy. OCHA, the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Action, already works to synchronize emergency relief efforts. Its 
existence champions humanitarian relief as an adequate response to conflict. A 
similar agency is needed, not only to generate integrated, strategic and 
collaborative peace work, but also to legitimize and advance the idea that NGOs 
can work directly to instill peace. 
Because direct conflict intervention does not fit either Realist or Liberalist 
ideals about NGOs' roles in conflict, such a network may face significant 
resistance from the international community. However, NGOs' interventions are 
supported by increasingly accepted alternative theories, such as Track diplomacy 
(Track 2, Track 1.5 and Multi-track), constructivism, critical theory, and non-
marxist radical thought. Moreover, enough organizations have begun the work of 
civilian diplomacy, operating on the margins but achieving successful outcomes, 
that there is ample evidence for the value of NGOs in direct conflict intervention. 
As Ricigliano advocates, this regional body should not be a source of 
added rules, institutionalization, or established procedures. As seen in chapter 4, 
most of the advantages of NGOs comes from the fact that they are not official, not 
institutionalized, with set procedures of operation. Instead, organizations should 
use the regional body as an informal mechanism to promote dialogue. 
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Organizations need conversations to identify, in each country of conflict, what is 
being done, what needs are met, what gaps exist, what works and does not. NGOs 
should not have to reinvent the wheel, learning how to be sensitive to the specific 
country context, how to evaluate or provide security given local conditions. 
Communication would generate collective knowledge, and thus, more strategic 
responses.
Further, organizations should also dialogue about discourse itself, 
acknowledging that the rhetoric they use both reflects and impacts the choices 
they make and the way they view the problem. Although case study organizations 
ostensibly share goals – peace and poverty alleviation in Cote d'Ivoire and 
Somalia – it does not take extensive analysis to see that they are literally speaking 
different languages. The terminology associated with rhetorical peace and conflict 
families (peacekeeping, conflict management, etc.) is used to refer to a range of 
activities. These 'branded', technical terms link into extensive theory and networks 
of professionals. However, when organizations use the terms in their colloquial 
sense (e.g. 'transforming conflict' without implying 'conflict transformation' 
theories, per se), they fail to precisely communicate their strategies and priorities.
In many instances, organizations use technical terms interchangeably, 
unintentionally muddling the needs and prerogatives of the peace process. For 
example, conflict transformation, compared to conflict resolution, emphasizes the 
critical role of dialogue, policy and service provision to solve underlying 
inequalities driving the conflict; this does not make conflict transformation 
synonymous with grassroots development. Similarly, 'conflict', the value-neutral 
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expression of discord between groups in society, should not be mistaken for 
'violence', a uniformly destructive product of unhealthy conflict, or 'dispute', a 
disagreement, less complicated than 'conflict', which can be readily resolved 
through dialogue. 
Academic literature over the past two decades has trended toward conflict 
transformation theories, promoting on-going dialogue, discourse across vertical 
and horizontal constituencies, with attention to the diverse social, structural, 
political and psychological domains of conflict. Regardless, organizations 
continue to use 'conflict mitigation', 'management' and 'resolution', approaches 
which numerous scholars have identified as outmoded, blunt tools that do not 
yield sustainable peace. Based on the range of activities with which organizations 
associate these terms, there does not seem to be a very clear understanding about 
their meaning or significance. Interorganizational conferences on conflict 
transformation rhetoric, theories and methods would help to: clarify the 
distinction between branded and conventional definitions (e.g. 'transformation' in 
the economic and religious sense), promote social justice-minded approaches to 
conflict work; encourage organizations to work collaboratively on conflict 
intervention and generate a collective identity for the profession. 
Beyond the peace and conflict family of terms, two important rhetorical 
changes are necessarily to legitimize and advance NGOs' direct conflict 
intervention: 'humanitarian' does not mean emergency relief, and 'political' does 
not mean self-aggrandizing. The invocation of 'humanity' is a powerful ideational 
tool for NGO activity, generating collaboration and cementing social movements. 
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Chapters 1 and 4 underscore the idea that emergency relief is not the ticket to 
long-term social good. Thus, if organizations are to achieve peace, poverty 
alleviation or justice for humanity, they will have to be more aggressive, 
calculating and political. We might, for example, begin to speak of 'humanitarian 
mediation': facilitated negotiation driven by an external observer with no intrinsic 
preference for either party, but with explicit adherence to values of non-violence 
and social equality. 
Interpeace offers a rhetorical link that might be consciously advanced as a 
way to coalesce conflict transformation and politicized peace work as a 
profession. The staffmembers of the organization are 'peacebuilders'. A brief 
survey of other organizations indicates that the term is gaining ground. 
Organizations like No Women No War, UNOY (the United Network of Young 
Peacebuilders), and the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders have all begun 
to self-identify with the term. Many organizations in conflict only self-identify 
with relief and development terminology, indicating a lack of conflict sensitivity. 
A professional rhetoric and identity of peace would help to instill conflict 
sensitivity to all development interventions, whether during war, or as conflict 
prevention / reconstruction. The direct conflict intervention regional network or 
the interorganizational conflict transformation seminars are both excellent spaces 
to solidify the identification of conflict intervenors as 'peacebuilders'. 
Generations of Peace Work
To reinforce ideas presented elsewhere in a format more conducive to 
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discussion and application beyond theoretical work, I propose a categorical 
classification for peace intervention, five 'generations of peace work'. This 
categorization, like Assefa's analysis in Figure 2.2, values proactive, long-term 
approaches to conflict intervention. Each generation is successively more 
desirable for the pursuit of peace, with Generation 5 the ideal form: 
1. Emergency relief.
2. Project-oriented development work.
3. Collaborative, integrated, empowering development work.
4. Development work, coupled with mediation, negotiation and advocacy.
5. Advocacy, service delivery and dialogue that is flexible, integrated, 
collaborative, locally driven, and conflict sensitive, intended to address 
underlying needs, transform conflict into productive discourse, end 
violence, and promote structural changes across all levels of society. 
One argument against NGO involvement in generation 5 peace work says 
that NGOs cannot do everything (Walsh 1996). If an organization is focused on 
medical care to refugees, for example, they should not also try to intervene in 
rural housing or advocate for minority rights. This argument relies on the false, 
albeit common belief that social issues can be isolated, “hermetically sealed from 
influencing each other” (DeMars 2005, p. 6). In reality, social issues interact in 
various, complex ways. The idea that NGOs can singularly specialize in one issue 
area, without attention to or flexibility in other areas, is an illusion born of post-
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industrial capitalism, useful for assembly-line widget production, but not so 
functional for achieving social objectives like poverty alleviation. 
Case study NGOs offer many examples of generations 1-4 on a program-
by-program basis; an organization does not necessarily operate at one generation. 
For example, Horn Relief delivers water and non-food items – generation 1 work. 
It also has project-oriented cash-for-work programs (generation 2), grassroots 
education in natural resource management, human health, and leadership 
development, in partnership with local women's organizations (generation 3), and 
advocacy for environmental protection, coupled with governance and resource 
management in pastoral communities (generation 4). Some organizations tend to 
work at a particular generation. World Vision, for example, works primarily in 
generation 1 (although it has programs in generation 2 and 3 as well). By contrast, 
Caritas International spends most of its time in generation 4. While some 
programs trend toward generation 5 work, no organizations might be so classified. 
Fifth generation peace work requires integration or 'big picture' thinking, with 
seamless collaboration and strategic cooperation, rather than an arbitrary division 
of labor. Thus, no single organization can achieve generation 5 peace work alone.
In order to move toward generation 5 peace work,  I tentatively conclude 
that organizations should: 
Cultivate Impartiality, but not Neutrality
NGOs and scholars alike underscore the importance of maintaining 
impartiality as third-party mediators. Preferential treatment toward either party is 
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a sure recipe for mistrust, breaking lines of communication that might otherwise 
facilitate peace. Undoubtedly, organizations must tread cautiously, so as not to 
lose their only source of legitimacy – moral and intellectual expertise. 
However, the imperative for impartiality should not be – and too often is – 
confused with neutrality. Impartiality means organizations should harbor no 
inherent preference for either candidate in an election, or warring party in a battle. 
This does not mean they should act without opinion as to the events and outcomes 
of the conflict. Organizations should be adamantly biased in favor of peacefully 
conducted conflict, justice and the rule of law, and biased against violence, abuse 
and violations of human rights. Impartiality requires adherence to 'higher' values, 
over political parties. It does not excuse an organization from pursuing social 
progress and speaking about injustice, either active abuse, such as rape or child 
enslavement, or passive violations, such as the failure to meet the needs of the 
famished. 
Promote Security through Adherence to Mission
Impartiality over neutrality is not only a programmatic approach, but also 
a security strategy as well. Adherence to values without political preference 
makes an organization predictable and consistent; it enables honesty and 
transparency. An organization with explicit and well-publicized values can more 
easily facilitate negotiation, and its presence reduces, rather than amplifies 
tensions. The organization can demand – and itself obey – a principled 
nonviolence, a separate and unrelated matter from the underlying issues in 
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conflict. NGOs can communicate: 'we acknowledge that both sides have valid 
concerns and we should continue this conflict through dialogue, but as an 
organization, we will do everything our power to stop this violence, not because 
we necessarily disagree with the cause of the instigating party, but because we 
stand against the destruction and suffering wrought by violence itself.' In this way, 
communities learn to trust organizations, certain that they will never be harmed by 
the NGO regardless of political affiliations or preferences. As long as NGOs are 
persistent in this message and similarly reflect this message in its actions, neither 
civilians nor combatants will have a reason to harm the organization or its staff. 
To do so would merely shame the party at fault. 
Avant (2007) advocates for mission-driven security as a centerpiece to a 
three-pronged approach of acceptance, deterrence and protection. Like Avant, I 
agree that organizations should make security decisions based not on safety of 
their staff, per se (they would certainly be safer at home), but on the optimal 
realization of the mission. Moreover, I contend that deterrence and the pursuit of 
peace are not mutually compatible activities. An unarmed staff member walking 
into a community where it has developed trust and local connections will be 
infinitely safer than an armed organizational crew, protected by private security 
guards, driving in a bullet-proof vehicle, unknown by the community because the 
organizational headquarters is isolated and under surveillance. Communities must 
be able to trust that the NGO will always reject violence and promote peaceful 
dialogue regardless the circumstances. Carrying a gun is no way to convey a 
principled abstention from violence. In order for this security strategy to work, 
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organizations have to be absolutely certain to abide by their own principles, never 
resorting to violence, or even militarized deterrence as a mechanism for securing 
their staff. 
Promote Non-Violent Methods of Navigating Conflict
Abstaining from violence is only half the work, only negative peace. 
Positive peace, the presence of social justice and inclusion, requires more than 
principled non-violence. Societies also need alternative methods to work through 
conflict, an inevitable and healthy byproduct of the reality that no community is 
utopian. Organizations should promote non-violent methods of conducting 
conflict. Standard, institutionalized methods include elite dialogue, elections and 
judicial procedures. Many organizations, like the Carter Center, Interpeace, GIZ 
and Care, are engaged in monitoring and supporting these processes. However, 
these processes often exclude marginalized populations and rely on 
representative, rather than discursive democracy. Thus, organizations should also 
support more grassroots methods of working through conflict non-violently, 
including rallies, marches, protests, demonstrations, labor strikes and free, active, 
public media. Although these activities are often suppressed during war for fear of 
amplifying violence, they are part of a solution, rooted in the belief that pluralism, 
disagreement and discourse are vital to a peaceful society. 
Develop Context-Specific Responses to Conflict
One frequently absent component of NGO conflict intervention is a well-
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developed, clearly communicated sensitivity to the context of the conflict. 
Currently, organizations tend to describe local conditions as a play-by-play of 
major events: battles, attacks, body counts, official mediations, and peace 
agreements. These are important considerations and a certain step above blind 
imposition of aid without concern for political context. However, the exclusion of 
minority needs, rural perspectives, or civilians' stake in the conflict produces an 
oversimplified view of conflict causes; noncombatants may be 'innocent' in the 
sense that they do not wield guns, but they rarely lack opinions about the 
outcomes of the disagreement. Understanding of the causes of conflict are often 
reported in terms of historical imperatives (e.g. Somalia has always been a place 
of clan-based anarchy) or national elections (e.g. people resent that Gbagbo has 
overstayed his term). Conflicts, particularly contemporary intrastate, intractable 
conflicts, are far more complex, with numerous competing and mutually 
reinforcing causes, further exacerbated by the persistence of violence, the 
accumulation of resentments and the devolution of productive dialogue and 
structures for public welfare. 
Depending on the situation, context-awareness might also include 
culturally appropriate strategies, such as traditional conflict mediation. Zartman 
(2002) explains that most traditional mediation practices follow the modern third 
party conflict mediation form, but with a strong emphasis on inclusion and 
integration. Responsibility for conflict is placed not on the perpetrators – one side 
or group – but on the whole society for engendering conditions that led to 
conflict. Mediation occurs through the normative force of the community, based 
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on a universal desire for the wholeness of the social unit; justice is served only as 
a “compensation for loss, not a retribution for offense”. This might be an 
opportunity for two-way training, wherein NGOs educate the community on 
conflict resolution methods and human rights, and conversely, the community 
trains the NGO in local customs and mediation methods, to generate more 
egalitarian partnerships. 
Work at Quadrants II and IV
Figure 8.5B (see below) presents the distribution of potential interventions 
over perpendicular axes of society-level engagement and intervention strategy 
from basic needs to direct efforts. Ideally, organizations' activities should be 
evenly distributed across all four quadrants, addressing basic needs and 
intervening directly at all levels of society. However, case study organizations 
tend to operate only in quadrants I and III, either meeting basic needs at the 
grassroots or intervening directly at the national level. Organizations should work 
to fill the gaps, increasing their involvement in  basic needs provision at the 
national level (via policy, infrastructure, training) and direct peace work at the 
grassroots (e.g. community-level mediation, public outreach and advocacy). 
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Barnes (2005) suggests that elite mediation might seek grassroots input for 
more multi-layered peace work (across quadrants I and IV). NGOs might survey 
individuals, with particular attention to traditionally silenced subgroups, asking: 
“what needs to change for you to enjoy full and abundant lives in terms of 
country, community and individual?” Similarly, NGOs might ask each warring 
party to identify what they stand for, what they hope for, and what they envision 
in the future, rather than what they are against. All this begins to develop common 
ground from which future negotiations may proceed. These kinds of 
conversations can occur during service delivery, as well, integrated basic needs 
and direct efforts. The quadrants do not have to be mutually exclusive. All 
activities, whether focused on material needs or long-term peacebuidling, have the 
potential to build trust and social integration if conducted with a sensitivity and 
awareness to the multi-dimensional process. 
Educate Donors about Direct Conflict Intervention
Organizations' activities vary greatly depending on internal dynamics. 
Based on qualitative analysis of case study organizations, there seems to be a 
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strong correlation between the country in which an INGO headquarters and the 
societal level at which the organization engages, and between an organizations' 
primary funding source and its intervention strategy. Organizations 
headquartering in the U.S. are more likely to work to meet basic needs than 
organizations headquartering elsewhere. Similarly, organizations with strong 
government funding are more likely to operate at the national level, while 
organizations heavily reliant on individual donors are more likely to act at the 
grassroots. In other words, donors and constituencies back home have a big 
influence on organizational decision-making. Although not the most rational state 
of affairs in terms of conflict response, this is not a surprising result; organizations 
depend on donors for their continued existence. 
However, if NGOs are not careful, organizations' priorities can be co-
opted by donors' whims, both real and perceived. Programs that meet basic needs 
are more compelling and easier to sell in two-sentence sound bites than complex, 
politicized, locally sensitive strategies for long-term peace and justice. This is 
almost certainly a contributing factor to the current organizational preference for 
basic needs provision (generation 1 and 2 work). In order to move towards 
generation 5, organizations cannot pander to donors' wishes, cannot rely on 
'upward accountability', but instead must pursue higher values and rational 
theories of action. They should proactively educate donors about the importance 
of direct conflict intervention. They need to develop snappy ways to market peace 
dialogue, gather heart-wrenching stories to engage observers, and hone methods 
of qualitative evaluation to demonstrate the impact of process-based activities. 
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Get Political
One of the reasons many organizations shy away from direct conflict 
intervention is fear of the 'p' word. Case study NGOs describe their work as 
humanitarian, impartial, principled, inclusive, respectful and disciplined, but 
never 'political'. It is true that organizations acting as impartial third-party 
mediators should not seek to influence election outcomes or preference one party 
or candidate, but as an ethos of action, politics are imperative for long-term 
impact. This means organizations must be willing to engage with the 
controversial, take sides on social issues, and participate in discourse about the 
just distribution of power and resources. They should advocate for the needs of all 
vulnerable populations, not just the ones that are internationally recognized and 
politically safe to defend. When petitioning action by the international 
community, NGOs should be specific; generic calls for intervention (the 'do 
something' plea) are not compelling and do not maximize NGOs' potential as 
local experts and moral ambassadors. In order to achieve any mission related to 
peace, justice or poverty alleviation, NGOs must promote forward-looking justice 
through positive-sum, cooperative mediation processes, guided by clear values 
and expectations. As Interpeace proclaims, “Strengthening the foundations of a 
society that has been torn apart by conflict is not business as usual”. The 
manifestation and preservation of peace requires only the most aggressive, 
outspoken, honest and principled work an organization can possibly muster. 
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Creating Lasting Peace
This thesis theoretically justifies a political role for nongovernmental 
organizations in conflict, explores approaches to the major challenges these 
organizations face, and analyzes public data from ten large NGOs in two countries 
of conflict. I draw tentative conclusions about trends, tendencies and gaps in NGO 
conflict intervention. A larger case study sample would produce more verifiable 
conclusions and would illuminate different models and approaches. Organizations 
vary so greatly in their strategies that generalizations and tendencies are only 
useful to a point. As this research demonstrates, an organization's internal reality 
has more impact on its decision-making than field conditions. 
While this research assesses organizations' public self-presentation, in-
person interviews would be needed to capture motivations behind organizational 
decision-making and the local and international impact of projects and programs. 
Particularly, interviewees should include NGO staffmembers, both in the field and 
in headquarter offices, donors, local partners, staff of IGOs, and individuals from 
affected communities. Academics in either peace and conflict studies or 
transnational NGO management might take interest in such research. In particular, 
I believe there is greatest need for more sophisticated models to classify NGOs' 
role in conflict, and more precise, universal rhetoric for describing the kind of 
proactive, holistic strategies crucial for peace. 
One critical perspective beyond the scope of this particular thesis is the 
importance of advocating for changes in transnational society. Here, I discuss how 
NGOs might produce peace and justice within a singular country context. 
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Realizing world peace will also require efforts at the international scale to 
redistribute power and resources, right transnational injustices and stem human 
rights violations caused by IGOs, multinational corporations, and socioeconomic 
systems beyond the purview of any one government. As Albin (2009) writes, “The 
international community is at times portrayed too narrowly focused on containing 
conflict in and stabilizing particular trouble areas without working to reduce 
global inequalities on which peace ultimately depends” (p. 580). Although I do 
not discuss this role for NGOs in this thesis, it should not detract from the 
significance of this type of civilian peacebuilding. 
Within the singular context of a country of conflict, I hope to see NGOs 
following through with their lofty rhetoric, really “getting to the root of the 
problem”. The complex and numerous conflicts of today's hyper-pluralistic 
society are not to be fixed with food aid or primary education or even project-
based mediation. Instead, organizations need to design innovative, dynamic 
strategies, integrated collaborative, and conflict sensitive interventions that 
address poverty, human rights violations and violence simultaneously, with 
explicit recognition that these forces are concomitant and mutually reinforcing. 
This level of complex analysis in an aid industry driven by sound bites and heart-
wrenching pictures necessitates a change of pace.
As constructivism offers, “humans are capable of changing the world by 
changing ideas” (Karns 2004, p. 50). The most powerful impact of an NGO is not 
in items it delivers, the wound it heals or the children it educates, but in the 
symbolic ideas it promotes, in the implicit messages its actions convey. 
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Organizations must be astutely aware of the symbolic implications of their work: 
when they enter and leave a country, what weapons they wield, what words they 
use, and with whom they interact. NGOs are not a uniformly welcome presence in 
global civil society; competition for resources, short-sightedness, and corruption 
plague these organizations as readily as any other international actors. Yet, if 
constantly attentive to the political implications of their conflict intervention, 
NGOs can be a powerful force for peace and justice. 
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Advocacy: the promotion of a cause, with intent to inspire action by an 
individual, government, intergovernmental organization (IGO), corporation, or 
informal association. As Lindenberg and Bryant (2001) explain, “advocacy work 
entails moving beyond implementation programs to help those in need, to actually 
taking up and defending the causes of others and speaking out to the public on 
another's behalf” (p. 173). While this has typically been a marginal activity in 
comparison to direct service provision, NGOs are increasingly engaged in 
advocacy, with activities including research, education, outreach, consciousness-
raising, public dialogue, lobbying, and policy change.
Arbitration: a method of conflict settlement in which warring parties 
select a third party arbitrator, usually a tribunal of international experts. Once 
guidelines of the arbitration have been negotiated, the arbitrator listens to both 
sides and stipulates terms of a peace agreement (Bilder 2007). This differs from 
mediation, in which a third party facilitates negotiation but provides no solution, 
and juridical settlement, in which adjudication follows procedures established by 
international law through an existing international court.
Conflict: explicit disagreement between two or more parties. Although the 
term is often conflated with violent war, conflict, as defined here, can be either 
violent or peaceful (non-violent). Examples of peaceful conflict include labor 
strikes, political protests and social movements. Theories have been developed to 
explain both the causes of conflict, and the evolution from peaceful conflict to 
violence. 
Conflict management: action, usually by an intergovenmental organization 
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(IGO), in response to the outbreak of violent conflict. Lepgold (2003) identifies 
three methods of conflict management: “multilateral diplomacy, peacekeeping, 
and multilateral enforcement” (p. 12). Only multilateral diplomacy seeks to 
resolve violence peacefully; the latter two methods employ coercive force to 
reduce violence.
Conflict prevention: efforts to avert the outbreak or recurrence of violent 
conflict. Activities can be classified as “operational prevention”, strategies to stem 
the tide of violence, or “structural prevention”, strategies to resolve underlying 
causes of conflict (Barnes 2005, p. 12). Bakker (2001) makes a slightly different 
distinction, between “light prevention”, diplomacy to forestall violence, and “deep 
prevention”, building domestic or regional capacity to respond to conflict. 
Prevention activities may include grassroots-level conflict mediation, 
consciousness-building, healing and restoration of social tensions, human rights 
monitoring and advocacy, and development work aimed at equality and justice. 
Conflict resolution: a method of reducing violence through constructive 
deliberation. At least three core ideas have emerged from the field: all conflicts 
can be cognitively reframed as problems with mutually tolerable solutions; third 
party mediators can help warring groups reach peace settlements; and effective 
mediation is a learned skill, not an innate personality trait (Kriesberg 2007). 
Conflict transformation: a process in which conflict is replaced with 
“positive relationships, such as satisfaction, cooperation, empathy and 
interdependece between parties” (Zartman 2007, p. 13). John Paul Lederach 
contends that conflict transformation is a more holistic approach than conflict 
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resolution, “concerned with broader social structures, change and moving toward 
a social space open for cooperation for more just relationships and for non-violent 
mechanisms for handling conflict” (qtd in Rupesinghe 1995, p. xiii). 
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR): one of the many 
objectives of post-conflict peacebuilding, DDR includes collecting and 
repurposing weapons, splintering armed forces, and reintegrating combatants to 
peaceful roles in society (Bariyo 2007). The 'R' in DDR may include resettlement, 
employment, education or counseling. It is a dynamic and challenging task; “the 
demobilized person [is] not merely a soldier to be disarmed or restrained, nor a 
person with psychological needs, but a person on a journey to seek restoration and 
healing, embedded in a society that is seeking the same” (Lederach 1998, p. 245). 
Often, disarmament and demobilization are predicated on promises of 
reintegration never fulfilled (Faltas and Paes 2005). Lederach (1998) considers 
this a fatal mistake, and contends that reintegration may be the most essential 
component of peacebuilding efforts. 
International Governmental Organization (IGO): an organization, 
formally created under international law, with at least three members states and 
multiple states of operations (Karns and Mingst 2004). Examples include the 
United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), and the World Bank. The Yearbook of  
International Organizations estimates 250 IGOs as of 2011. 
International Nongovernmental Organization (INGO): a nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) operating across multiple countries, usually with 
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headquarters in the global North and activities in the global South. Many INGOs 
are structured as organizational 'families', with an international branch that 
oversees a variety of country branches (e.g. Care International, Care UK, Care 
France, etc). 
Intervention: third party involvement in a dispute or conflict within or 
between countries. This is a catch-all term for diverse forms of conflict response, 
ranging from humanitarian relief and development to conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding. Chapter 4 will outline three categories of intervention strategy as 
defined by Kuchinsky (1999): response to basic human needs; indirect efforts 
including education and capacity building; and direct efforts such as mediation 
and advocacy. 
Intractable conflict: episodic bouts of violence that reoccur and defy 
efforts to settle through a peace process. Civilians are often the main targets of the 
violence and armed forces have the autonomy to “pursue their unilateral 
objectives free from considerations of cost or risk” (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 
2009, p. 493). In addition to the initiating causes of a dispute, intractable conflicts 
self-perpetuate through aggravated poverty, polarized civil society, habitual 
violence, and failure of previous efforts at peace. Abeyant intractable conflict, a 
similar concept, describes conditions in which violence has been suspended, but 
underlying causes of conflict remain unresolved. 
Mediation: a method of third party intervention in conflict, in which a 
mediator (an individual, state, IGO, or NGO) facilitates conversation between 
clashing parties. Mediators strive to direct parties toward an agreement that will 
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allow for peaceful coexistence. However, mediators, unlike arbitrators, cannot 
promote one solution above another (Bariyo 2007).
Nongovernmental Organization (NGO): a voluntary, formalized 
association of citizens working outside the state and market to achieve 
sociopolitical objectives (see previous section for more detail). This refers to any 
such organization at the local, national or international level. 
Peace: desirable conditions in society; the existence or continuation of 
social life without violence. Friedrich (2007) distinguishes between negative 
peace, or the absence of society-level violent conflict, and positive peace, which 
“relies on respect for human rights, ecological concerns, education and economic 
well-being” (p. 5). Negative peace is achieved through conflict resolution and 
peacekeeping, while processes of conflict transformation and peacebuilding aim 
to generate positive peace. 
Peace advocacy: citizen advocacy, including research, education, 
outreach, consciousness-raising, public dialogue, lobbying, and policy change, 
meant either to prevent, stop or reduce violence, or to promote social justice. This 
is the primary activity of peace and conflict resolution organizations (P/CROs), a 
counterpart to mediation and peace-oriented service provision.
Peace and Conflict Resolution Organization (P/CRO): a marginal type of 
NGO characterized by direct intervention in conflict with the aim of ending 
violence and promoting lasting peace. These organizations may focus on 
“consciousness-raising, changing attitudes regarding the conflicts,” reaching out 
to the 'enemy', advocacy, mediation, or dialogue (Gidron 2002, p. 5). Service 
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delivery may also be a component of their work, but only when used deliberately 
as a strategy to secure peace. 
Peacebuilding: a post-conflict process intended to lay the foundations for 
sustainable peace through reconciliation, disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration of forces (DDR), transitional justice, human rights monitoring, and 
poverty alleviation. Lederach (2001) explains that peacebuilding should occur at 
all levels in society: at the grassroots (“local peace commissions, grassroots 
training, prejudice reduction, and psychosocial work in post-war trauma”), middle 
(“problem-solving workshops, training in conflict resolution, peace commissions, 
and insider-partial teams”), and national level (“high-level negotiations, cease-
fire, highly visible, single mediator”) (p. 844). Whereas peacemaking and conflict 
resolution focus on the moment of settlement, peacebuilding approaches peace as 
an on-going pursuit, mutually entangled with social justice.
Peacekeeping: operations conducted by UN peacekeeping military and 
civilian forces intended to ensure the cessation of violence. Diehl, Druckman and 
Wall (1998) describe twelve categories of peacekeeping missions: observation, 
collective enforcement, election supervision, humanitarian assistance during 
conflict, nation building (restoration of law and order), pacification (forcibly 
separating belligerents), preventive deployment, arms control verification, 
protective services, intervention in the support of democracy, and sanctions 
enforcement. 
Peacemaking: efforts to end conflict and secure a peace settlement through 
non-violent means, such as mediation, negotiation, arbitration or adjudication 
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(Doyle 1998). The term peacemaking is generally used in reference to action by 
the UN and is considered a political or diplomatic counterpart to peacekeeping. 
Reconciliation: a cognitive change, produced through negotiation or 
mediation, such that warring parties no longer rest their identities on the negation 
of the other. Reconciliation requires “a revision of each group's narrative so that it 
can accommodate the identity of the other” (Kelman 2007, p. 78). Ideally, groups 
will build “positive interdependence”, such that both parties view each other as 
beneficial, even essential, to their own identities.
Rehabilitation: a process of restoring and improving psychosocial 
conditions of a country post-conflict. Rehabilitation primarily refers to grassroots 
level work, including education and employment of combatants, resettlement and 
reintegration of refugees, trauma-sensitive care for people victimized by war, and 
unification of opposing parties through mutual interests, such as local governance 
or environmental restoration (Kuchinsky 1999). 
Security: safety from violence or physical harm, used in reference to third 
party agents (such as UN peacekeepers or NGO staff), or to conditions of society 
at the local, national or global scale. Renner (1999) adds that “human security”, 
security at the societal level, must be common and comprehensive. For one party 
to feel secure, all parties must feel secure and in all aspects of life, including 
“non-military factors such as social inequity, poverty, environmental degradation 
and migratory pressures” (p. 48). 
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1960: Independence from colonial rule; creation of an optimistic new democracy.
1963: Border dispute with Kenya over northern regions of the country largely 
inhabited by Somalis.
1964: Border dispute with Ethiopia over Ogaden territory formerly seized from 
Somalia during WWII (see figure 5.2). Relations tense with the West, 
inspired largely by their support of Ethiopia and Kenya.
1969: Siad Barre of the Darod clan, assumes power after military coup; declares 
Somalia a socialist state. “Widespread corruption fueled by a large influx 
of foreign aid, arousing the envy of other clans” (“Somalia Conflict 
History” 2008, para 1).
1974-75: Severe drought and famine causes great human suffering and attracts 
international attention. International aid fails to reduce suffering; support 
government corruption (Abley 1997). 
1978-79: Ogaden War (violent conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia); influx of 
Western aid agencies help with Ethiopian refugees into Somalia.
1980s: After the Soviet Union build up relations with Ethiopia, U.S. seeks to 
foster alliances with Somalia through the use of military and economic 
aid.
1987: Economic collapse and repression leads several clan-based groups 
(including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the Somali 
National Movement (SNM), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and 
the United Somali Congress (USC)) to violent rebellion lasting four years 
(Elmi 2009). 
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1991: Siad Barre overthrown, forced into exile, resulting in a anarchic power 
vacuum. Thousands of civilians killed in conflict between rival clan 
leaders, Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed. Somaliland 
declares independence from Somalia. 
1992: UN deploys peacekeeping troops, initially for impartial conflict 
management, later in active pursuit of General Aidid. Attacks on UN and 
NGO aid workers (AP, Reuter 1992). 
1993: Now infamous U.S. Operation Blackhawk results in the death of 18 U.S. 
soldiers, including one iconically dragged through the streets. “Somalia 
[becomes] a symbol of a failed UN post-Cold War peacekeeping effort” 
(Karns 2004, p. 279). 
1995: Second UN mission in Somalia withdraws. A series of peace talks between 
warlords begin, and last for the next five years. 
2000: Arta peace agreement: Abdikassim Salat Hassan appointed president as a 
Transitional National Government (TNG). Fuels violence by clan-based 
leaders who protest the decision for the next two years.
2002: Cease fire achieved by Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD); peace talks initiated.
2004: Parliament constructed of representatives from each clan. 
2006: Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed elected president; prime minister Ali Muhammed 
Geedi appointed => Transitional Federal Government (TFG), a fragile 
peace divided with the president and prime minister on the one side, and 
the parliamentary speaker and a coalition of faction leaders on the other. 
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Fighting breaks out between the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and the 
TFG, with the U.S. supporting the UIC. By June, a cease fire is declared; 
in July, Ethiopian troops enter in support of the TFG which creates 
resentment among UIC. By December, the TFG and Ethiopian troops 
defeat the UIC; power politics become clan-centered again. 
2007: African Union initiates a peacekeeping mission; seen by UIC leaders as 
enemy forces. A new faction is formed, the Alliance for the Re-liberation 
of Somalia (ARS). When Ethiopian troops are reinforced, hundreds 
protest; Ethiopian troops “fire on protesters and radio stations [are] later 
closed in crackdown on media” (“Somalia Conflict History” 2008, para 8).
2008: UN-led peace talks begin between TFG and ARS; Djibouti agreement 
mandates cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. Both 
ARS and TFG independently fragment. An Islamist militant group al-
Shabaab begins to gain power in the southern regions of Somalia. 
2009: Ethiopian troops leave, inspiring “celebration in the streets” (Inside Story 
2008). Many see this as a turning point, yet violence in Mogadishu continues to 
escalate. Fighting intensifies between the African Union and al-Shabaab. 
2010: Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam insurgents begin “a new offensive to topple 
the TFG” (“Somalia: Stop War Crimes” 2011). The TFG on a growth plan 
with the international community, with objectives to reduce corruption and 
increase power-sharing with other clans. 
2011: Violence continues between the African Union and al-Shabaab in 
Mogadishu. Fighting also intensifies near Kenyan and Ethiopian borders; 
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Ethiopia sides with the TFG while Kenya rules to prohibit immigration. 
Human Rights Watch accuses all parties of attacks on civilians, and finds 
al-Shabaab guilty of using child soldiers. Piracy at sea reaches an all-time 
high. TFG “unilaterally announces plans to postpone elections until 2012” 
(International Crisis Group). Relations tense between Somalia and the 
self-declared independent republics of Puntland and Jubaland (Stevenson 
2007). 
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1960: Independence from French colonization; stability and economic growth in 
the first twenty years of the new democracy had people talking about “the 
Ivoirian miracle” (Little 2011). Influx of immigrants from neighboring 
countries, including Liberia, Burkina Faso. 
1980s: Economic decline and growing political tensions. 
1993: New president, Henry Konan Bedie, introduces policies of ivoirité, which 
distinguish between citizens of Cote d'Ivoire and immigrants
1995: Bedie wins an election boycotted by two main opposition groups: the 
Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) led by Laurent Gbagbo and the Rally of the 
Republicans (RDR) led by Alassane Ouattara
1998: Corrupt governance leads to the suspension of economic aid from EU, 
World Bank, and IMF
2000: Supreme Court rules many candidate ineligible for election: Ouattara (per 
ivoirité) and Bedie (unable to “prove his mental and physical fitness”); 
after Guei declares himself winner, FPI stages protests; Guei flees and 
Gbagbo takes office (“Cote d'Ivoire Conflict History” 2010).
2001: Failed coup attempt two months into Gbagbo's term; Gbagbo continues 
“Bedie's ivoirité policies, favoring largely-southern, 'pure' FPI supporters 
at the expense of largely-northern, mixed-heritage supporters of the RDR” 
(ibid)
2002: Violent rebellion breaks out, splitting the country in two: northern region 
controlled by Ouattara's RDR, Southern half controlled by Gbagbo and the 
FPI; the opposition group MPCI (Patriotic Movement of Cote d'Ivoire) 
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found responsible for the initial attacks; open fighting between the MPCI 
and the government continues even after a cease fire is signed; two new 
youth movements emerge, which consolidate efforts as Forces Nouvelles 
(FN). 
2003: Paris peace accord seeks to de-escalate violence and address underlying 
issues rooted in policies of ivoirité; government of national unity includes 
both FPI (with Gbagbo as president) and MPCI; nonetheless, political 
tensions rise, and violence continues. 
2004: Violence continues, high civilian casualties; Accra III agreement sets “a 
timetable for political reform and disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration”; tensions over rebel disarmament cause further violence 
(Bariyo 2007). 
2005: As violence continues, elections scheduled for 2005 are postponed, and 
Gbagbo's term is extended. 
2007: Peace agreement signed between Gbagbo and FN leader, Guillaume Soro 
includes “demilitarization and disarmament, political amnesties, and 
moves towards new presidential elections” (“Cote d'Ivoire Conflict 
History” 2010); Soro named prime minister; buffer zone lifted between the 
north and south. 
2008-09: Relative peace; elections postponed, waiting on completion of 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
2010: On October 31, elections held between fourteen candidates produce no 
clear winner (Gbagbo 38%, Ouattara 32%); run-off elections on November 
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28; “both parties allege fraud, intimidation” (“Crisis Watch” 2011); clashes 
between riot police and Ouattara supporters; curfew imposed; insurgent 
troops deployed from the north.
2011: 
   January: Electoral Commission rules Ouattara the leader; pro-FPI 
Constitutional Commission rules Gbagbo the leader; the international 
community recognizes Ouattara as the rightful leader; more than 170 
people killed; at least 15,000 refugees flee to Liberia; reports of human 
rights violations, alleged mass graves, threats of civil war.
   February: Gbagbo still refusing to step down; at least 260 people killed; UN 
deploys 2,000 additional peacekeepers for a total of 11,000 troops; 
“allegations that armed forces, militia groups are recruiting, arming 
respective ethnic groups” (“Crisis Watch” 2011); international community 
fears decline into civil war or genocide (AFP 2010).
    March: Gbagbo still claims power; FPI (supporting Gbagbo) and FN 
(supporting Ouattara) clash in Abidjan;  an estimated 38,000 internally 
displaced persons (IDPs); AU panel meets confidentially with Gbagbo and 
Ouattara.
    April: Violence escalates between FPI and FN, use of “heavy weaponry... in 
densely populated civilian areas” (Inside Story 2011); “reports of sexual 
violence, summary executions, individuals burnt alive and heavy fighting 
across the country” (“Crisis Watch” 2011); new Ouattara-led opposition 
force FPCI (Forces Republicanes de Cote d'Ivoire). 
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    May: FPCI troops raid Gbagbo's home and arrest him; Ouattara “orders all 
troops to... end attacks, restore stability” (ibid); “signs of split in pro-
Ouattara coalition... between mainly northern FPCI and Abidjan-based” 
troops. 
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Care International http://www.care.org/
Caritas Internationalis www.caritas.org/
Carter Center www.cartercenter.org/
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammernarbeit (GIZ)
http://www.giz.de/en/home.html
Horn Relief www.hornrelief.org/ 
International Rescue Committee www.rescue.org/
Interpeace www.interpeace.org/
Medecins Sans Frontieres www.msf.org/
Mercy Corps www.mercycorps.org/
World Vision www.wvi.org/
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